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INTRODUCTION 
When a Navajo tribal member commits a serious felony against another 
Navajo on the remote Navajo Indian Reservation, the crime sets in motion 
not a tribal criminal investigation and tribal court proceeding, but a federal 
investigation and federal court proceeding under the federal Major Crimes 
Act.1 For trial, the Navajo defendant, the Navajo victim, and the witnesses 
(all of whom are also likely to be Navajo) will be summoned to a federal 
district court far away from the reservation and the specific community 
where the crime occurred. Unlike a felony involving only non-Indians, 
which would be routinely adjudicated at the local county or district court­
house, the Navajo felony will be tried in a distant federal court in Phoenix, 
Salt Lake City, or Albuquerque. 2 
The federal court operates in a language that is foreign to many Navajos; 
thus the Navajo defendants, victims, and witnesses may require interpreters 
to translate the proceedings. Neither the judge, the court reporter, the prose­
cutor, 3 the court security officers, the deputy marshals, nor the defense 
1 .  1 8  U.S.C. § 1 153 (2000). Even if tribal police investigate the offense, the tribal police 
may very well be acting with federal funding, administering a federal responsibility, and acting, in 
effect, as federal agents. See, e.g., Indian Law Enforcement Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 1 0 1 -379, 104 
Stat. 473 ( 1990) (codified primarily at 25 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2809 (2000)). 
2.  D epending in part on the precise location where the crime occurred and in part on the 
pleasure of the federal judge assigned to hear the matter, such a case might also be tried in Prescott, 
Arizona, or Santa Fe, New Mexico, though these locations are also substantially distant from the 
Navajo reservation. 
3. The Navajo Nation is the second largest Indian tribe in the United States. It has a legal 
culture so well established that it has long had its own bar examination and a court system with 
numerous district courts and a supreme court that, together, hear tens of thousands civil and misde­
meanor cases each year. See HARVARD LAW SCH., NAVAJO NATION COURTS (2004), 
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attorney or investigator are likely to be Navajo or even understand or speak 
the Navajo language. Perhaps even more importantly, the federal jury that 
hears the evidence is unlikely to include a Navajo, or even an Indian, or any 
other member of the community where the crime occurred.
4 
While the Navajo Nation provides a compelling example of such alien­
ation because it ranges across three states and is inhabited by more than 
180,000 people in hundreds of distinct Indian communities, this federal 
criminal justice regime spans more than one hundred Indian reservations 
across the United States and involves thousands of federal cases opened 
each year within "Indian country" as that term is defined by federal law.
5 
Thus, similar circumstances can be described for many other Indian tribes 
and their reservations, such as the Jicarilla Apache in northern New Mexico, 
the Hualapi who live adjacent to the Grand Canyon in Arizona, the Red 
Lake Chippewa in northern Minnesota, or the various Chippewa and Po­
tawatomi tribes in Michigan's upper peninsula. 
Serious practical problems arise by virtue of the vast distances between 
some Indian reservations and the federal courts that serve them. Consider, 
for example, the challenge facing a victim or witness from the Red Lake 
Band of Ojibwe Reservation near the Canadian border in northern Minne­
sota who may be required by federal summons to travel 250 miles or more 
of back roads and highways to reach federal court in St. Paul or Minneapo­
lis, Minnesota. 6 While such distances would be daunting to anyone, 
residents of Indian reservations (and certainly victims and witnesses to vio­
lent crime) tend to have incomes well below the poverty level.7 It is fair to 
assume that most reservation residents drive vehicles consistent with their 
respective income levels.8 Indeed, the "Indian car" has become nearly as 
http://lapahie.com/courts.cfm. Yet not one of the dozens of federal prosecutors who prosecute all of 
the federal felonies from the Navajo reservation is a Navajo tribal member. 
4. See, e.g., United States v. Footracer, 189 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 1 999) (holding that the 
transfer of a case to a district court division with a much lower percentage of American Indians did 
not deprive defendant of a jury representing a fair cross-section of the community); United States v. 
Etsitty, 1 30 F.3d 420, 425-26 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding no evidence of discriminatory jury selection 
in this case but noting in dicta that the systematic transfer of cases to district court divisions with 
lower percentages of American Indians might result in the discriminatory exclusion of American 
Indians); United States v. Turcotte, 558 F.2d 893, 895 (8th Cir. 1 977) (noting that there were no 
American Indians on the jury, although defendant failed to prove discrimination in the jury selection 
system). 
5. See 1 8  U.S.C. § 1 1 5 1  (2000). 
6. The distance from the Red Lake Reservation to Minneapolis is approximately 250 miles 
and might take nearly six hours even with good road conditions. Similarly, the Fort Peck Reserva­
tion is nearly 300 miles from the federal courts in either Great Falls or Billings, and both drives 
could easily take six hours in good weather. See ROBERT N. CLINTON ET AL., AMERICAN INDIAN 
LAW: NATIVE NATIONS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 657--62 (4th ed. 2004). 
7. Low income is correlated with a high rate of violent crime victimization for American 
Indians. STEVEN w. PERRY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, AMERICAN INDIANS AND CRIME: A BJS STATIS­
TICAL PROFILE, 1 992-2002, at 5 (2004), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/ 
aic02.pdf; see also LAWRENCE A. GREENFELD & STEVEN K. SMITH, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 
AMERICAN INDIANS & CRIME 5 ( 1 999), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/aic.pdf. 
8. In 1999, 4 1 .5% of the residents of the Navajo Nation, for example, had household in­
comes of less than $ 14,999. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, PROFILE OF SELECTED EcONOMIC 
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fabled today as the Plains Indian pony was in the past, but for vastly differ­
ent reasons.
9 
In sum, a witness in an Indian country case may be facing a five-hour 
or longer drive in an untrustworthy vehicle in a northern winter with noth­
ing to look forward to but being forced to speak in public in front of a 
large group of non-Indian strangers, or being forced to endure a painful 
cross-examination in which her motives and perhaps her character will be 
questioned. IO Consider also the unfortunate federal prosecutor11 or defense 
attorney: a harried trial attorney working hard to marshal the evidence in a 
criminal case while nervously looking out the window of the federal court­
house (at falling snow in Minneapolis in winter or the scorching desert 
terrain in Arizona in the summer time) and desperately hoping that her 
witnesses appear on time to testify. 
12 
As a result of a series of federal statutes, felony criminal justice is pri­
marily a federal responsibility on hundreds of Indian reservations in the 
Southeast, the Midwest, and throughout the western United States.13 Though 
the problems identified above are simple, practical obstacles to effective 
CHARACTERISTICS: NAVAJO NATION RESERVATION AND OFF-RESERVATION TRUST LAND 3 (2000), 
available at http://censtats.census.gov/data/US/2502430.pdf. Likewise, 32.3% of residents of the 
Fort Peck Reservation and 34.6% of residents of the Red Lake Reservation earned household in­
comes of less than $ 14,999 in 1 999. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, PROALE Of SELECTED EcoNOMIC 
CHARACTERISTICS: 2000: GEOGRAPHIC AREA: FORT PECK RESERVATION AND OFF-RESERVATION 
TRUST LAND 3 (2000), available at http://centstats.census.gov/data/US/2501250.pdf. 
9. The phrase "Indian cat" has become a term of art in Indian country, and was immortal­
ized in a song by the same name by Bois Forte Chippewa recording artist Keith Secola and his Wild 
Band of Indians. KEITH SECOLA AND THE WILD BAND OF INDIANS, Indian Car, on CIRCLE (Nor­
mal/ Akina Records 1992). In the song, Secola describes the stereotypical Indian car: "My car is 
dented, the radiator steams I Head light don't work, radio can scream I Got a sticker, says "Indian 
power" I On my bumper, holds my cat together." The 1 999 Miramax film release Smoke Signals 
features an Indian car that can only drive in reverse, derived from a Sherman Alexie story. SHERMAN 
ALEXIE, THE LONE RANGER AND TONTO FISTAGHT IN HEAVEN 1 56 (HatperPerennial 1994) ( 1 993); 
SMOKE SIGNALS (Miramax 1998). In sum, the Indian cat is generally considered far less reliable 
than the Indian pony of the nineteenth century. 
IO. American Indians age twelve and over are victims of rape and sexual assault at a rate 
nearly four times that of all races (seven Indian victims per 1000, compared to two victims per 1000 
for all races). GREENFELD & SMITH, supra note 7, at 3.  
1 1 . As a practical matter, federal prosecutors in such cases rely heavily on victim/witness 
coordinators, often tribal members themselves, who work in the United States Attorneys' Offices. 
Victim/witness coordinators provide a host of duties to prosecutors and crime victims. One of the 
most basic is to ensure that Indian victims and witnesses are provided transportation and accommo­
dations so that they can appear for trial. The victim/witness coordinators are vital to the federal 
prosecutors, and most cases that go to trial would not be successful without their hard work, their 
careful logistical planning, and the supportive bond they form with the Indian victims and witnesses. 
For a description of the role these employees play, see generally U.S DEP'T OF JUSTICE, VICTIMS 
AND WITNESSES: UNDERSTANDING YOUR RIGHTS AND THE FEDERAL COURT SYSTEM (2002), avail­
able at http://www.justice.gov/usao/alm/LECC/VW _Rights.htm. 
1 2. Larry EchoHawk, Child Sexual Abuse in Indian Country: ls the Guardian Keeping in 
Mind the Seventh Generation ?, 5 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & Pus. PoL'Y 83, 99 (200 1 )  ("[T]ravel time [in 
federal Indian country cases] is often three or four hours or more. When witnesses have to travel far 
to give testimony, they sometimes do not show up."). 
1 3 . On some reservations in so-called Public Law 280 states, this responsibility is a state and 
local one. See generally Carol E. Goldberg, Public Law 280: The Limits of State Jurisdiction over 
Reservation Indians, 22 UCLA L. REV. 535 ( 1975). 
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criminal justice, they may represent problems that are far more serious. In 
the United States, criminal justice is an inherently local activity as a matter 
of constitutional design; American criminal justice systems are carefully 
designed to empower local communities to solve internal problems and to 
restore peace and harmony in the community. Viewed in this light, many of 
the practical problems outlined above, and more serious ones discussed be­
low, may represent violations of fundamental constitutional norms. In short, 
federal justice in Indian country simply may not accord with many of the 
basic legal principles that guide American courts, prosecutors, and law en­
forcement officials. 
Consider some of the most obvious questions raised by a federal Indian 
country prosecution: Does an Indian defendant receive a trial by a jury of 
his peers when he faces a federal jury in a distant city composed of non­
Indians who are foreign to the Indian community, who may very well speak 
a different language and who are subject to a different set of laws and a dif­
ferent process for adjudicating them? Does an Indian community have a 
voice in issues of public safety when its local felonies are prosecuted, de­
fended, and adjudicated in distant and foreign tribunals by federal officials 
who are not accountable to tribal leaders or the community? Are basic re­
quirements of fairness and due process met when defendants, crime victims, 
and witnesses are summoned to court hundreds of miles away to testify 
about simple but serious local crimes that occurred in their own backyards? 
Can a community enjoy its right to a "public trial" when a local crime is 
adjudicated in a non-televised trial hundreds of miles away in a city that is 
difficult to reach from the reservation? As these questions suggest,14 the fed­
eral Indian country criminal justice scheme is subject to a host of criticisms 
derived from implicit constitutional values of federalism and localism and 
explicit constitutional requirements of criminal procedure. 
Among the chief sources of criticism of the federal Indian country 
criminal justice system is the prevalence of crime against Indians.15 Indians 
are far more likely than members of all other major racial classes to be victims 
of violent crime. An American Indian or Alaska Native is two-and-a-half 
times more likely than a member of the general public to be a victim of vio­
lent crime and twice as likely as an African American.16 From 1992 through 
2001, the average annual rate of violent victimizations among Indians was 
14. This list of questions leaves out a host of equal protection questions potentially raised by 
prosecutions in Indian country, such as disparities between federal and state sentences for identical 
offenses based on the racial identities of the perpetrators and victims. The Supreme Court has gen­
erally indicated that equal protection claims premised on race are not salient in Indian law given the 
unique political status of Indians and Indian tribes recognized in the Constitution. See United States 
v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641 ( 1977). 
15 .  For an extensive review of then-existing research in involving Indians and crime, see 
DAVID LESTER, CRIME AND THE NATIVE AMERICAN ( 1999). Lester challenges research studies as­
serting that Indians commit crime more than other minority groups, but does not address the 
assertions that Indians are victimized at higher rates. See generally also RoNET BACHMAN, DEATH 
AND VIOLENCE ON THE RESERVATION ( 1992). 
16. PERRY, supra note 7 at 5-6. 
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10 1 per 1,000 residents twelve years of age and older.17 This compares to 
fifty violent victimizations per 1,000 blacks, forty-one per 1,000 whites and 
twenty-two per 1,000 Asians.18 Sexual offenses against women and children 
are especially serious problems in Indian country.19 
In discussing the high crime rates on Indian reservations, academics 
fault federal prosecutors and law enforcement agents who are accused of 
declining meritorious prosecutions, particularly of non-Indian offenders. 
Congress has found fault too, but has treated the issue as a resource alloca­
tion problem. In recent years, Congress has dramatically increased funding 
and positions for federal prosecutors and FBI agents who work these 
cases. But the problems that exist in Indian country criminal justice may 
be far deeper than a lack of enthusiasm by federal prosecutors or an insuf­
ficient number of federal prosecutors and investigators to perform the 
tasks. It may stem from structural problems in the system. 
For thirty-five years, federal policymakers have moved more and more 
decisively in the context of Indian law and policy toward an approach that 
fosters "tribal self-determination" and have sought to restore the powers of 
tribal governments. As a result of the advance of federal Indian policy, the 
federal criminal justice system in Indian country no longer rests comfortably 
within the mainstream of federal Indian policy. To some degree it seems to 
be a relic, perhaps, of colonialism. While the notion of community "self­
determination" has been enthusiastically embraced only fairly recently in 
federal Indian policy, it is a long-standing and hallowed norm in American 
criminal justice. Indeed, many of the key institutions of the federal criminal 
justice system, such as juries, were designed to assure community control of 
criminal justice. Given that American criminal justice is designed in many 
respects to build in "self-determination" as its own guiding principle, it is 
perhaps ironic that criminal justice in Indian country has been resistant to 
such notions. 
Thus, rather than challenging the existing system on the grounds that it 
is inconsistent with federal Indian policy, this Article instead asks a more 
fundamental question: is this federal criminal justice system consistent 
with its own prevailing norms? In other words, this Article evaluates the 
federal Indian country criminal justice regime, not against norms of Indian 
law and policy, but against those of criminal law and policy. Specifically, 
this Article evaluates the federal constitutional norms that lie at the heart 
of American criminal justice and that are designed to ensure the legitimacy 
of federal criminal trials. Toward that end, Part I presents a critical de­
scription of key facets of the federal Indian country criminal justice 
system. Part II begins the critical evaluation by evaluating a key institu­
tional player in the federal system, the federal prosecutor. It highlights the 
17. Id. 
18. Id. 
19. PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FULL REPORT ON THE 
PREVALENCE, INCIDENCE, AND CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 21-23 (2000), 
available at http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles l/nij/183781.pdf. 
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handicaps faced by federal prosecutors in Indian country prosecutions and 
questions whether prosecutorial discretion can be exercised appropriately 
when "outsiders" prosecute local crimes in Indian country. Part III focuses 
on another key institution in criminal justice, the jury. It describes the role 
that juries serve in American criminal justice and explains why federal 
juries in Indian country cases cannot perform some of these functions, 
leaving them inadequate under the Sixth Amendment. Part IV turns to the 
somewhat related topics of venue and the right to a public trial, examining 
whether the existing Major Crimes Act system is consistent with prevail­
ing First Amendment values of public access and general constitutional 
principles of venue and vicinage in criminal cases. 
I. THE MODERN STRUCTURE AND PROCESS OF 
INDIAN COUNTRY CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
A brief introduction to the current contours of criminal justice in Indian 
country, and a critical description of the process from the viewpoint of the 
Indian community is helpful to understanding the complex problems that the 
system must address. 
A. A Legal Description of the Indian Country Regime 
The federal Indian country criminal justice regime consists primarily 
of a trio of federal laws that create a complex jurisdictional framework.20 
The first of the three statutes is 1 8  U.S.C. § 1 1 5 1, which defines no of­
fenses but merely sets forth the geographic scope of federal Indian country 
jurisdiction. Literally defining the term "Indian country," § 1 1 5 1  demar­
cates federal jurisdiction as extending to all lands within Indian 
reservations as well as so-called "dependent Indian communities" and al­
lotments to which the Indian titles have not been extinguished.21 While 
interpretation of the statute is relatively straightforward, recent cases have 
imposed a distinct judicial gloss that has both expanded and narrowed the 
scope of the plain language in significant ways. For example, the Tenth 
Circuit has held that Indian country includes some federal trust lands that 
20. The entire scheme is set out in much greater detail in Robert N. Clinton, Criminal Juris­
diction Over Indian Lands: A Journey Through a Jurisdictional Maze, 18 ARIZ. L. REV. 503 (1976). 
The United States Code defines a handful of other offenses related to highly specific subjects, such 
as intoxicating liquors, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1154-56 (2000), gambling, 18 U.S.C. § 1166 (2000), and 
unauthorized hunting, 18 U.S.C. § 1165 (2000), but these offenses are rarely prosecuted. 
21. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2000) provides: 
Except as otherwise provided in sections 1154 and 1156 of this title, the term "Indian country", 
as used in this chapter, means (a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the 
jurisdiction of the United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and, 
including rights-of-way running through the reservation, (b) all dependent Indian communities 
within the borders of the United States whether within the original or subsequently acquired 
territory thereof, and whether within or without the limits of a State, and (c) all Indian allot­
ments, the Indian titles to which have not been extinguished, including rights-of-way running 
through the same. 
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do not otherwise fit neatly within the three categories set forth in the stat-
22 ute. In contrast, the Supreme Court has so narrowly defined the second 
category, "dependent Indian communities," that the phrase would no 
longer seem to apply to those communities that originally gave the phrase • • 23 its meaning. 
The other two key statutes are the Major Crimes Act, set forth at 18 
U.S.C. § 1153 and another statute known variously as the Indian Country 
Crimes Act or the General Crimes Act24 (the latter will be used here, in 
contradistinction to "Major Crimes Act"). The General Crimes Act pro­
vides that the general federal laws enacted to apply to locations within 
exclusive jurisdiction of the federal government, also known generally as 
the federal enclaves laws, apply in Indian country. One of the federal en­
claves laws, the Assimilative Crimes Act,25 provides that any state criminal 
law of the state in which the lands are located can be assimilated if there is 
no federal criminal law on point. Because of this provision, the General 
Crimes Act allows a federal prosecution for virtually any conceivable of­
fense, whether misdemeanor or felony. 
While the General Crimes Act appears tremendously broad, it has 
some limitations. First, as a matter of federalism, federal courts have held 
that the law may not be used to prosecute a crime in which no Indians are 
involved.26 As a result, the General Crimes Act may be used to prosecute a 
non-Indian only if the non-Indian has committed a crime against an In­
dian. Second, the General Crimes Act explicitly excludes offenses by one 
Indian against another. Thus, a prosecution against an Indian under the 
General Crimes Act is available only if the Indian commits a crime against 
a non-Indian. The General Crimes Act existed before the Major Crimes 
22. See Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450, 453 n.2 (1995) (using term 
"informal reservation"); United States v. Roberts, 185 F.3d 1125, 1129-31 (10th Cir. 1999) (declar­
ing that Indian Country jurisdiction extends over tribal lands held in trust by the federal government, 
even though such land is not within an Indian reservation, is not an allotment, and does not techni­
cally meet the definition of "dependent Indian community"). 
23. Compare Alaska v. Native Viii. of Venetie Tribal Gov't, 522 U.S. 520 (1998), with 
United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28 (1913). See also Kristen A. Carpenter, Interpreting Indian 
Country in State of Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie, 3 5  TULSA L.J. 73 (1999) (criticizing the 
Venetie decision's narrow interpretation of the term). 
24. Section 1152 declares: 
Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the general laws of the United States as to the 
punishment of offenses committed in any place within the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of 
the United States, except the District of Columbia, shall extend to the Indian country. 
This section shall not extend to offenses committed by one Indian against the person or prop­
erty of another Indian, nor to any Indian committing any offense in the Indian country who has 
been punished by the local law of the tribe, or to any case where, by treaty stipulations, the ex­
clusive jurisdiction over such offenses is or may be secured to the Indian tribes respectively. 
18 U.S.C. § 1152 (2000). 
25. 18 u.s.c. § 13 (2000). 
26. See United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621 (1882) (providing that if a non-Indian 
commits a crime against another non-Indian, then the state has exclusive jurisdiction because there 
is no federal interest in the case). 
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Act and originally arose as a way to address conflict between Indians and 
settlers and to federalize protection of each against one another. 27 
The Major Crimes Act addressed this second limitation. As a matter of 
respect for the sovereignty of Indian tribes, Congress never applied the 
General Crimes Act to offenses between Indians.28 In the Major Crimes 
Act, however, Congress gave federal prosecutors authority to prosecute 
certain "major" crimes by Indians against Indians or others. The Major 
Crimes Act thus intruded into an area of exclusive tribal sovereignty and 
made federal law enforcement officers the primary agents for adjudicating 
serious crimes on Indian reservations. 
Viewed together, the Indian country definition, the Major Crimes Act, 
and the General Crimes Act constitute the jurisdictional apparatus for 
bringing criminal cases in Indian country into federal court. None of these 
laws, however, provides the substantive offenses to which they refer. The 
substantive definitions must be found elsewhere in the criminal code and, 
if the Assimilative Crimes Act is used, in state law. This means, of course, 
that the serious crimes in Indian country are defined by federal and state 
officials, not by tribal officials. 
Complementing this trio of federal statutes is the Indian Civil Rights 
Act. That Act strips tribes of jurisdiction over crimes punished by sen­
tences greater than one year of imprisonment or a fine of more than 
$5000.29 As a result, tribes may define and prosecute any offense, but be­
cause of the sentencing limitation, tribal offenses would be labeled 
federally as misdemeanors. As a result, though many tribes have active 
criminal court dockets, only the federal government-and not tribes-can 
address serious crimes with felony sentences. The Indian Civil Rights Act 
thus has the effect of elevating the importance of the federal criminal jus­
tice regime in Indian country and giving it primacy. 
27. See Clinton, supra note 20, at 537. 
28. Thus, while most of the Indian law and policy criticisms of the Major Crimes Act set 
forth above do not apply to prosecutions under the General Crimes Act, many of the criticisms from 
the standpoint of constitutional criminal procedure set forth below will apply. 
29. 25 u.s.c. § 1302 (2000). 
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The FB I has investigative jurisdiction over all the crimes listed in the 
Major Crimes Act.31 However, Indian country cases differ in several respects 
from most other crimes investigated by the FB I. First, the cases are almost 
always reactive. That is, a crime occurs and is then investigated by federal 
law enforcement. In most cases, it is a singular event and not part of an on­
going criminal enterprise. Few proactive investigations occur in Indian 
country. As a result, few sophisticated law enforcement tools are used at the 
field level in Indian country. It is exceedingly rare, for example, for Indian 
country FB I agents to employ wiretaps, to execute trap and trace or pen reg­
ister subpoenas on phone companies, or to work with informants who have 
infiltrated a criminal organization. Indeed, undercover operations are espe­
cially rare, partially because of the great difficulty outsiders have infiltrating 
criminal organizations in Indian communities. With the exception of an oc­
casional polygraph exam or DNA or fingerprint analysis, Indian country 
cases call on few of the specialized skills of the FB I. 
Second, though the offenses are "major" and often tremendously impor­
tant in the communities where these crimes occur, almost all of the crimes 
are routine, local and simple cases involving violent crimes that, in another 
context, would be characterized as "common street crimes" and that would 
not be investigated by federal officials but for the Indian country nexus. 
Given the FB I's many other responsibilities, such as counterintelligence, 
terrorism prevention, and the investigation of other serious offenses, such as 
organized crime and complex narcotics conspiracies, Indian country crimes 
rarely rank high among the FB I's priorities. As a result, the moniker "major" 
is somewhat misleading as an expression of FB I interest and prioritization. 
The routine and unsophisticated character of these cases has ramifica­
tions at both the organizational and the individual level. At the 
organizational level, few FB I agents are assigned to Indian country investi­
gations. In contrast to the team approach that prevails in many FB I 
30. The authority for this section of the Article, except where otherwise noted, is the author's 
own admittedly subjective viewpoint derived from his experience as a federal prosecutor in an In­
dian country district and from conversations with other former and current Indian country federal 
prosecutors, such as Norman Bay (D.N.M.), Kathleen Bliss (D. Nev.), Chris Chaney (D. Utah), Jeff 
Davis (W.D. Mich.), Jonathon Gerson (D.N.M.), Tom Heffelfinger (D. Minn), Diane Humetewa (D. 
Ariz.), Joseph Lodge (D. Ariz.), Arvo Mikkanen. (W.D. Okla.), Cliff Wardlaw (D. Minn.), and Sam 
Winder (D.N.M.). It also reflects impressions gained from several federal public defenders, such as 
John Butcher (D.N.M.), Vito De La Cruz (D. Nev.), Michael Keefe (D.N.M.), John Rhodes (D. 
Mont.), and Jon Sands (D. Ariz.). Finally, this section also reflects my impressions gained from 
conversations with several FBI agents, such as Special Agent Frank Chimits. While facts were 
gleaned from my own experience and each of these conversations, some of the officials named 
above would disagree strongly with the conclusions I have drawn. I imply no endorsement. 
31. See U.S. DEP' T OF JUSTIC, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL: nTLE 9, CRIMINAL 
RESOURCE MANUAL §§ 675-76, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/ 
usam/title9/download.htm [hereinafter U.S. Arr'ys' MANUAL] (setting forth authority for federal 
law enforcement in Indian country within Memorandum of Understanding between the United 
States Department of the Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs and the United States Department of 
Justice, Federal Bureau oflnvestigation in November 1 993). 
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investigations, the agent handling Indian country investigations often works 
alone in rural settings and may travel hundreds of miles of reservation roads 
in the course of a week's work.3 2  Because of the high caseload that each 
agent bears, agents often work together only when crucial to personal 
safety.33 As a result, the individual FB I agent may find such work lonely, 
dull, or, given the subject matter, even unpleasant.34 To the extent that an 
agent does work with another person, it is often a tribal officer. 
Most Indian country agents work out of small offices called "resident 
agencies" or "R As" which are often staffed with just two or three other 
agents in small cities bordering or near Indian reservations.35 An agent 
posted at an R A  may not have signed up to the FB I expecting to be posted to 
such an out-of-the-way location or to be handling the kind of cases that fill 
the caseload of the average Indian country special agent, such as sexual 
abuse of children. Because Indian country tends not to be a prestigious post­
ing, the agents in the R As are often rookies or "first office agents" who seek 
transfer as soon as they are eligible, leading to sometimes high turnover 
among the FB I personnel dealing with Indian country offenses.36 
The law enforcement arm of the Bureau of Indian Affairs also possesses 
investigative jurisdiction over Indian country offenses.37 Because of the 
overlap in investigative jurisdiction with the FB I, B I A  patrol officers and 
criminal investigators generally handle offenses of less serious magnitude 
than the ones handled by the FB I. One key difference between the FB I and 
the B I A  is that the federal policy of tribal self-governance has taken hold 
within the B I A  law enforcement program. Through agreements with the 
Department of the Interior known as "638 contracts" and "self-governance 
32. Over the years, the FBI has begun several initiatives with local tribal law enforcement 
agencies to address some of these problems. The current initiative is called the "Safe Trails Task 
Forces." Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Indian Country Crime (Oct. 28, 2004), http://www.fbi.gov/ 
hq/cid/indian/safetrails.htm. 
33 .  This is obvious from FBI statistics. In the calendar year 2004, approximately JOO FBI 
agents worked on Indian country cases nationwide. Collectively, they instituted numerous investiga­
tions culminating in approximately 1900 cases. See Grant D. Ashley, Executive Assistant Dir., Fed. 
Bureau of Investigation, Remarks at the National Native American Law Enforcement Association's 
12th Annual Training Conference (Oct. 28, 2004), http://www.fbi.gov/pressrel/speeches/ash­
ley I 02804.htm. 
34. Violent crimes investigations sometimes involve blood spatter, collection of semen, and 
other "blood and guts type" evidence, or, even worse, difficult social and emotional issues, such as 
sex crimes against children. 
35. For example, Indian country RAs are located in Flagstaff and Pinetop, Arizona; Bemidji, 
Minnesota; Gallup and Farmington, New Mexico; and Vernal and Monticello, Utah, among other 
cities. See, e.g., Phoenix Division Regional Offices, http://phoenix.fbi.gov/pxterrit.htm (last visited 
Dec. 17, 2005) (listing RAs in the Arizona area). 
36. According to federal law enforcement lore, Indian country RAs once served a punitive 
role as places to exile FBI agents that fouled up important cases or were otherwise the subject of 
disfavor within the Bureau. See infra note 30. 
3 7. See 25 U.S.C. § 2803 (2000) (BIA law enforcement authority); see also U.S. ATT'vs' 
MANUAL supra note 3 1, §§ 675-76 (including a memorandum of understanding between the United 
States Departments of Justice and Interior reaching agreement that each United States Attorney will 
prepare local guidelines indicating which law enforcement agency has primary jurisdiction and that 
jurisdictional disputes will be resolved, if possible, at the field level). 
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compacts,"38 many tribal governments have undertaken the BIA's law en­
forcement and investigative responsibilities on their reservations. In 
undertaking this responsibility under federal law, a tribal government effec­
tively substitutes its own tribal police for BIA law enforcement (just as BIA 
law enforcement once supplanted tribal law enforcement institutions).39 
Since investigation precedes a criminal prosecution, the "devolution" to 
tribes of this important function can give tribal law enforcement a key role 
in criminal cases. As a result, in some cases involving less serious felony 
offenses, tribal police will work directly with federal prosecutors. 
Because authority for investigation of such crimes overlaps between in­
dependent law enforcement agencies, jurisdictional disputes can develop.40 
Often, uniformed BIA or tribal police arrive on the scene first. The overlap 
in the jurisdictional roles of the FBI and BIA, while sometimes leading to 
conflict, has some advantages to the community in that one agency can in­
vestigate even if another declines to do so.41 
Because alcohol is involved in a substantial number of the crimes in In­
dian country,42 many cases are not difficult to solve. Suspects rarely employ 
sophisticated strategies for covering their tracks. Often the perpetrator is 
known and the most difficult challenge is to locate him and make an arrest. 
On rural parts of reservations that are accessed by dirt roads without street 
signs or visible addresses on the homes, however, effective investigation 
38. See 25 U.S.C. § 450(1) (Supp. V 1 975) and 25 C.F.R. § 27 1 ( 1 996). Although neither 
BIA officials nor the tribes were particularly happy with practical implementation of the 638 con­
tract program, the regime was hampered by the Byzantine bureaucracy of the BIA, which 
compartmentalized functions in a manner that frustrated flexibility among those providing services. 
See Tadd M. Johnson & James Hamilton, Self-Governance for Indian Tribes: From Paternalism to 
Empowerment, 27 CONN. L. REV. 1 25 1 ,  1 264-66 ( 1 995). 
39. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 2804(f) (2000) (recognizing that tribal law enforcement officers 
possess the status of federal officers for certain purposes when working under a 638 contract for law 
enforcement); see also WILLIAM T. HAGAN, INDIAN POLICE AND JUDGES 20-2 1 ( 1 966) (describing 
various traditional tribal law enforcement institutions such as the Cherokee Lighthorsemen). 
40. HAGAN, supra note 39, at 20-22. 
4 1 .  Investigative decisions by Tribal or BIA law enforcement officials not to investigate or 
not to refer a case for prosecution are not decisive because the FBI may independently investigate 
and make its own referral if it deems appropriate. See U.S. Arr'vs' MANUAL, supra note 3 1 ,  
§ §  675-76 (including memorandum indicating that tribal or Interior law enforcement must notify 
the FBI of any decision to decline to investigate a criminal matter falling within the investigative 
authority of either agency). Likewise, investigative decisions by tribal law enforcement officials to 
investigate and refer a case are reviewed by a United States Attorney who can, of course, decline to 
prosecute. Id. 
42. See Christine Zuni Cruz, Four Questions on Critical Race Praxis: Lessons from Two 
Young Lives in Indian Country, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2 1 33, 2 145, 2 1 54 (2005) (noting "oppressive 
force of alcohol in the Native community"); Kathy Helms, Navajo Nation No.I in Crime, INDEP. 
(Gallup, N.M.), Nov. 1 ,  2004, at 2 (quoting Assistant United States Attorney Diane Humetewa, 
"Ninety-nine percent of the cases referred to [the Arizona United States Attorney's Office] involve 
alcohol or substance abuse . . . .  "); see also LAWRENCE PIERSOL ET AL., U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 
REPORT OF THE NATIVE AMERICAN ADVISORY GROUP 35 (2003), available at http://www.ussc.gov/ 
NAAG/NativeAmer.pdf ("Across the board, alcohol plays a significant role in all violent crime 
arising in Indian country."); STEWART WAKELING ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, POLICING ON 
AMERICAN INDIAN RESERVATIONS 19 (2001 )  (noting that alcohol-related crime is the leading crime 
problem in Indian country and explaining the repeated citation of alcohol abuse as a challenge fac­
ing Indian policing and Indian communities in general). 
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may require significant local knowledge of homes and other locations. It 
may also require some knowledge of family ties and social networks in the 
community. Because Indian communities are often relatively closed to 
strangers, federal law enforcement officers such as FB I agents face a sig­
nificant handicap and often find themselves at the mercy of tribal officers. 
Indeed, a tribal police officer that lives in a community is almost certain to 
have stronger contacts and may very well be able to produce information in 
an investigation that a federal agent would never discover. As a result, fed­
eral agents often develop close working relationships with tribal officers. 
After the arrest, federal officers are likely to extract a confession. Con­
fessions seem far more common in federal Indian country cases than in 
other federal cases, such as narcotics cases. While the relative lack of so­
phistication of the criminal defendant and the strength of the evidence may 
occasionally work to help the FB I agent extract a confession, at least one 
commentator has speculated that the tribal values of honesty and of being 
forthright in accepting responsibility for one's actions that disrupted the 
community may also play a role.43 
Once the perpetrator is found (sometimes in tribal custody), federal 
agents must make the arrest (or take custody) and take the perpetrator before 
a United States Magistrate Judge for an initial appearance. Because the 
cases tend to be reactive, it is often at the time of the arrest, or only shortly 
before, that the United States Attorney's Office first learns of the offense. 
The first substantive prosecutorial step in a federal major crimes case is 
review of the evidence and the determination of whether or not to pursue a 
prosecution. Following the arrest, federal prosecutors work with the arrest­
ing officer to prepare a criminal complaint or else direct that the perpetrator 
be released. If the United States Attorney's Office ( "U S AO") decides to pro­
ceed, it will file a criminal complaint. The perpetrator will then be taken to 
the nearest federal court for an initial appearance. During that appearance, 
the federal prosecutor may file a motion for a detention hearing.44 If so, the 
defendant is "bound over" and remains in custody pending the hearing. 
If the defendant is indigent, an attorney will be appointed to represent 
him in later proceedings. A substantial number of Indian country defendants 
are indigent and are represented by the Federal Public Defender or, if that 
office is unavailable or has a conflict, an attorney selected by the court from 
a panel of attorneys on a court-approved list of criminal defense attorneys 
who are willing to take cases under the court's modest fee structure. 
The defense attorney will face several obstacles that may make it diffi­
cult to provide effective representation. At the outset, the defense attorney 
43. Zuni Cruz, supra note 42, at 2 1 56 ("[T]here is a socialization to accountability that oper­
ates in indigenous societies that is not necessarily compatible with the underlying principles of 
American criminal law . . . .  ") .  
44. . See 18 U.S.C. § 3 142(f)(2). A handful of federal districts with substantial Indian reserva­
tion lands have part-time magistrate judges who sit in smaller cities close to Indian reservations who 
serve no other purpose but to preside over initial appearances so that a perpetrator may be bound 
over for a detention hearing. 
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may need an interpreter to communicate with the defendant45 and may face 
significant cultural hurdles in developing a trusting relationship. With lim­
ited resources, the defense attorney may have difficulty investigating a crime 
that occurred a great distance from the court (and the defender's urban of­
fice). Hours of investigative work may be consumed in traveling to and from 
the reservation to search for and interview witnesses. The defense team may 
not have the resources to send an investigator on numerous trips to the res­
ervation. In this respect, there may be striking asymmetry between the 
prosecutors who use agents relatively close to the reservation and defense 
attorneys who lack "resident agency" offices for their investigators. 
Once a defendant has been charged, and following the initial appear­
ance, a defendant commonly appears before a United States Magistrate 
Judge for an arraignment and, if the United States seeks to hold the defen­
dant in custody pending trial, a detention hearing.46 At these preliminary 
stages, the court fills two primary roles. The court identifies the charges that 
the defendant faces and formally advises the defendant of his key procedural 
rights. The second role is risk assessment: the court must measure the likeli­
hood that the defendant will flee or otherwise fail to appear at future 
proceedings, and determine whether release of the defendant "will endanger 
the safety of any other person or the community."47 
The magistrate judge who must make these evaluations is almost certain 
to be a non- Indian who lacks any particular familiarity with the Indian 
community where the defendant was arrested. Moreover, if the court lies at 
a great distance from the community where the crime occurred, it may be 
difficult for the defendant and his attorney to locate and present witnesses 
who can assist the defendant in contesting detention. Often a defendant will 
meet his attorney only a short time before the arraignment and detention 
hearing. Even outside Indian country, such hearings often occur with imper­
fect and incomplete information. In the Indian country context, reliable 
information and witnesses are likely to be even more difficult to obtain. 
In the federal system, no felony prosecution, including those for major 
crimes in Indian country, may proceed without an indictment issued by a 
grand jury.48 Thus, whether or not the defendant is held in detention, the 
45. Federal courts certify Navajo interpreters. Cristina M. Rodriguez, Accommodating lin­
guistic Difference: Toward a Comprehensive Theory of language Rights in the United States, 36 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV . 1 33, 201 n.255 (2001 ). However, some tribal courts routinely proceed in 
their own native languages, other than Navajo, such as Lakota. See, e.g., FRANK POMMERSHEIM, 
BRAID OF FEATHERS 69-70 ( 1 995). This suggests that some federal Indian defendants other than 
Navajos might also benefit from official interpreters. 
46. See 1 8  U.S.C. § 3 1 42 (2000); FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(a). 
47. 1 8  U.S.C. § 3 1 42(c) (2000). 
48. The Fifth Amendment guarantees the right to an indictment: "No person shall be held to 
answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on presentment or indictment of a Grand 
Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in 
time of War or public danger . . . .  " U.S. CONST. amend. V. This guarantee is incorporated into Rule 
6 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which sets forth the method for constituting a grand 
jury and applicable rules, such as the rule of secrecy. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(3)(1 ). However, a criminal 
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United States Atto rney must next present an indictment to the grand jury or 
risk having the case dismissed.49 A federal grand jury consists of up to 
twenty-three citizens selected randomly to serve for a lengthy term-often 
one year, though a longer time is authorized.50 Grand jurors screen and 
evaluate prosecutorial charging decisions by ensuring that the evidence pre­
sented by the prosecutor is sufficient to meet a legal standard of probable 
cause. Though the American criminal justice system uses a grand jury for 
this function primarily to ensure that the community has a role in the ad­
ministration of criminal justice, f ew or none of the grand jurors in most 
Indian country cases actually reside in any Indian country community.51 
As an empirical matter, grand juries usually issue the indictments that 
f ederal prosecutors seek.52 Once the indictment is issued, the defendant will 
be arraigned again on the indictment. The defendant, in consultation with 
his atto rney and in negotiations with federal prosecutors, will decide 
whether to plead guilty or go to trial. If the defendant chooses to go to trial, 
witnesses must be found and served with subpoenas ; they will be required to 
travel to federal court to testify and may be required to wait around a day or 
two to testify, depending on the pace of the trial. 
For reasons that will be addressed fully below,53 the venire from which 
the jury is selected is unlikely to have a single member of the Indian com­
munity in which the crime occurred. At trial, neither the prosecutor, the 
defense attorney, the marshals, nor the court security officers, the court re­
porter, the judge, or law clerks are likely to live within the community 
where the offense occurred. In many cases, the only other tribal member in 
the courtroom will be the interpreter,54 if one is needed, and the witnesses. In 
defendant who cooperates may waive indictment and allow the United States to proceed on the basis 
of an information. FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(b). 
49. FED. R. CRIM. P. 48(b). 
50. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(a), (g). The federal grand jury in districts with large numbers of major 
crimes prosecutions typically meets for one to three days on a monthly or semiweekly basis. 
5 1 .  For a discussion of Indian representation on juries, see infra Section III.B-C. 
52. Lawyers and scholars tend to be skeptical of the importance of the modem grand jury's 
screening power. Many believe that grand jury review represents, at best, "a modest screening 
power, a fact recognized by the familiar courthouse saying that a grand jury would indict a ham 
sandwich if the prosecutor asked it to do so." Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, The Screen­
ing/Bargaining Tradeof , 55 STAN. L. REV. 29, 5 1  n.70 (2002) (citing R. Michael Cassidy, Toward a 
More Independent Grand Jury: Recasting and Enforcing the Prosecutor's Duty to Disclose Exculpa­
tory Evidence, 1 3  GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS, 361 ,  36 1 (2000)). 
53. See infra Section III.B-C. 
54. See Christopher Chaney, Victim Rights in Indian Country-An Assistant United States 
Attorney Perspective, U.S. ATT'Ys' BULL., Jan. 2003 at 36 (noting use of a Navajo/English language 
translator for a nineteen-year-old witness in a typical, though fictional, case). The courts largely 
need interpreters not for the witnesses and the defendant, but for the judge, the jury, the prosecutor, 
the defender, and for purposes of creating a written record. In other words, the interpreter is needed 
for reasons external to the community and precisely because the community's language is not ade­
quate for purposes of the federal court. The need for a translator is thus emblematic of the colonial 
nature of the system; it is designed to inflict an external justice system on communities that have 
existed in the same locale since before English was spoken. 
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that s ens e, the tribu nal may seem ali en to th e defe ndant , a nd he may not fe el 
that he is b eing ju dg ed i n  a ny s ens e by his ow n c ommu nity. 
I f  th e defe nda nt pl eads guilty or is c onvicted at trial , he will pr oceed t o  
s ent enci ng b efor e a federal ju dg e. Th e fe deral judge generally will not b e  
accust omed t o  s eei ng th e ki nd o f  off ens es at issu e i n  th e case, exc ept i n  I n­
dia n  country cas es. B ecause h e  has littl e exp erienc e with similar off ens es 
that occur outside th e res ervati on a nd ar e thus ha ndl ed r outi nely in  stat e 
c ourts , th e judge may w ell have a s kew ed vi ew of th e I ndia n  commu nity 
wh ere  th e crime occurr ed. 
At s ent encing ,  the defe nda nt will b e  s ent enc ed i n  acc or da nce with the 
federal s entenci ng guidelines a nd other fe deral laws , includi ng ma ndat ory 
minimum s ent enc es for certai n crimes .  As a practical matt er,  neither Congr ess 
nor the U. S. S entenci ng Commission have c onsi der ed th e particular effect of 
the sent ences on India n  c ommu nities or I ndia n  c ou ntry defenda nts. ss As a 
r esult , th e s ent enc es may w ell b e  substa ntially l ong er than the av erage s en­
t enc e for a similar off ens e  i n  stat e c ourt. s6 M or eov er, th ough the defe ndant's 
crimi nal rec or d  i n  federal or state c ourts will b e  used t o  calculat e his crimi­
nal hist ory for purp os es of calculati ng th e l ength of his s ent ence, federal 
c ourts usually ig nore th e defe nda nt's crimi nal r ec or ds fr om tribal courts. s7 
O nce th e s ent enc e  is pr onou nc ed, th e fe deral Bur eau of Pris ons will as­
sig n th e defe nda nt to  a particular pris on. Th e pris on is li kely to  b e  l ocated i n  
a diff er ent stat e tha n wher e  the off ens e occurr ed. ss This gr eater r elative dis­
ta nc e  is li kely to  ma ke it much m or e  di fficult for th e defenda nt's chil dr en 
a nd oth er family m embers to  visit him , a pr oblem exac erbated by th e pr e­
vaili ng p ov erty am ong I ndia n  famili es. Th e defe nda nt thus may b ec ome 
ali enat ed fr om his family a nd depriv ed of emoti onal supp ort that oth erwis e 
might hav e helped him survive i ncarc erati on a nd achi eve s ome m easur e of 
rehabilitati on. 
55. PIERSOL, supra note 42; see also Native Am. Advisory Group, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, 
Transcript of Public Hearing at the Judicial Conference Center (Nov. 4, 2003), 
http://www.ussc.gov/NAAG/NAAGhear.pdf [hereinafter Transcript]. 
56. See Transcript, supra note 55. The amount of the disparity depends, of course, on the 
state in which the offense occurred. 
57. See Kevin K. Washburn, Tribal Courts and Federal Sentencing, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 403, 
4 1 4- 1 7  (2004 ); see also Kevin Washburn, Reconsidering the Commission 's Treatment of Tribal 
Courts, 1 7  FED. SENT'G REP. 209, 209 (2005); Jon M. Sands & Jane McClellan, Commentary, Pol­
icy Meets Practice: Why Tribal Convictions Should not be Counted, 1 7  FED. SENT'G REP. 2 1 5  
(2005); Bruce D .  Black, Commentary o n  Reconsidering the Commission 's Treatment of Tribal 
Courts, 1 7  FED. SENT'G REP. 2 1 8  (2005); William C. Canby, Jr., Commentary, Treatment of Tribal 
Court Convictions, 17 FED. SENT'G REP. 220 (2005); Charles Kornmann, Commentary on Recon­
sidering the Commission 's Treatment of Tribal Courts, 1 7  FED. SENT' G REP. 222 (2005). 
58. The problem is exacerbated by Federal Bureau of Prisons policy. For more than a dec­
ade, the only substantial sex offender treatment program within the federal prisons was in Butner, 
North Carolina, which is more than 1 700 miles from Albuquerque, New Mexico, and more than 
1 800 miles from Rapid City, South Dakota. As a result, federal defendants had to make an unfortu­
nate choice between living near family and obtaining treatment. See MAGDELINE JENSEN ET AL., 
FINAL REPORT OF THE SEXUAL OFFENSES SUBCOMMITTEE TO THE NATIVE AMERICAN SENTENCING 
AD HOC ADVISORY GROUP, UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION (2003) (on file with author). 
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I I. FEDERAL PROSECUTORS IN INDIAN COUNTRY 
Because the prosecutor is, in many respects, the single most important 
actor in a federal Indian country case ,59 an examination of the role of the 
prosecutor is a useful place to begin a critical examination of federal Indian 
country prosecutions. The prosecution and imprisonment of an Indian for an 
on -reservation crime against another Indian is perhaps the single most ag­
gressive use of federal power against an Indian that routinely occurs, at least 
in mode m times, and thus may be one of the greatest existing intrusions on 
internal tribal affairs. I will address three different types of problems created 
by the use of federal prosecutors in Indian country. The first set of problems 
relates to the intersection between community values, prosecutorial discre­
tion, and prosecutorial accountability. The second major problem is a 
practical political dynamic that I will characterize as the "cavalry effect." 
And, finally, the third is a tribal govern ance issue that stems partially from 
the previous problems. 
A. Community Values and the Foundation of Prosecutorial Discretion 
and Prosecutorial Accountability 
In the American criminal justice system, the prosecutor "is the represen­
tative of the public in whom is lodged a discretion " to review the evidence 
and determine whether or not to bring criminal charges. 60 In the United 
States, the power of prosecutors is routinely characteri zed as "tremendous "61 
and the prosecutor's discretion is described as "virtually unlimited."62 Prose­
cutorial discretion begins with the decision to charge the defendant, a most 
important power, but it actually extends to numerous decisions made 
throughout a federal case, such as which charges to include, whether to seek 
to have the defendant held in custody pending trial, whether to offer alterna­
tive sanctions such as pretrial diversion, whether to accept a guilty plea to 
59. Mandatory minimum sentences and the overwhelming prevalence of plea bargains have 
arguably made federal prosecutors more powerful than judges; once the prosecutor decides which 
offense to charge, the prosecutor has, in effect, locked in a very narrow range of discretion for the 
judge in deciding the sentence. See Albert W. Alschuler, Monarch, Lackey, or Judge, 64 U. CoLo. L. 
REV. 723 ( 1993). While a jury could conceivably exercise discretion over the prosecutor's charging 
decision by, for example, convicting on a lesser-included offense, juries are not informed about 
mandatory minimum sentences or about the power of nullification. Moreover, juries are absent in 
the overwhelming majority of cases that are resolved through plea bargains. See Stephanos Bibas, 
Judicial Fact-Finding and Sentence Enhancements in a World of Guilty Pleas, 1 10 YALE L.J. 1 097, 
1 149-50 (200 1 )  (noting that only 4% of adjudicated felons have jury trials, and 5% have bench 
trials, while 91 % plea bargain). 
60. United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 1 67, 192 (5th Cir. 1965) (Wisdom, J., concurring) (quot­
ing United States v. Brokaw, 60 F. Supp. 1 00, IOI (S.D. Ill. 1 945)). 
6 1 . Robert H. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 24 J. AM. JUDICATURE Soc'y 1 8, 1 8-19  
( 1 940). 
62. James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1 5 2 1 ,  
1 525 ( 198 1 ); see also James Vorenberg, Narrowing the Discretion of Criminal Justice Officials, 
1 976 DUKE L.J. 65 1 ,  678 ("The prosecutor's decision whether and what to charge is the broadest 
discretionary power in criminal [justice] administration."). 
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less than all of the offenses charged , and whether to seek sentencing en­
hancements. 63 
While the decision to prosecute for a specific offense is reviewable , to 
some degree , by the grand jury,64 decisions not to bring a case or to "under ­
charge" are entirely unreviewable.65 As Kenneth Culp Davis has recognized , 
"the a ffirmative power to prosecute is enormous , but the negative power to 
withhold prosecution may be even greater , because it is less protected 
against abuse."66 
As a practical matter , it is incorrect to say that federal prosecutorial dis­
cretion is entirely unbounded. Federal prosecutors are guided both by 
general and specific directions set forth in the Dnited States Attorney's 
Manual ,67 which apply nationwide. Federal prosecutors generally also pos­
sess district-specific guidelines , written and unwritten ,68 that inform 
decisions about which cases to prosecute.69 The local prosecutorial guide­
lines , which describe threshold facts that must exist to warrant consideration 
of the case for prosecution , are routinely shared with law enforcement agen ­
cies to assist agents in determining how to prioritize their investigations.70 
Those United States Attorneys with Indian country criminal jurisdiction of­
ten spell out specific guidelines for the offenses enumerated in the Major 
Crimes Act. These local guidelines are generally not binding ; they exist en­
tirely as a matter of discretion and therefore need not be strictly followed by 
the prosecutors who rely on them. It is thus unclear how much effect the 
federal prosecutorial guidelines have on prosecutorial behavior. 
63. See, e.g., Charles D. Breitel, Controls in Criminal Law Enforcement, 27 U. CHI . L. REV . 
427, 428 ( 1 960). 
64. See supra notes 48-5 1 and accompanying text (discussing the grand jury). 
65. See William T. Pizzi, Understanding Prosecutorial Discretion in the United States: The 
Limits of Comparative Criminal Procedure as an Instrument of Reform, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 325, 
1 337 ( 1 993); see also Patrick Halligan, A Political Economy of Prosecutorial Discretion, 5 AM. J. 
CRIM. L. 2, 6 ( 1 977) (noting that the discretion to prosecute is limited to some degree by equal pro­
tection guarantees, but that the discretion not to prosecute is limitless). 
66. KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 1 88 ( 1 969). 
67. U.S. Arr' Ys ' MANUAL, supra note 3 1 ,  §§ 675-76; see also Bruce A. Green & Fred C. 
Zacharias, Prosecutorial Neutrality, 2004 Wis. L. REV. 837; Michael A. Simons, Prosecutorial 
Discretion and Prosecution Guidelines: A Case Study in Controlling Federalization, 75 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 893, 934-36 (2000). 
68. See, e.g. , Richard S. Frase, The Decision to File Federal Criminal Charges: A Quantita­
tive Study of Prosecutorial Discretion, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 246 ( 1 980). 
69. U.S. Arr'ys' MANUAL, supra note 3 1 ,  § 9-27.230(8)( 1 )  (setting forth the Principles of 
Federal Prosecution). 
70. For example, the United States Attorney's Prosecutive Guidelines for the District of New 
Mexico in force in 1 997 provided that it would "accept any prosecutable cases which affect inter­
state commerce and which involve death or serious bodily injury. In all other cases there must be a 
provable interstate commerce nexus and the property damage must be over $ I  0,000." Memorandum 
from U.S. Att'y to Special Agent in Charge, Regarding Prosecutive Guidelines for Matters Within 
the Jurisdiction of the United States Attorney's Office, District of New Mexico 3 (Apr. 1 8, 1 997) (on 
file with author). This guideline for arson is not unusual in that it leaves a large gray area; it does not 
necessarily indicate that the office will accept prosecution of cases involving greater than a $ 1 0,000 
loss that do not involve a dwelling or danger to human life. Id. 
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Even where prose cutors purport to be followin g obje ctive guidelines, 
they nevertheless have tremendous latitude be cause they must also make an 
independent and hi ghly subje ctive jud gment about the suffi cien cy of evi­
den ce to brin g a case. In other words, even where the alle ged fa cts clearly 
meet the guidelines, a prose cutor may well decide that the alleged facts can­
not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Such de cisions are notoriously 
diffi cult to se cond -guess, and no other institutional actor has constitutional 
d
. 
d 71 stan mg to o so. 
The tremendous breadth of prose cutorial dis cretion has been justified on 
a number of grounds. First, courts have re gularly noted the pra cti cal diffi­
culty in reviewin g su ch de cisions. 72 Such de cisions are based on all sorts of 
reasons, such as allo cation of prose cutorial and investi gative resour ces, law 
en for cement priorities, and subje ctive assessments of evidence and guilt. 
And few of these reasons are set forth in a written re cord that make them 
amenable to judi cial review. Se cond, there are strong institutional con cerns 
for preservin g separation of powers between the judi cial and exe cutive 
bran ches of government. 73 Third , prose cutors must retain broad dis cretion in 
a world in whi ch they simply cannot enfor ce all of the criminal laws on the 
books. 74 In addition to these pra cti cal justifi cations, broad prose cutorial dis­
cretion has been normatively justified by the premise that prosecutors take 
into account and indeed internalize the community's values and mores in 
determinin g whi ch cases to prosecute . .In other words, we trust prosecutors 
with broad power pre cisely because we expe ct them to exer cise that power 
in a manner consistent with the needs of the community. Indeed, in the 
Ameri can system, in whi ch many prose cutors announ ce their appearan ce in 
court by claimin g that they represent "the people," the prose cutor is imbued 
with an almost moral authority that trans cends mere governmental power. 75 
7 1 .  See, e.g. , Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 479, 48 1-82 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (stating that 
the prosecutor must consider "[m]yriad factors" and "no court has any jurisdiction to inquire into or 
review his decision"). 
72. See, e.g., Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 ( 1985) ("[B]road discretion rests 
largely on the recognition that the decision to prosecute [is based on a variety of factors and] is 
particularly ill-suited to judicial review."). 
73. United States v. Armstrong, 5 1 7  U.S. 456, 464 (1996). 
74. DAVIS, supra note 66, at 1 92-93 (recognizing the nearly universal view that the prosecut­
ing power intrinsically involves broad discretion because not all laws can be enforced, prosecution 
involves interpretation of statutes that are inherently uncertain, and the prosecutor must exercise 
discretion in determining whether evidence is sufficient); see also Green & Zacharias, supra note 
67, at 899 n.206 ("[R]esource constraints prevent universal prosecution and incarceration of all . . .  
who technically . . .  violate[] the law."). 
75. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 ( 1935), provides the most well-known expres-
sion of this moral authority: 
The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, 
but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obliga­
tion to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that i t  
shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite 
sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or inno­
cence suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor-indeed, he should do so. But, 
while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty 
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This moral and legal authority to act on behalf of the community is rein­
forced by the fact that most prosecutors are local officials entrusted by the 
community to perform this important function .76 The premise that the prose­
cutor acts with community values in mind is supported, in most non-federal 
American jurisdictions, by strong political checks on prosecutorial abuses.77 
The chief prosecutor in most American jurisdictions is elected. Public ac­
countability arises from the notion that "prosecutors are . . .  likely to satisfy 
the public's desires if their decisions have some implications for their ca­
reers."78 The political checks include direct control through election of 
prosecutors (or those who appoint them), to serve limited terms (in contrast 
to, for example, federal judges who have life tenure ), and indi rect control 
through appropriations and other legislative decisions. 79 It also presumably 
includes indirect and · informal checks such as media attention and popular 
opinion. 
Even in the federal system , where prosecutors are appointed by the 
President and thus are insulated to a greater degree from electoral politics, 80 
the basic organi zational scheme nevertheless reflects a preference for local 
control and the notion that a local prosecutor can better reflect local com­
munity values. Then-Attorney General, later Justice, Robert Jackson 
recogni zed that even federal prosecutors should be responsive to community 
values and sentiments when he recogni zed that "the moral climate of the 
United States is as varied as its physical climate," and thus even federal 
prosecutors "could hardly adopt strict standards for loose states or loose 
standards for strict states without doing violence to local sentiment."81 In 
keeping with this admonition, federal prosecutors presumably endeavor to 
exercise their discretion in a manner consistent with community values. 
As a local official, the federal prosecutor is in many ways little different 
from the state prosecutor ; she is a member of the community, at least in 
some broad sense, for which she is prosecuting offenses and her authority 
to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongfui conviction as it is to use 
every legitimate means to bring about a just one. 
76. See Pizzi, supra note 65, at 1 337; see also WILLIAM T. PIZZI, TRIALS WITHOUT TRUTH 
( 1999). 
77. See Pizzi, supra note 65, at 1 337-38, 1 342 (noting the political controls on prosecutors 
and even those appointed as federal prosecutors by the President); see also William J. Stuntz, The 
Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice, 1 07 YALE L.J. 1 ,  22 ( 1 997) 
("On the government's side, prosecutors are bureaucrats; like other bureaucrats, their activity level is 
largely governed by their budgets. Rationing in this setting is akin to queuing, albeit in a system 
where the prosecutor defines one's place in line."). 
78. Green & Zacharias, supra note 67. 
79. See Anthony C. Thompson, It Takes a Community to Prosecute, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
321 , 327 (2002) ("In a world of limited resources, prosecutors must act in accordance with the pri­
orities of their funding authorities."). 
80. Frase, supra note 68, at 249 ("(T]he federal prosecutor is not an elected official, and is 
not subject to popular political pressures, although he may be removed by the President."). 
8 1 .  Jackson, supra note 6 1 ,  at 20. 
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der ives normat ively fr om her represe ntat ion of that commu nity.82 I n  that re­
spe ct, the only real d iffere nce, for m ost offe nses, is that the f ederal 
prose cutor 's " commu nity" is simply a larger d istr ict tha n the state prose cu­
tor's commu nity a nd the range of pr ose cutable offe nses is m ore narr ow. 
Thus, it is easy for the federal prose cut or t o  exer cise h is auth or ity in a ma n­
ner cons iste nt w ith commu nity mores if he s o  chooses. I n  m ost 
cir cumsta nces, he presumably ca n intu it them almost as well as a state 
pr ose cut or ca n. 
B. The Federal Prosecutor in Indian Country 
A n  impl icit just ificat ion for the modern federal I nd ian cou ntry cr im inal 
just ice reg ime is that the U nited States has a resp ons ib il ity t o  preserve pub­
l ic safety on I nd ia n  reservat ions.83 I ndeed, the reg ime d oes not purp ort t o  be 
pr imarily respons ible for public safety thr ough out the ge neral commu nity 
e ncompass ing the e nt ire federal judicial distr ict or state but merely concer ns 
th ose commu nit ies that l ie w ithin the jur isd ict ional confi nes of " I nd ia n  
cou ntry," as that term is defi ned in the U nited States Code. I n  other w ords, 
the reg ime is des ig ned t o  pr ov ide publ ic safety a nd cr im inal just ice in I nd ia n  
cou ntry and the statutory scheme is ge ographically defi ned as apply ing only 
to  that area.84 Give n that backgr ou nd, the appare nt respons ib il ity of the 
pr ose cut or in a n  I nd ian country case is t o  represe nt-a nd pr ote ct-the I n­
d ia n  cou ntry commu nity. 85 
1. The Prosecutor as Representative of the Community 
F or a var iety of reas ons, one m ight be h ighly skeptical of the ab il ity of a 
f ederal pr ose cut or t o  represe nt the I nd ia n  country community. U nl ike the 
usual cir cumsta nces, in wh ich the pr ose cut or internal izes and a cts in a ccor­
dance w ith the mores and values of the community ( of which she 
the oret ically is a part), a f ederal pr osecutor in I nd ia n  cou ntry may l ive hu n­
dreds of m iles fr om the reservation and may not eve n speak the la nguage 
used in that community. She may not be able t o  u nderstand a nd internal ize 
the values of the commu nity that she the oret ically pr ote cts. 
82. See generally JAMES EISENSTEIN, COUNSEL FOR THE UNITED STATES: U.S. ATTORNEYS 
IN THE POLITICAL AND LEGAL SYSTEMS ( 1 978); WHITNEY NORTH SEYMOUR, JR., UNITED STATES 
ATTORNEY: AN INSIDE VIEW OF "JUSTICE" IN AMERICA UNDER THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION 
( 1975). 
83. See Contemporary Tribal Governments: Challenges in Law Enforcement Related to the 
Rulings of the United States Supreme Court: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Indian Af airs, 107th 
Cong. 9-1 1 (2002) (statement of Thomas B. Heffelfinger, U.S. Att'y for the Dist. of Minn.), avail­
able at http://Indian.senate.gov/2002hrgs/07 1 102hrg/heffelfinger.pdf ("Since 1 885, when Congress 
passed the Major Crimes Act, United States Attorneys have had primary responsibility for the prose­
cution of serious violent crime in Indian country." (citation omitted)). 
84. See supra note 2 1  and accompanying text. 
85. Thus, the Indian country case stands in contrast to the normal situation in which "the 
prosecutor's client is the [general] public." See Green & Zacharias, supra note 67, at 866 n . 106. 
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The federal prosecutor 's lack of membership in the Indian country 
community is not the only obstacle she will face in intuiting community 
values. First, she is not present on a daily basis within the community to 
participate in ongoing communications about community values and mores. 
She will not know, firsthand, what the community is talking about or con­
cerned about. Second, since many Indian communities are closed and 
suspicious of outsiders, it is unrealistic to believe that they will easily con­
fide in a federal prosecutor about matters that are important to them. 
This critique, at first blush, may not seem to be limited to Indian country 
cases. Admittedly, a federal judicial district is composed of numerous het­
erogeneous "communities," and members of many communities, especially 
the minority communities within the jurisdiction, might feel that the local 
prosecutors do not internalize their values and thus do not "represent" them. 
An African American community, for example, may feel that prosecutors 
are unfairly targeting it. While Indian country communities have a some­
what stronger claim because of the explicitly geographical jurisdictional 
grant, it is important to remember Felix Cohen 's famous metaphor of Indi­
ans as the "miner's canary" with the treatment of Indians reflecting the 
health of American policy and democratic values beyond Indian policy.86 
The Indian country regime, in explicitly creating a scheme for prosecut­
ing local offenses with no national nexus and applying only to Indian 
country, offers insight into our national psyche.87 While federal law may not 
consciously single out African American communities, its willingness to 
single out "Indian country" for special treatment in this way may be cause 
for broader concerns by other communities. In Indian country, the federal 
prosecutor is alien to the community and less able or unable to understand, 
internalize and protect, or e ven act in accordance with, the community 's 
values. Perhaps such an official simply is not institutionally competent. This 
gives rise to a related problem. 
2. The A ccountability Problem 
The alignment between the prosecutor and community values that ser ves 
as the normative foundation for broad prosecutorial discretion is supported, 
in most American jurisdictions, by prosecutorial accountability through the 
political process. The crimes enumerated and prosecuted under the federal 
Indian country regime are crimes that Roscoe Pound would have character­
ized as crimes against "local order."88 Outside of Indian country, such crimes 
are routinely prosecuted by local (state) prosecutors elected by the local 
86. FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, at v (Rennard Strickland ed., 
1982). 
87. While some of my criticisms might also apply to certain federal enclaves such as military 
bases, application of federal rules on federal enclaves does not have the same ramifications as fed­
eral rules on Indian reservations where, presumably, an existing community has addressed such 
issues since time immemorial. 
88. ROSCOE POUND, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA 1 5 1  ( 1930). 
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commu nity or county in which the crime occurred .89 I ndeed, one of the 
commo n qu alific atio ns of st anding for electio n as a st ate or loc al prosecutor 
is residency within the jurisdiction .9() Thus , in theory, the elected prosecutor 
is not o nly an elected age nt of the people but almost alw ays is also a mem­
ber of the commu nity i n  which the crime occurred.91 
Thou gh prosecutors are represe nt atives of the public, prosecutors h ave 
their ow n person al i nterests i n  decidi ng which c ases to prosecute. M any 
comme nt ators h ave noted wh at mi ght collectively be c alled " age ncy prob­
lems "92 th at prevent perfect ali gnment of the i nterests of the prosecutors and 
the public. For re aso ns discussed immedi ately here and above , these 
" age ncy problems " are f ar more severe in  Indi an country. At the other e nd of 
the spectrum, some schol ars h ave expressed appropri ate concern about 
prosecutors who are too account able to the commu nity.93 Others h ave ex­
pressed the notion th at the account ability question is more complex th an it 
seems. 94 Prosecutors m ay seek to vi ndic ate community v alues th at are re­
flected i n  l aws or they m ay seek to vi ndic ate commu nity v alues th at are 
i nfl amed i n  a p articul ar e gre gious c ase. Most comme nt ators would agree 
th at prosecutors should resist the "mome nt ary hue and cry " of the public in 
a "he ated mome nt "  and rem ai n  true i nste ad to the public will in a more ge n­
er al sense as "expressed over time in the l aw and popul ar culture. "95 
However, such deb ates are e ntirely ac ademic for I ndi an tribes. 
Feder al I ndi an cou ntry prosecutors are less likely to feel any pressure to 
be accou nt able to either type of . commu nity will. The politic al power of In­
di an trib al commu nities over their (feder al) prosecutors is strikin gly 
differe nt from the politic al power over the prosecutors who brin g the s ame 
kind of c ases i n  no n-I ndi an commu nities. Bec ause feder al prosecutors are 
appoi nted, r ather th an elected , direct politic al account ability is absent in all 
I ndi an cou ntry c ases, i ncre asing the gulf between the interests of the prose­
cutors and the commu nity. 
89. Cf Pizzi, supra note 65, at 1 338 (noting that state prosecutors are almost always elected 
officials). 
90. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 2 1 5.2 (West 2000) ("The district attorney shall 
reside in the county from which he was elected during his term of office."). 
9 1 .  See generally Richard H. McAdams, Race and Selective Prosecution: Discovering the 
Pitfalls of Armstrong, 73 Ctt1.-KENT L. REV. 605, 643-52 ( 1 998) (asserting that prosecutors are, in 
general, representative of their communities). 
92. See, e.g., Tracey L. Meares, Rewards for Good Behavior: Influencing Prosecutorial 
Discretion and Conduct with Financial Incentives, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 85 1 ,  865 ( 1 995); Ted 
Schneyer, Legal Process Scholarship and the Regulation of lawyers, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 33, 53-
54 (1 996); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, IOI YALE L.J. 1979, 1987-88 
( 1 992). 
93. DAVIS, supra note 66. 
94. See Green & Zacharias, supra note 67, at 870 n . 1 1 6. 
95. Id. at 870. 
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That is not to say that federal prosecutors are dea f to popular opinion on 
Indian reservations.96 To the extent that prosecutors are attuned to commu­
nity concerns , though , Indians have the additional problem o f  dilution. 
External motivations , such as the media attention that comes with a high 
profile case , are also problematic.97 Indian country cases rarely obtain much 
media exposure.98 From the federal prosecutor's perspective , an urban or 
suburban bank robbery may very well obtain greater and more sustained 
media attention than a multiple homicide on a rural Indian reser vation. 
Some federal Indian country prosecutors undertake extraordinary for­
mal99 and in formal '00 efforts to get to know their Indian communities. Such 
knowledge is absolutely crucial to the task. One federal prosecutor has ex­
plained , for example , the Navajo cultural no rm against loo king a person in 
the eye ,  which can be considered "offensive , an affront , even a challenge to 
96. Indeed, Professor Frase's assertion that a federal prosecutor "is not subject to popular 
political pressures" because "[he] is not an elected official" is true as a fonnal matter, but it can be 
qualified. Frase, supra note 68, at 249; see also supra note 80 and accompanying text. A practical, 
albeit indirect, constraint on United States Attorneys is the fact that many such officials expect to 
seek other appointed or elected office in the future. See, e.g. , Dan M. Kahan, ls Chevron Relevant to 
Federal Criminal Law?, 1 1 0 HARV. L. REV. 469, 486 ( 1996) ("U.S. Attorneys are extraordinarily 
ambitious and frequently enter electoral politics after leaving office."). Though political ambition 
likely increases accountability, it does so only marginally with regard to Indian tribes. The reserva­
tion communities are just one of many constituent groups and may be the smallest and poorest such 
groups at that. Each Indian community is only one of many constituencies of a United States Attor­
ney, and often a small, distant, and poor constituency. And Indian communities, like most poor and 
undereducated communities, are notorious for not voting. However, this appears to be changing. 
See, e.g., John P. LaVelle, Strengthening Tribal Sovereignty Through Indian Participation in Ameri­
can Politics: A Reply to Professor Porter, JO KAN. J.L. & Pus. Pot.'Y 533 (2001 ). 
97. See Simons, supra note 67, at 932 ("[There is a] common . . .  desire of prosecutors to 
prosecute highly publicized cases."). 
98. Neil M. Richards, The Supreme Court Justice & "Boring " Cases, 4 GREEN BAG 2D 401 ,  
403 (2001 )  (noting that Justice Brennan once referred to an Indian law case as a "chicken-shit" case). 
99. Most United States Attorney's Offices in states with Indian country jurisdiction have 
explicitly designated an Assistant United States Attorney as a liaison to the Indian tribes within the 
jurisdiction. See U.S. Dep't of Justice, OJP Resources for Indian Country, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ 
americannative/attysoffices.htm (last visited Dec. 1 7, 2005). The tribal liaison positions are some­
what political in nature, that is, the liaison is assigned a relationship with the tribal government, 
rather than the tribal community at large. Moreover, in some districts, the USAOs designate a civil 
attorney rather than a prosecutor as the liaison to avoid any awkwardness for a liaison serving a role 
as prosecutor and also fielding tribal complaints about prosecutions involving tribal members. Fed­
eral prosecutors are authorized, though not required, by federal law to report the declination of an 
Indian country prosecution to the appropriate Indian tribe. 25 U.S.C. § 2809(b) (2000). 
JOO. Following an outbreak of violence on the Red Lake Chippewa Indian reservation in 
Minnesota, the United States Attorney in Minnesota publicly said that he was redoubling federal 
efforts to address violent crime on that reservation. See Margaret Zack, State-Federal Project 
Fights Reservation Violent Crime, STAR Turn. (Minneapolis), Aug. 30, 2002, at 2B (noting that 
the Red Lake Reservation, with a population of 5000, had five homicides during a nine-month 
period beginning in late 2001 ) .  Among other efforts to reach out to the community, the United 
States Attorney attended the final game of a 2003 state high school basketball tournament to 
cheer for a high school team from the Red Lake Chippewa Indian Reservation. Conversation with 
Tom Heffelfinger, June 2003, notes on file with author. Such actions are commendable; they are 
not necessarily the norm. The Red Lake school shooting case in March 2005, which cost ten lives 
and resulted in a federal juvenile prosecution, dealt a serious blow to federal efforts to improve 
crime statistics on that reservation. 
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the othe r pe rson."101 Knowled ge of and respect for such a cultu ral no rm 
mi ght make a diffe rence in whethe r the prosecuto r will gain or  lose the as­
sistance of a key witness. A misstep here can make the diffe rence between a 
ri ghteous conviction and a colossal waste of fede ral resources. 
But even for federal prosecuto rs who a re sensitive to cultural differences 
and conce rned enough to make ex trao rdinary efforts, 102 the shee r distance be­
tween United States Atto rney's O ffices and many of the fede ral Indian 
rese rvations they serve present tremendous obstacles that the ave ra ge violent 
crime prosecutor in the state system does not face. Perhaps as a result, United 
States Attorneys have been widely criticized for decades for failing to give 
prope r attention to Indian coun try cases. w3 The substance of such complaints 
almost always involves the failure to p rosecute aggressively enou gh and al­
most neve r involves complaints of "over-prosecution."104 
Because of the non -reviewability of decisions to decline prosecution or  to 
under-prosecute, the weak or  nonexistent political accountability of fede ral 
p rosecutors to t ribal communities, and the lack of media interest in Indian 
country prosecutions, fede ral prosecutors feel little external pressure to t reat 
Indian country cases se riously. Unde r such a scheme, well-intentioned fede ral 
p rosecuto rs will wo rk hard in Indian country, and many do. But even hi gh 
levels of commitment and interest by fede ral prosecuto rs are no substitute for 
actual accountability. Those prosecutors who a re not committed to Indian 
country cases will simply not pursue them. And in Indian coun try, it is often 
I O I .  Chaney, supra note 54, a t  39. 
I 02. Some federal prosecutors are members of Indian tribes and at least one serves his own 
reservation, but such circumstances are unusual. 
103. See CAROLE GOLDBERG-AMBROSE WITH TIMOTHY CARR SEWARD, PLANTING TAIL 
FEATHERS: TRIBAL SURVIVAL AND PUBLIC LAW 280, at 162 ( 1 997) ("In practical application, federal 
law enforcement agents, particularly the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the U.S. Attorney's 
Office, have demonstrated a history of declining to investigate or prosecute violations of the Major 
Crimes Act."); Larry Cunningham, Note, Deputization of Indian Prosecutors: Protecting Indian 
Interests in Federal Court, 88 GEO. L.J. 2 1 87, 2 1 88 (2000) ("[M]any U.S. Attorneys have abdicated 
their responsibility to prosecute crimes in Indian country committed by non-Indians."); EchoHawk, 
supra note 12, at 99-100 ("U.S. Attorneys often decline to prosecute Major Crimes Act cases on the 
reservation because of a mixture of factual, legal, practical, or logistical problems."); B.J. Jones, 
Welcoming Tribal Courts into the Judicial Fraternity: Emerging Issues in Tribal-State and Tribal­
Federal Court Relations, 24 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 457, 5 1 3  ( 1998) ("Federal prosecutors, busy 
with prosecuting a variety of more serious crimes, perhaps have been remiss in devoting the neces­
sary attention to the problems that arise when non-Indians commit offenses in Indian country . . . .  "); 
Peter Nicolas, American-Style Justice in No Man 's Land, 36 GA. L. REV. 895, 963 (2002) ("U.S. 
Attorneys, unlike state prosecutors, typically decline to prosecute in a far greater percentage of 
cases . . . . [resulting] in the underenforcement of criminal laws in Indian country."); Amy Radon, 
Note, Tribal Jurisdiction and Domestic Violence: The Need for Non-Indian Accountability on the 
Reservation, 37 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1 275, 1278 (2004) ("Because federal prosecutors decline to 
prosecute [domestic violence], the law provides no deterrent effect . . . .  "); Tim Vollmann, Criminal 
Jurisdiction in Indian Country: Tribal Sovereignty and Defendants ' Rights in Conflict, 22 U. KAN. 
L. REV. 387, 403 ( 1 974) ("[O]verburdened U.S. Attorneys are not notorious for seeking further 
responsibilities of prosecution in Indian Country . . . .  "); cf. Laurence Davis, Criminal Jurisdiction 
over Indian Country in Arizona, 1 ARIZ. L. REV. 62, 72-73 ( 1 959) (noting reluctance of federal 
prosecutors and federal courts to handle petty offenses over which they also have jurisdiction in 
Indian country, with the result that "petty frauds and simple assaults" by non-Indians against Indi­
ans, "which are fairly numerous-usually escape prosecution entirely"). 
104. Davis, supra note 103, at 72-73. 
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the decisions not to prosecute, called "declinations," that cause the most grief 
and consternation. ws As a result, it would appear that federal Indian country 
prosecutors are failing in precisely the area in which their discretion is subject 
to the least scrutiny and accountability. 106 The extensive critical commentary 
in academic literature may be the most serious negative repercussion that 
these federal officials face. 1
01 
The result is that criminal justice in Indian coun­
try is occasionally pursued aggressively and is sometime ignored, making 
criminal justice a haphazard event at best for Indian tribes. 1
08 
Accountability and control of governing institutions has become a key in­
dicator of tribal success in improving tribal economic and social conditions.109 
Indeed, lack of accountability by federal law enforcement has been identified 
as a chief problem for effective policing in Indian country.1w Given the close 
relationship between police and prosecutors, it follows that lack of account­
ability by prosecutors may pose similar problems. 
In summary, the fundamental criminal law justifications for broad prose­
cutorial discretion simply do not apply when a federal prosecutor is working 
in Indian country. Unlike a narcotics distribution offense, which is subject to 
federal jurisdiction wherever it occurs within the exterior boundaries of the 
United States, the federal prosecutor has jurisdiction over Indian country of­
fenses only if the offense occurred in Indian country. Yet the federal 
prosecutor is unaccountable to the relevant community and has no particular 
motivation to address community concerns. The Indian country regime thus 
imposes an important responsibility on federal prosecutors without imposing 
any accountability. The ramifications of this structural problem are enormous 
and undermine the legitimacy of the federal prosecutor's power in Indian 
country cases. These problems, though serious, are exacerbated by an even 
deeper problem in Indian country cases to which this Article now turns. 
1 05. See id. 
1 06. To be fair, such complaints are not limited to Indian country. As Roscoe Pound once 
wrote about the American system, "[c]omplaint of non-enforcement is as old as the law itself." 
POUND, supra note 88, at 12. 
1 07. See supra note 103 and accompanying text (criticizing federal prosecutors for high dec­
lination rates). 
108. My colleague Michael Tonry offered the important insight that under-prosecution by 
federal prosecutors may not necessarily be problematic because it presumably makes tribal justice 
systems more relevant in cases in which the federal authorities decline to prosecute. 
1 09. See generally Stephen Cornell & Joseph P. Kalt, Where 's the Glue? Institutional and 
Cultural Foundations of American Indian Economic Development, 29 J. Soc10-EcoN. 443 (2000); 
Stephen Cornell & Joseph P. Kalt, Sovereignty and Nation-Building: The Development Challenge in 
Indian Country Today, 22 AM. INDIAN CULTURE & RES. J. 1 87 ( 1 998); Stephen Cornell & Joseph P. 
Kalt, Where Does Economic Development Really Come from? Constitutional Rule Among the Con­
temporary Sioux and Apache, 33 EcoN. INQUIRY 402 ( 1995). 
1 10. WAKELING ET AL., supra note 42 at 43-44, 49 (concluding that accountability for polic­
ing on Indian reservations is diffused both by federal control that reduces tribal involvement and by 
diffusing authority among numerous different bureaucratic actors) .  
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3.  Federal Prosecutors and the Cavalry Effect 
For many Americans, the phrase, "the cavalry has arri ved," has come to 
be a humorous an d informal euphemism for the arri val of help or rescue ; in 
popular usage, the phrase presumably creates a sense of relief in the listener. 
For In dian tribes, in contrast, the arrival of the cavalry has rarely been cause 
for relief or celebration an d it often has quite the opposite connotation in 
In dian country. To members of many In dian tribes, the wor d "cavalry" 
brings to min d oppression, rapaciousness, 111 mur der, an d even genoci de.112 
In In dian country, the fe deral government is hel d in the esteem it has 
e arne d  in more than two centuries of f ederal-tribal relations.113 Its reputation 
in In dian country has been forge d, in part, by the nineteenth -century cavalry 
officers who committe d atrocious actions, such as mur der, 114 and the In dian 
agents who committe d atrocious omissions, such as the withhol ding of 
treaty -guarantee d  foo d an d supplies in winter.115 Its reputation was forme d 
by the actions of go vernment officials who use d gifts of smallpox -infecte d 
blankets to destroy tribal communities 1 6 an d by f ederal officials who unilat­
erally violate d treaties an d encourage d private actors to do the same, 117 an d, 
in more recent years, the fe deral trustee that lost track of the recor ds of mil­
lions an d perhaps billions of dollars of Indian assets hel d by the Department 
of the Interior in tribal accounts an d In divi dual In dian Money accounts. 118 
Enter the well-intentione d fe deral prosecutor seeking to prosecute a vio­
lent crime in In dian country. While fe deral prosecutors may be talente d and 
committe d public ser vants who are trying to "do goo d" by helping to pro­
vi de public safety or bringing justice to In dian country, each carries 
tremen dous moral, emotional, an d symbolic freight of which he may not 
1 1 1 .  See EDWARD LAZARUS, BLACK HILLS WHITE JUSTICE (1 999) (discussing General 
George Custer's extraordinary efforts to appeal to gold prospectors to violate federal treaty obliga­
tions that protected the B lack Hills in the Great Sioux Nation). 
1 1 2. While words like "genocide" should be used advisedly, it is surely appropriate in the 
context of the Wounded Knee and Sand Creek massacres, both of which involved the indiscriminate 
killing of women and children by American soldiers. See ANGIE DEBO, A HISTORY OF THE INDIANS 
OF THE UNITED STATES, 1 94-95 (Sand Creek), 292-93 (Wounded Knee) ( 1989). 
1 1 3 .  Then-Assistant Secretary Kevin Gover issued an apology to tribes on behalf of the BIA 
in September of 2000. Brian Stockes, Gover Apologizes for Atrocities of the Past, INDIAN COUNTRY 
TODAY, Sept. 20, 2000, available at http://www.indiancountry.com/content.cfm?id=63 I .  
1 14. DEBO, supra note 1 12, at 194-95, 292-93. 
1 1 5 .  See Minnesota v .  Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S.  172 ( 1999). 
1 16. For one account and citation to much of the historical literature on these events, see 
Gloria Valencia-Weber, The Supreme Court's Indian Law Decisions: Deviations from Constitutional 
Principles and the Crafting of Judicial Smallpox Blankets, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 405, 405--07 
(2003). 
1 1 7 .  See LAZARUS, supra note 1 1 1 . 
1 1 8. See Cobell v. Norton, No. 1 :96CVOl 285, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14303 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 
20, 2003). 
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even be aware. Indians and Indian tribes have long memories. Such is the 
f l d
. . 119 power o ora tra 1t 10ns. 
Though experiences vary from tribe to tribe, the federal prosecutor in In­
dian coun try is, in some respects, the direct lineal descendant of the blue­
coated, sword-wielding cavalry officer ; the prosecutor represents the very 
same federal government that committed cruel and violent acts against Indian 
tribes for more than a century. He represents the gove rnment that has made 
and then broken sacred promises. Yet he shows up on the tribal member 's 
doorstep with the claim, "I am here to help you obtain justice." Given the his­
tory of federal-tribal relations, tribes have every reason to be suspicious of 
such an o fficial and such a claim. In a real sense, for many reservation Indi­
ans, the federal gove rnment continues to represent the enemy. 
In such a context, the federal prosecution creates a political dynamic in 
the tribe that must be addressed in virtually every case. Consider a typical 
case of sexual abuse of a child : after the child victim reluctantly reports an 
incident of abuse by another family member, it is surprisingly co mmon for 
the victim's family members to align themselves with the defendant and 
against the victim. This is not unheard of outside Indian country, 120 but it 
represents a particularly serious problem in Indian coun try cases.121 The dy­
namic, though extremely unfortunate, is explainable. When the federal 
gove rnment accuses a community member of a heinous offense and brings a 
criminal compl aint or an indictment, the community may naturally become 
protective of the accused defendant in the face of this outside authority, even 
if the charges are based on a report by another tribal member. The family 
may not perceive its choice as one between the perpetrator and the victim, 
but between a tribal member and the United States gove rnment. As a result, 
when the family chooses sides, it may line up behind the perpetrator and 
against the child who has been victimized. 
Given the long history of federal-tribal relations, the federal prosecutor 
simply may not be anyone whom the community has any reason to trust. 122 
1 19. See, e.g. , John W. Ragsdale, Jr., Some Philosophical, Political and Legal Implications of 
American A rcheological and Anthropological Theory, 70 UMKC L. REV. I ,  45-46 (200 1 )  (describ­
ing the power and legitimacy of tribal oral histories). 
1 20. Christine Adams, Note, Mothers Who Fail to Protect Their Children from Sexual Abuse: 
Addressing the Problem of Denial, 12 YALE L. & PoL'Y REV. 5 1 9, 523-24 { 1 994) (describing the 
phenomenon and some of its harms). 
1 2 1 .  EchoHawk, supra note 12, at 99 (noting that an Indian parent's fear of losing custody 
can cause the parent to support "herself, her family, and even the perpetrator" against white institu­
tions (quoting Irl Carter & Lawrence J. Parker, lntrafamilial Sexual Abuse in American Indian 
Familes, in FAMILY SEXUAL ABUSE: FRONTLINE RESEARCH AND EVALUATION 106, 1 1 4 (Michael 
Quinn Patton ed., 1 99 1 ))). 
1 22. Id. ("Many Indians distrust the legal and social authorities that could be most helpful to 
them because of past experiences of unjust treatment."); cf Ronald S. Fischler, Child Abuse and 
Neglect in American Indian Communities, 9 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 95, 98 ( 1985) (noting that 
even Indian Health Service physicians are "mistrusted as outsiders and federal government employ­
ees"). This phenomenon is familiar to many criminal law professors who teach State v. Williams, 
484 P.2d 1 167 (Wash. Ct. App. 197 1 ), a tragic case in which uneducated American Indian parents 
were charged with manslaughter after failing to obtain medical treatment for their seventeen-month­
old son for fear that the baby would be taken from them. 
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The result is that the child victim is victimized anew by a political dynamic 
that aligns the victim with the United States and against the community and 
the defendant.123 This dynamic may well cause further psychological injuries 
to the child victim of sexual assault and lead to the victim's alienation and 
estrangement from family members. In that respect, a new harm is done to 
the child that might not have occurred in the absence of the federal prosecu­
tor. According to experts in the field, this alienation of a child from the 
family often has psychological ramifications that are even more serious than 
the harm done by the perpetrator of the sex offense.12 4 In addition to harming 
victims, the dynamic may cause numerous lesser evils, such as practical 
problems in prosecutions. It sometimes, no doubt, causes victims to recant 
and frustrates effective prosecutions of sexual predators.125 As a result, sex­
ual predators are not effectively removed from the community. 
Use of a federal prosecutor likely creates a host of other less -serious 
problems as well. Even leaving out the emotional and historical baggage 
that creates the political dynamic that I will characterize as the "cavalry ef ­
fect," child sex abuse cases are among the most difficult cases to prosecute 
success fully, even in the best of circumstances. As an alien to the commu­
nity, the federal prosecutor is likely to find it difficult to communicate with 
the Indian child and even more difficult to convince the child victim to par­
ticipate in a trial. As evidence that these problems are very real, federal 
prosecutors have taken to employing "victim-witness coordinators"126 who 
often work to bridge the cultural gap between the Indian victims and the 
federal prosecutors.12 7 Without the assistance of the victim-witness advo ­
cates, Indian country prosecutions would be far less success ful. 
While the child sexual assault case presents perhaps the most tragic in­
stance of this phenomenon, the "cavalry effect" likely occurs, to some 
degree , in any case in which the United States sides with an Indian victim 
against an Indian perpetrator in an intratribal dispute. Indeed, the dynamic 
has existed in tribes since the early nineteenth century in many different 
circumstances as tribal members turned against others who assisted federal 
officials.128 
The cavalry metaphor offers one other key insight : the cavalry chooses 
its battles care fully and then leaves when the battle is over. One telltale sign 
of the lack of trust of federal law enforcement and prosecutors is the fact 
123. This phenomenon is present in many intrafamily child sex abuse cases, see Adams, supra 
note 1 20, but it is likely exacerbated in cases involving a federal prosecutor and an Indian community. 
1 24. Id. (citing numerous authorities). 
1 25.  See generally Fischler, supra note 1 22, at  1 02 (noting that families often suppress evi­
dence and bring pressure on victims to change their testimony). 
1 26.  See, e.g., Office of the U.S. Attorney, Eastern District of Wisconsin, Victim and Witness 
Assistance Unit, http://www.justice.gov/usao/wie/vicwit/ (last visited Dec. 1 7, 2005). 
1 27.  The USAOs frequently hire tribal members to serve in these positions. 
1 28. Cf Ex parte Crow Dog, 1 09 U.S. 556 (1 883); MORRIS L. WARDELL, A POLITICAL HIS­
TORY OF THE CHEROKEE NATION 1 838-1907, at 1 6-19 ( 1938) (discussing the murder of Cherokee 
leader John Ross apparently for his role in agreeing to federal efforts at Cherokee removal). 
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t hat many cr imes are never even reported. 129 One key reason for t he fa ilure 
to report is that v ict ims do not trust the federal aut hor it ies to protect them 
from retal iat ion. 130 Like t he cavalry, federal prosecutors and FB I '  agents 
swoop in occas ionally to prosecute a perpetrator, but they do not ma inta in a 
constant presence and do not necessar ily cons ider t he broader impact of 
t he ir work. They address only t he ser ious offenses and t hey leave w hen eac h 
case is concluded. It is up to the tr ibal commun ity to address other offenses 
and t he aftermath of the felony and to attempt to restore t he fabr ic of t he 
community. Even assuming that t he federal prosecutors who agree to handle 
suc h cases are generous, selfless, and committed to better ing the l ives of the 
reservat ion commun ity (as most of them no doubt are), even the best of in­
tent ions may not always be able to overcome the hand icaps noted here in. 
Cons ider one obv ious alternat ive approach: a tr ibal prosecutor. As a 
member of the Ind ian country commun ity, a tr ibal prosecutor mig ht face 
f ew of t he hand icaps that t he federal prosecutor faces. A tr ibal prosecutor 
would not be forced into t he same dynam ic-s he could represent t he 
commun ity and t he commun ity would feel less of a need to attempt to pro­
tect t he defendant aga inst an e xternal aut hor ity. In add it ion, unl ike t he 
federal prosecutor, a tr ibal prosecutor would presumably l ive w it hin t he 
commun ity. T his would convey a much stronger sense of interest and in­
vestment in t he commun ity and would allow t he prosecutor to help t he 
commun ity address t he collateral issues that ar ise from t he prosecut ion. 
T he presence of t he prosecutor w it hin t he commun ity m ight also g ive 
greater comfort to t hose v ict ims of cr ime who are unw ill ing to come for­
ward. Moreover, a tr ibal prosecutor m ight act- in a var iety of ways- in a 
fas hion more compat ible w ith commun ity norms. 
4. Obstacles to Tribal Governance and Self-Determination 
In addit ion to t he problems noted above, the role of federal prosecutors 
creates a ser ious obstacle to tr ibal self -determinat ion. Use of a federal 
prosecutor to address major cr imes between Indians sends a clear message 
of inf er ior ity about tr ibal law enforcement and tr ibal courts, t hat is, t hat 
tr ibes cannot handle felonies. And it robs the tr ibal commun ity of leaders hip 
in one of the most important areas of governance: ma intenance of publ ic 
safety and crim inal just ice. In some respects, t he system can create a vac­
uum of tr ibal leaders hip on publ ic safety issues that can e xacerbate cr ime 
problems by s idel in ing t he people who m ig ht be best able to address these 
ser ious issues. 
Cons ider the pol it ical ramificat ions at t he tr ibal level. In myr iad ways, 
federal prosecutors need the ass istance of tr ibal governments in prosecut ing 
Ind ian country cases. T hey may need ev idence from a tr ibal reg istrar t hat a 
1 29. WAKELING ET AL., supra note 42, at 1 3-14. 
1 30. Id. 
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particular victim or defendant is a tribal member.1 3 1  Or they may need offi­
cial tribal real property records documenting the status of the land on which 
the offense occurred. Or they may simply need help locating witnesses. But 
even in circumstances in which the assistance of tribal officials is crucial to 
the prosecution of the case, it may be politically problematic for a tribal of­
ficial to appear to be assisting federal prosecutors in the prosecution of a 
tribal member.
1 32 In such a case, the system essentially asks a tribal official 
to take sides not only against one of his own constituents but with a long­
time enemy. In that respect, the "cavalry effect" may animate tribal officials 
in the same way that it takes hold in Indian families; it may make tribal offi­
cials reluctant to assist federal prosecutors. 
The existence of the federal prosecutor thus creates structural barriers to 
tribal participation in the prosecution. While tribal leaders may be criticized 
when they fail to provide assistance in such circumstances (and perhaps they 
should be), these structural problems simply do not exist in other federal 
prosecutorial contexts or in state prosecutions of crimes equivalent to those 
enumerated in the Major Crimes Act. This handicap is created solely by the 
dynamics of the federal scheme. 
Other serious political ramifications exist as well. Tribal officials are 
likely more knowledgeable than federal officials about remote Indian reserva­
tions and are also likely to be much more responsive to the tribal community. 
Yet a tribal leader running for election would be ill-advised to promise his 
constituents that he could address serious public safety and criminal justice 
problems on the reservation; he simply lacks control of the key resources.1 33 
To make such a promise, he would need to have assurances from federal offi­
cials. Given the history of promises by federal officials, even in sacred 
treaties, a tribal official would be foolish to count on any such assurance. As a 
result, even in circumstances in which tribal governments do not actively seek 
to frustrate federal prosecutions, tribal leaders are much less likely to be in­
vested in felony criminal justice. One of the telltale signs of the lack of official 
interest in these issues is the fact that crime statistics are so difficult to obtain 
for Indian reservations. 1
34 One would be hard-pressed to find a mayor of a 
major American city who was unaware of the crime rate for that city. Yet tribal 
leaders do not routinely collect such data and would be hard-pressed to an­
swer such a question, partially no doubt because they often do not have line 
authority over the law enforcement officers involved.1 35 If tribal political 
1 3 1 .  United States v. Prentiss, 273 F.3d 1 277 ( 10th Cir. 200 1 )  (suggesting that proof of tribal 
status of victim and or defendant may be an element of the offense). 
1 32. See, e.g. , United States v. Velarde, 40 F. Supp. 2d 1 3 1 4  (D.N.M. 1 999). In Velarde, the 
Jicarilla Apache Tribe sought to quash federal subpoenas that the United States Attorney served on 
various tribal officials in order to establish jurisdiction over a defendant accused of raping an eight­
year-old child. Id. The court rejected the tribe's efforts to prevent federal prosecutors from gaining 
access to tribal records. Id. at 1 3 1 5 . 
133 .  See supra text accompanying notes 20-57. 
1 34. See WAKELING ET AL., supra note 42, at vii (explaining that, for a variety of reasons, 
tribal-level data about crime in Indian country is unavailable). 
1 35 .  Id. 
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leaders are unwilling to use their limited resources or stake their reputations 
on improvement in this key area of tribal public policy, then improvements 
may never occur. 
Viewed from the standpoint of federal officials, the situation is equally 
untenable. The existence of exclusively federal jurisdiction for felonies in 
Indian country shifts the apparent responsibility to maintain institutions that 
help to provide safe reservation environments away from local tribal offi­
cials and toward federal o fficials. 136 The tribal leaders who have been 
rendered impotent by the scheme theoretically can criticize and blame the 
federal prosecutors but must shoulder little of the blame or accountability 
for the problem. Thus, while federal prosecutors lack any sense of account­
ability, they also likely do not even feel much appreciation for their work in 
many cases. 
In short, the federal Indian country regime creates an unfortunate and 
indefensible paradox. It wrests control of the key and inherently local issue 
of felony criminal justice away from tribal leadership and places control 
over these issues in the hands of federal officials who have little account­
ability to the tribal community and little incentive to be responsive. The 
result is not only irrational from a criminal justice standpoint ; it is contrary 
to the stated federal policies of tribal self -determination and self­
gove mance. 
C. Concluding Thoughts about Federal Prosecutors137 
Locating the power to prosecute in a federal official from outside the 
reservation poses numerous practical problems, such as difficulty in obtain­
ing the cooperation of witnesses at trial, and creates structural problems by 
often converting the tribal government into an opponent of the prosecution , 
even when the prosecution would otherwise have worked to produce a safer 
reservation environment. The cavalry effect and other problems related to 
the Indian country criminal justice system in flict serious costs on the com­
munity and serious damage to individual Indian defendants and victims. 
This model of criminal justice, in which prosecutions are handled by an out­
side authority and not the tribal government, creates a system that smacks 
more of colonialism than of rational criminal justice policy. It simply is not 
consistent with mode m principles of federal Indian policy and it is dys func­
tional from the standpoint of federal criminal justice policy. It is for this 
reason that federal Indian country prosecutions should be "de-colonize d." 
136. Cf Simons, supra note 67, at 93 1 ("When Congress expands the Department [of Jus­
tice's] authority to fight local crime, it also expands the Department's responsibility to fight local 
crime." (emphasis added)). 
1 37. Because of the practical problems noted above and others, critical questions can also be 
raised about the ability of federal defenders to provide competent representation in Indian country 
cases. In the interest of space, the author leaves that subject for another day. 
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I I I. JURIES AND JURY COMPOSITION IN INDIAN C OUNTRY 
While the prosecutor is ideally supposed to "represent" the community, 
the greatest opportunity for the community to participate affirmatively in the 
administration of criminal justice is, of course, through juries. In the Ameri­
can criminal justice system, the jury trial is constituted not only as a key 
procedural safeguard to the defendant, but to give the community a central 
role in the administration of criminal justice. 138 
The importance of the jury has been dramatically underscored-and 
strongly reaffirmed-in a series of recent Supreme Cou rt cases. In Jones v. 
United States, 139 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 140 R ing v. A rizona, 141 Blakely v. 
Washington, 142 and United States v. Booker143 the Supreme Court used the 
Si xth Amendment to strike down state and federal laws that sought to limit 
the role of the jury in American criminal justice . Juries were given a hal­
lowed role in the American judicial system when the founders created the 
Constitution and the Bill of Rights. And, as these cases illustrate, that role is 
just as important to the criminal trial today as it was then. For reasons set 
forth more fully below, the Indian country community tends to be absent 
from the juries that hear Indian country cases. Because of the central impor­
tance of community participation, through juries, in insuring the legitimacy 
of federal convictions, I argue that the absence of the Indian community is a 
serious problem. This Part will e xplain why juries are important, how the 
Supreme Court and Congress have sought to ensure their representativeness, 
why Indian country juries fall short, and why challenges to this system have 
been unsuccess ful. 
A. The Centrality of the Jury in A merican Criminal Justice 
The Constitution guarantees that "trial of all crimes . . .  shall be by Jury ; 
and such Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have 
been committed."144 The Si xth Amendment creates additional rules, guaran­
teeing, inter alia, "the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury 
of the State" and that the trial occur in the "district wherein the crime shall 
1 38. Some scholars, such as Akhil Amar, argue that community involvement is not merely a 
safeguard for the defendant, but also represents the community's independent right to be involved in 
criminal justice. AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 
( 1 998). 
1 39. 526 U.S. 227 (1999) (holding that facts rendering defendant subject to greater statutory 
penalties must be treated as elements of the offense and found by the jury). 
140. 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (finding that facts increasing penalty beyond statutory maximum 
must be found by the jury). 
1 4 1 .  536 U.S. 584 (2002) (noting that the presence or absence of aggravating factors that 
would lead to imposition of the death penalty must be found by jury). 
142. 542 U.S. 296 (2004) (determining that facts relevant to mandatory guidelines must be 
found by the jury). 
143. 1 25 S. Ct. 738 (2005) (recognizing that the Federal Sentencing Reform Act did not meet 
the Sixth Amendment requirements for jury involvement in sentencing). 
144. U.S. CONST. art. ill, § 2. This is often referred to as the "venue requirement." 
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have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained 
b 1 ,,145 y aw . . . . 
While the language of the Sixth Amendment is phrased as a guarantee 
of the rights of the criminal defendant, both the Sixth Amendment and 
Article I ll's trial provision are thought to serve a valuable community in­
terest as well : insuring the community's participation in the criminal • • 146 JUSt ice system. 
The motivation for enacting these provisions can be found in key events 
that occurred shortly before this nation's founding.147 Following the Boston 
Massacre in which British soldiers were accused of killing American colo­
nists, the British soldiers were tried in Boston before local juries.148 Because 
the British Parliament wished to prevent future trials of British soldiers, 
which might occur before biased juries, the British Parliament enacted the 
Administration of Justice Act that provided that British officials would 
thereafter be taken to England and tried there for crimes in the colonies. 149 
This Act was one of the " Intolerable Acts" complained of in the Declaration 
of Independence.150 Thus, at the time of the founding of the Republic, the 
Founders had clear reason to be aware of the need to preserve local partici ­
pation in criminal justice, through the jury system. 151 
The Founders' concerns for preserving local control over criminal jus ­
tice continue to inform interpretation of the constitutional provisions that 
they drafted. Writing for the Court in Smith v. Texas152 in 1 940, Justice Black 
described juries as "instruments of public justice" and held that a jury must 
be constituted in large measure in a manner that ensures that it is "a body 
145 .  U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
146. See Toni M. Massaro, Peremptories or Peers?-Rethinking Sixth Amendment Doctrine, 
Images, and Procedures, 64 N.C. L. REV. 501 ,  546 ( 1 986) ("One function of the jury, although not 
the only function, is to satisfy a community-centered interest in participation in the justice system 
by injecting representative community voices and values into the decision process."); see also 
Nancy J. King & Rosevelt L. Noble, Felony Jury Sentencing in Practice: A Three-State Study, 57 
VAND. L. REV. 885, 888 (2004) ("Theoretically, jury sentences would take into account the full 
range of penalties authorized by the legislature and mirror community norms concerning retribution, 
deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation."). King and Noble also refer to juries as a "commu­
nity-based barometer" of punishment. Id. 
147. See generally AMAR, supra note 1 38, at 106; see also BERNHARD KNOLLENBERG, 
GROWTH OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 1 766-1775, at 66-69 ( 1 975) (discussing colonial up­
heaval over British attempts to remove treason trials to Great Britain in 1 769). 
148. See generally HILLER B. ZOBEL, THE BOSTON MASSACRE 225-303 (1970) (providing a 
detailed account of the Boston Massacre trials, jury selections, and effects of the verdicts on the 
Boston population). 
1 49. KNOLLENBERG, supra note 1 47,  at 1 1 9 (discussing outrage over the Administration of 
Justice Act labeled "The Murdering Act" by many colonials); Steven A. Engel, The Public's \!ici­
nage Right: A Constitutional Argument, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 658, 1 683 (2000). 
150. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 7  (U.S. 1 776). 
1 5 1 .  See generally Engel, supra note 1 49, a t  1 684-85 (discussing how the Continental Con­
gress responded to British attempts to remove trials from the hands of local juries: "The Continental 
Congress understood the vicinage presumption to be a structural property of the 'great right,' one 
that served not only the interests of the defendant, but those of the community as well"). 
1 52. 3 1 1 U.S. 1 28, 1 30 ( 1 940). 
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truly representative of the community."153 Shortly thereafter , in Glasser v. 
United States, 154 the Court indicated that a representative jury is fundamental 
to the "basic concepts of a democratic society and a representative govern-
t 
,,155 men . 
The notion that the jury 's primary purpose is to represent the community 
comes through in many modern cases as well. In Taylor v. Louisiana, 156 for 
example, the Supreme Court held that the constitutional notion of trial by 
jury implicitly "presupposes a jury drawn from a pool broadly representative 
of the community."15 Highlighting the "political function" of the jury , the 
Supreme Court explained , "the jury is designed not only to understand the 
case , but also to reflect the community's sense of justice in deciding it."158 
According to the Court, " [c ]ommunity participation in the administration of 
the criminal law . . . is . . .  critical to public confidence in the fairness of the 
criminal justice system."159 
It would take many pages to provide a full catalogue of the Supreme 
Court's statements as to the role that juries serve in the American criminal 
justice system. The most consistent theme underlying all of these functions , 
however, is that the jury provides a role for the community in criminal jus­
tice.160 A recent case reflects the essence of much of the Supreme Court's 
rhetoric : 
The opportunity for ordinary citizens to participate in the administration of 
justice has long been recognized as one of the principle j ustifications for 
retaining the jury system . . . .  
Jury service preserves the democratic element of the law, as it guards the 
right of parties and ensures continued acceptance of the laws by all the 
people. It affords ordinary citizens a valuable opportunity to participate in 
a process of government, an experience fostering, one hopes, a respect for 
law. Indeed, with the exception of voting, for most citizens, the honor and 
153. Smith, 3 1 1  U.S. at 1 30. Professor Massaro argues that this represents the first time the 
Court recognized the interest of community values in this context. See Massaro, supra note 1 46, at 
532. Professor Randall Kennedy finds such an interest recognized as early as Strauder v. West °Vir­
ginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1 880). RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 1 70 ( 1997). 
1 54. 3 1 5  U.S. 60 ( 1942). 
1 55. Glasser, 3 1 5  U.S. at 85. 
1 56. 419  U.S. 522 (1975). 
1 57.  Taylor, 419 U.S. at  530-3 1 (quoting Thiel v .  S. Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 2 1 7, 227 ( 1 946) 
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting)). 
1 58. Id. at 529 & n.7 (quoting with approval a House Report on the Jury Selection and Ser­
vice Act of 1968, H.R. REP. No. 90- 1076, at 8 ( 1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1 797). 
159. Id. at 530. 
160. See Massaro, supra note 146, at 5 1 2  ("Popular participation in criminal trials also serves 
community interests . . . .  Juries . . .  satisfy the community's desire to participate in, and conse­
quently to effect some control over, the criminal justice system. The jury interjects community 
conscience into the process, if only symbolically."). 
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privilege of jury duty is their most significant opportunity to participate in 
the democratic process. 
161 
The Supreme Court has also suggested myriad ways in which juries improve 
the quality of criminal justice, many of which hinge directly on community 
involvement. One broad way that juries improve the criminal justice system 
is simply by providing twelve different human perspectives on the evidence 
and thus improving the quality of the ultimate verdict. 162 
Perhaps one of the most compelling functions of the jury is to serve as 
one of the "checks and balances" in American governance.163 The jury 
guards against official corruption by pulling together a group of citizens and 
empowering them to watch over the work of the prosecutor and the judge. 164 
The jury interposes the "common sense judgment" of the community be­
tween the defendant and powerful government officials. 165 For many of these 
reasons, the Supreme Court held in Duncan v. Louisiana166 that juries are 
fundamental to our system of ordered liberty and that the Fourteenth 
Amendment's due process provision incorporates the right to a trial by jury 
and thus requires state courts to provide juries. 
Another major function that juries serve is overtly political and it goes in 
two directions. Just as communities, through juries, affect the administration 
of criminal justice, the criminal justice system uses the jury to educate the 
public and to ensure the legitimacy of the system. Jury duty "educates citi­
zens in the mechanics of their justice system."167 Juries ensure "public 
confidence in the fairness of the criminal justice system"168 and ensure pub-
1 6 1 .  Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 406-07 ( 1 99 1 )  (quotation marks and citations omitted). 
Given the rhetoric of Supreme Court cases, one can easily see why some of the members of Con­
gress who favored passage of the Major Crimes Act thought that participation in federal criminal 
justice might have the effect of "civilizing" and assimilating the Indians. The problem is that adop­
tion of the Major Crimes Act did not come hand-in-hand with Indian participation on federal juries 
or in any role in the j udicial process, other than as defendants. 
1 62. Taylor, 4 19 U.S. at 535 (discussing the "quality of community judgment represented by 
the jury in criminal trials"). 
1 63.  Duncan v.  Louisiana, 39 1 U.S. 145, 155-56 ( 1 968). 
1 64. Id. at 155.  By placing the ultimate decisionmaking powers in the jury, the existing struc­
ture guards against corruption of judicial officers. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST PRINCIPLES 1 2 1  (1997) (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 83 (Alexander 
Hamilton)). 
1 65. See Massaro, supra note 146, at 5 1 0. 
1 66. 391 U.S. 145 ( 1968). 
167. Massaro, supra note 146, at 5 1 5; see also Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 400 ( 1990); 
Nancy J. King, Postconviction Review of Jury Discrimination: Measuring the Effects of Juror Race 
on Jury Decisions, 92 MICH. L. REV. 63, 1 1 5 ( 1 993) ("In addition, because jury trials educate jurors 
in self-governance, deterring discriminatory jury selection practices helps to ensure that all citizens 
have an equal opportunity for the civic education jury service provides." (citation omitted)); Mas­
saro, supra note 146, at 5 1 5  ( .. A powerful reminder of the educational aspect of jury trials is the 
positive reaction many citizens have to their service as jurors. Moreover, to the extent their encoun­
ter with the justice system increases jurors' respect for judgments, it preserves government power." 
(citation omitted)). 
1 68. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419  U.S. 522, 530 ( 1 975). 
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li e acce ptance of judicial outcomes.169 They "satisfy the community's desire 
to partici pate in , and consequently to effect some control over, t he criminal 
justice system. "170 It is for t his reason t hat some Justices would even hold 
t hat the Eig hth Amendment proscri ption on cruel and unusual punis hment 
contains an im plicit principle t hat capital punis hment may be imposed only 
by a jury and not by a judge ; t he jury has a "com parative advantage " over 
t he judge in ex pressing "t he community 's moral sensibility " and is more 
li kely to "ex press t he conscience of the community."11  
B. Representative Juries and Anti-Discrimination in Jury Composition 
Because of t he key role t hat t he jury plays in representing t he commu­
nity , t he Supreme Court began addressing racially discriminatory jury 
com position soon after t he Civil War. In Strauder v. West Virginia172 in 1 879, 
t he Su preme Court overturned a blac k man 's murder conviction because t he 
state had ex plicitly excluded blac ks from serving on the jury , holding t hat 
t he Fourteent h Amendment's Equal Protection Clause pro hibits exclusion of 
blac k jurors from juries in state courts. T he Court discussed two different 
ty pes of rig hts in its decision. First , it recognized t hat the blac k community 
has a "rig ht to participate in t he administration of the law " t hat may not be 
denied t hroug h racially discriminatory state laws.173 Second , t he Court rec ­
ognized t he rig ht of t he blac k defendant to a trial by a jury selected wit hout 
discrimination against ot hers of his race. 174 
The very next year , in Neal v. Delaware, t he Supreme Court held t hat 
eve n de facto discrimination was actionable.175 In t hat case , even t houg h 
Delaware's law was not explicit in excluding blac ks , t he Supreme Court 
overturned a blac k defendant's rape conviction on the basis of de facto dis­
crimination in lig ht of evidence establis hing that a blac k person had never 
served on a jury in t he entire state of Delaware.116 In ot her words , t he jury 's 
representative role was so important t hat t he Court was willing to protect it 
against even possibly accidental and unintentional actions t hat diminis hed 
t he jury 's re presentativeness. 
169. See id. ; see also Nancy J. King, Racial Jurymandering: Cancer or Cure? A Contempo­
rary Review of Affirmative Action in Jury Selection, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 707, 75 1 ( 1 993) (suggesting 
that a goal of race-conscious jury selection is that "it enhances public respect for criminal proceed­
ings and acceptance of their results"); Massaro, supra note 146, at 5 1 7  ("[J]ury selection procedures 
must produce juries that correspond to people's images of a fair jury. Otherwise, people will distrust 
jury verdicts regardless of the 'correctness' of those results on the merits, and the jury will lose the 
respect essential to effective decision making."). 
1 70. Massaro, supra note 146, at 5 1 2. 
1 7 1 .  Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 6 13-14 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring) (citing Justice 
Stevens's dissent in Harris v. Alabama, 5 1 3  U.S. 504, 5 1 5-26 (1 995)). 
1 72. 100 U.S. 303 ( 1 880). 
1 73. Strauder, 100 U.S. at 308; see also KENNEDY, supra note 153, at 1 69-7 1 .  
1 74. Strauder, 100 U.S. at 309. 
1 75. 103 U.S. 370 ( 1 8 8 1 ). 
1 76. Neal, 103 U.S. at 370. 
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During the next century, the Court 's jurispru dence on juries expan de d  
tremen dously. I n  the 1930s, the Court use d the prece dent in Neal v. Dela­
ware to overturn convictions of black def en dants in an Alabama county in 
which no living person coul d remember a black person ever serving on a 
jury 177 and in a Kentucky county in which no black person ha d serve d in the 
previous thirty years. 178 
In 1968, during the civil rights movement, Congress enacte d a law gov­
erning the selection of f ederal juries that co difie d much of the anti­
discrimination jurisprudence enunciate d by the Supreme Court in these 
cases an d others. The Jury Selection an d Service A d79 ( "JS S A") now pro­
vi des the basic legal rules that apply to jury selection in fe deral cases, 
inclu ding those arising in In dian country. The J S S A  generally provi des that 
all litigants in fe deral courts who are entitle d to trial by jury "shall have the 
right to gran d and petit juries selecte d at ran dom from a fair cross section of 
h 
. ,, 180 t e commu mty. 
While the statutory rules for jury selection apply in both civil an d 
criminal cases, the Supreme Court has elevate d the J S S A's rules to consti­
tutional status in criminal cases, hol ding that the Sixth Amen dment 
guarantee of an "impartial" jury means a jury that is selecte d from a venire 
that constitutes a " fair cross section of the community."181 Despite the 
statutory gui dance in the J S S A, Supreme Court case law continues to in­
form the analysis substantially. 
In Duren v. Missouri, 182 the Supreme Court set forth an analytical ap­
proach to determine whether the fair cross section requirement was violate d. 
To prove such a claim, the defen dant must establish: 
( I )  that the group alleged to be excluded is a distinctive group in the com­
munity; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which 
juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of 
such persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due 
to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process. 183 
While the requirement of a fair cross-section does not exten d to the final 
composition of the jury, 184 racial discrimination in the selection of the jury is 
1 77. Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 ( 1935). 
1 78.  Hale v .  Kentucky, 303 U.S.  6 13  ( 1938). 
1 79. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1 861-1869 (2000). 
1 80. 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (2000). 
1 8 1 .  See Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 477 ( 1 990); Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 
( 1 979); Taylor v. Louisiana, 4 1 9  U.S. 522, 528 ( 1975). Because federal law does not distinguish 
between the methods of selection of the pools from which grand or petit juries are chosen and the 
similar community representative purposes of each type of jury, the courts have treated issues as to 
the selection of either type of jury similarly. See generally 28 U.S.C. §§ 1 861-1 869 (2000)). 
1 82. Duren, 439 U.S. 357 ( 1 979). 
1 83 .  Id. at  364 (internal quotations omitted). 
1 84. Taylor, 4 1 9  U.S. at 538; see also Holland, 493 U.S. 474 ( 1990). In Holland, the Court 
indicated that the Sixth Amendment requires a venire that is representative of the community so that 
a jury will be "drawn from a representative cross section of the community," id. at 480 (quoting 
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c onsidered an unconstituti onal "ha rm" to the "entire c ommunity" that "un­
dermine [ s ]  public c onfidence in the fairness of our system of justice."185 
F ocusing primarily on A frican Americans, Pr ofess or Randall Kennedy 
has addressed many of the pr oblems related t o  underrepresentati on of mem­
bers of min ority gr oups on juries. As Kennedy has explained, the failure t o  
include A frican Americans on juries regarding crimes that affect their c om­
munities can have serious practical ramifications. 186 A c ommunity denied its 
pr oper r ole in the cri minal justice system may feel aggrieved and may seek 
justice by other means. C onsider, for example, the trial against white p olice 
officers accused of beating A frican American R odney King, which was 
moved out of Los Angeles t o  Simi Valley, a predominantly white suburb. 
When the Simi Valley jury returned n ot guilty verdicts on the m ost seri ous 
charges, members of the black c ommunity in Los Angeles perceived a mis­
carriage of justice. The ensuing ri ot was the most destructive in the United 
States in the twentieth century, culminating in fi fty -tw o deaths, th ousands of 
injuries, and nearly a billi on dollars of pr operty damage. 187 In any e vent, 
p ositive law in the United States has created general rules that ensure the 
R odney King case is excepti onal. American law is generally pr otective of 
the jury's c ommunity-representative r ole in cri minal justice. 
C. Underrepresentation of Native Americans on Indian Country Juries 
Despite the n ormative principle of representativeness, Indians tend n ot 
to  be well represented in federal juries in Indian c ountry cases. E ven in 
states with large Indian populations, Indians remain a very small fracti on of 
the p opulati on. 188 As a result, Indians would be expected t o  have minimal 
representati on in the jury venire. H owever, the statistics indicate l ower 
numbers than one w ould expect. Underrepresentati on e ven of the existing 
small fracti on of the p opulati on may occur for a variety of reas ons. First, 
Indians are am ong the p oorest Americans. 189 Because juries in m ost federal 
Taylor, 419 U.S. at 527), but that "[t]he 'representativeness' constitutionally required at the venire 
stage can be disrupted" for good reason while empanelling the jury through the exercise of peremp­
tory and cause strikes against particular members, id. at 483. 
1 85. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 87 ( 1986). 
1 86. KENNEDY, supra note 1 53, at 1 17-1 8. 
1 87. Id. ; see also Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81  ( 1996). Such civil unrest may be effec­
tive in gaining the attention of policymakers in ways that mere case law cannot. 
1 88. Even in the states with the largest percentages of American Indians, Indians account for 
less than twenty percent of the total population and usually less than ten percent. See STELLA U. 
0GUNWOLE, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CENSUS 2000 BRIEF: THE AMERI­
CAN INDIAN AND ALASKA NATIVE POPULATION: 2000, at 5 (2002). 
1 89. Yair Listokin, Confronting the Barriers to Native American Home Ownership on Tribal 
lands: The Case of the Navajo Pannershipfor Housing, 33 URB. LAW. 433, 434-35 (200 1 )  ("Indi­
ans are among the poorest Americans. In 1990, almost one third (3 1 .2 percent) lived in poverty­
much higher than the 1 990 national 1 3.5 percent poverty rate." (citation omitted)); see also Russel 
Lawrence Barsh, The Challenge of Indigenous Self-Determination, 26 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 277, 
287 ( 1993) (declaring Indians to be "among the poorest Americans"). 
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dist ricts are ch osen fr om state v oter r olls, 190 "fe de ral jury veni res un derrep­
resent the poor" who are less likely t o  register to  v ote an d, even if they have 
registe re d, are m ore likely t o  have move d since they last registe re d.191 
Even asi de fr om p overty, Indians may well have l ower rep resentati on in 
the p otential p ool than their small abs olute numbe rs might fo recast. In dians 
are, for e xample, li kely t o  be far m ore investe d in their tribal g overnments 
than state governments.192 Since juries are routinely selecte d fr om v ote r reg­
istrati on lists of state p olitical sub divisi ons, even relatively p olitically active 
an d aware tribal members may nevertheless not be represente d if they focus 
thei r activism s olely within the tribal government. While the JS S A  seems t o  
all ow use of tribal v oting registration lists, it does not require such use. 193 
Perhaps m ost imp ortant, h owever, is the ge ographic aspect of the p rob­
lem. The fe deral districts that include Indian reservati ons are physically 
am ong the largest in the Unite d States.194 Because of the t remen dous sizes of 
the districts, each ju dicial district is divi de d  int o multiple divisi ons. M ost 
fede ral c ourts are l ocate d in la rger cities, and they ten d to assemble jury ve­
nires fr om the divisi on in which they sit. An d even if the c ou rt attempts t o  
assemble juries fr om a divisi on that includes In dian reservati ons, the t rial 
may well be hel d in an even m ore distant l ocati on in an othe r divisi on.195 
1 90. See Jury Selection and Service Act of 1978, 28 U.S.C. § 1 863(b)(2) (2000) (indicating 
that each federal district must create its own plan for jury selection and indicating that such plan 
shall use voter registration records or lists of actual voters from political subdivisions within the 
state); see also King, supra note 169, at 7 12-1 7  (discussing some of the factors-for example, un­
representative voter registration lists, mobility of population, educational history-that make 
minorities less likely to be represented fairly in jury pools). 
1 9 1 .  Mitchell S. Zuklie, Comment, Rethinking the Fair Cross-Section Requirement, 84 CAL. 
L. REV. I O I ,  1 03--04 ( 1996) (collecting studies across the country concluding that the poor are 
underrepresented) .  
192.  Some Indians feel  that the unilateral extension of American citizenship to them without 
their consent was an act of "cultural genocide." See, e.g., Robert B. Porter, The Demise of the Ong­
wehoweh and the Rise of the Native Americans: Redressing the Genocidal Act of Forcing American 
Citizenship upon Indigenous Peoples, 1 5  HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 107 ( 1999). It would be fair to 
assume that many Native Americans holding these views might not register to vote in federal or 
state elections. 
1 93. The JSSA allows the names of prospective jurors to be selected from the "voter registra­
tion lists or the lists of actual voters of the political subdivisions within the district or division." 28 
U.S.C. § 1 863(b)(2); see also United States v. Bushyhead, 270 F.3d 905, 909-10 (9th Cir. 200 1 )  
(describing the Nevada federal jury selection plan as using the voter registration information only of 
state and county offices and not of tribal governments). 
1 94. There are ninety-four federal judicial districts in the United States and one United States 
Attorney for each judicial district. From a geographical standpoint, the largest federal judicial dis­
tricts are, in descending order, the Districts of Alaska, Montana, New Mexico, Arizona, and Nevada. 
The states of Arizona, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, and South Dakota are each comprised of a 
single statewide federal judicial district and each includes substantial Indian country jurisdiction. 
The United States Attorney's Office in Alaska, which has very little Indian country jurisdiction, has 
approximately twenty Assistant United .States Attorneys in total and a small number of support staff. 
U.S. Attorney's Office, District of Alaska. http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/ak/info/administrative.htm 
(last visited Nov. 27, 2005). In Arizona, in contrast, Indian country makes up nearly twenty percent 
of the land mass within the state. And in contrast to the small office in Alaska, the United States 
Attorney's Office in Arizona has approximately 275 employees. U.S. Attorney's Office, District of 
Arizona, http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/az/index.html (last visited Aug. 24, 2005). 
1 95. See United States v. Nakai, 4 1 3  F.3d 10 19  (9th Cir. 2005). 
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Reservations are often located at great distances from the principle cities 
where federal courts sit. 
Consider, for example, the federal District of Arizona. In Arizona, the 
Navajo reser vation sends more cases to the United States Attorney's Office 
than all other tribes in the state combined. 196 Federal trials of these cases 
routinely occur in Prescott or Phoenix. As the figure below indicates, Pres­
cott is around one hundred miles, as the crow flies, from the closest point on 
the Navajo Reservation and more than two hundred miles from the heart of 
that reservation. By highway, these distances are much greater. 
FIGURE I 
ARIZONA INDIAN RESERVATIONS AND DISTRICT COURT VENUES 
0 25 50 1 00 Miles 
I I I I I I I I 
1 96. PAUL K. CHARLTON, U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZ., U.S. DEP'T 
OF JUSTICE, 2004 INDIAN COUNTRY REPORT 64-69 (2004), http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/az/reports/ 
2004rpt/azusao.pdf. 
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Now consider the fede ral District of Minnesot a. Though Minnesot a is 
somewh at sm aller th an A rizon a, 197 the geog raphic re ality is simil ar. All of 
the fede ral Indi an count ry offenses in Minnesot a o rigin ate on two rese rv a­
tions, the Red Lake Reserv ation and the Bois Fort Reserv ation in the 
no rthern p art of the st ate. The fede ral c rimin al t ri als fo r  these rese rv ations 
routinely occur in the so-c alled Twin Cities of Minne apolis and St. P aul, 
which is whe re all of the fede ral dist rict court judges' ch ambe rs are lo­
c ated.198 As the figure below indic ates, both rese rv ations lie a t remendous 
dist ance from the Twin Cites, and the Red Lake reserv ation, which produces 
the v ast m ajority of the fede ral M ajo r C rimes c ases in the district, is p articu­
l arly remote from m ajo r highw ays, m aking it di fficult to re ach. 
As a result of the geog raphic facto rs and the other phenomen a men­
tioned p reviously, N ative Ame ric ans are poorly represented on all federal 
jury panels. Bec ause juries in Indi an count ry c ases are selected in the s ame 
m anner as all othe r federal c rimin al juries, Indi ans are almost neve r well­
rep resented as juro rs in Indi an country c ases. In th at sense, they sh are m any 
of the t radition al compl aints of other minority communities rel ated to the 
composition of juries.199 
197. Arizona at approximately 1 14,000 square miles is almost half again as large as Minne-
sota which encompasses less than 80,000 square miles. RAND MCNALLY & Co., THE ROAD ATLAS 
'05, at 8, 54 (2005). 
198. See U.S. District Court, District of Minn., http://www.mnd.uscourts.gov (last visited 
Nov. 13, 2005). 
199. Cf Laura G. Dooley, The Dilution Effect: Federalization, Fair Cross-Sections, and the 
Concept of Community, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 79, 80-8 1 (2004) (arguing that federal juries do not 
properly represent communities in urban drug offense cases because the federal jury is drawn differ­
ently than a jury that would be drawn under state law for a state prosecution); see also Paul Butler, 
Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal Justice System, 1 05 YALE L.J. 677 
( 1 995). Some cases have also addressed similar issues. E.g., United States v. Osorio, 801 F. Supp. 
966, 979-80 (D. Conn. 1 992) (defendant's challenge to a jury venire that excluded jurors from two 
of the most populous and most minority-dense cities from the venire). 
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FIGURE 2 . 
MINNESOTA INDIAN RESERVATIONS U NDER FEDERAL JURISDICTION 
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D. Legal Challenges 
Dr awing upon the leg al principles set forth in Duren v. Missouri, defen­
d ants in Indi an country c ases h ave ch allenged jury pool co mposition in a 
variety of circumst ances as being underrepresentative of N ative A meric ans.2 00 
200. Cf United States v. Gault, 14 1  F.3d 1 399 ( 1 0th Cir. 1998); United States v. Erickson, 75 
F.3d 470 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Herbert, 698 F.2d 981 (9th Cir. 1 983); United States v. 
Haworth, 948 F. Supp. 981 (D.N.M. 1996); United States v. Pleier, 849 F. Supp. 1321 (D. Alaska 
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In an early Eighth Circuit case, United States v. Clifford,201 the defen­
dant presented evidence that Indians living within the division from which 
the trial jury was selected constituted 15.6% of the total populace, but that 
only 8.4% of the jurors who served during a two -year period were Indian. 
This evidence demonstrated an "absolute disparity" (the difference be­
tween the figures) of 7.2% and a "comparative disparity" of 46%.202 In 
other words, each jury had, on average, 46% fewer Indians than it would 
have had if its composition matched the representation of Indians in the 
general population. 
Following an analysis that generally tracked the three-step Duren ap­
proach, 203 the Eighth Circuit recogni zed that Indians are a "distinctive 
group" that should be represented in a fair cross -section of the commu­
nity. 204 However, the Eighth Circuit held that the underrepresentation failed 
Duren 's second factor, which asks whether the group's representation is 
" fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the com­
munity."205 The court held that the disparity established by the evidence 
was not substantial enough as a matter of law to constitute a violation of 
the JS S A  or the Sixth Amendment. 206 Accordingly, the defendant was un­
able to establish a prima facie violation and was unable even to reach the 
third step of showing that the underrepresentation was due to "systematic 
exclusion." Since that time, other challenges in the Eighth Circuit have 
207 been equally unsuccess ful. 
The Tenth Circuit first addressed the issue at about the same time and 
reached a similar result. In United States v. Yazzie,208 an Indian defendant 
presented evidence that the proportion of Indians in the grand jury was 45% 
lower than the proportion of Indians over age eighteen in the general popu­
lation of the state. 209 The defendant also presented evidence that the 
proportion of jurors on the petit jury was 46% lower than the proportion of 
Indians in the general population over age eighteen in the division from 
which the jury was drawn. 210 The Tenth Circuit in Yazzie, like the Eighth 
Circuit in Clifford, held that such disparities were not substantial enough to 
1994 ). Because this Article is directed at cases prosecuted under the Major Crimes Act and not 
general federal laws, this Article will focus on cases that present the issue in Indian country. 
201 .  640 F.2d 1 50 (8th Cir. 198 1 ). 
202. Clifford, 640 F.2d at 1 54-55. 
203. See supra note 1 83 and accompanying text. 
204. Clifford, 640 F.2d at 1 54-55. 
205. Id. (citing Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 ( 1979)). 
206. Id. at 155-56. 
207. See United States v. Greatwalker, 356 F.3d 908 (8th Cir. 2004); United States v. Ireland 
62 F.3d 227 (8th Cir. 1995); United States v. Grey Bear, 883 F.2d 1 382 (8th Cir. 1989); United 
States v. Black Bear, 878 F.2d 213  (8th Cir. 1989); Peltier v. United States, 867 F.2d 1 1 25 (8th Cir. 
1989). 
208. 660 F.2d 422 ( 10th Cir. 1 98 1 ). 
209. Yazzie, 660 F.2d at 427. 
2 10. Id. 
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demonstr ate th at the venire w as "not [a] fair and re ason able" represent ation 
of the community. 21 1  Just as in the Eighth Circuit, no Indi an country defen­
d ant in the Tenth Circuit h as ever successfully ch allenged jury composition 
on such a b asis .212 
The issue h as also arisen regul arly in the Ninth Circuit. In United States 
v. Etsitty,213 a N avajo def end ant ch allenged the tr ansfer of a jury tri al from 
the District of Arizon a's Prescott Division of the court to the Phoenix Divi­
sion on the b asis th at the tr ansfer "deprived him of a jury venire th at 
reflected the l arge percent age of Indi ans in the Prescott Division."2 14 Accord­
ing to the court, the crimes occurred "within the territory of the Prescott 
Division," and the Prescott Division "cont ains sever al Indi an reserv ations, 
and consequently a f ar higher percent age of N ative Americ ans th an the 
Phoenix Division."215 The Ninth Circuit noted th at judges h ave tremendous 
discretion to tr ansfer c ases within the district and th at the jury selection pl an 
in the Phoenix Division fairly represents that division's population.2 16 De­
spite the fact th at the court h ad a loc al rule providing th at all c ases arising in 
either the Prescott or Phoenix Division would be tried in Phoenix, the court 
held th at the de fend ant h ad not presented sufficient evidence of a system atic 
tr ansf er of c ases from the Prescott Division to the Phoenix Division result­
ing in the exclusion of Indi an jurors bec ause the de fend ant f ailed to 
est ablish th at the loc al rule w as applied. 2 11 However, the court noted th at the 
system atic remov al of c ases from the Prescott Division to the Phoenix Divi­
sion would present a strong c ase for finding a system atic exclusion of 
Indi ans under Duren v Missouri.2 18 Thus, the court indic ated th at such a 
pr actice, if est ablished, would amount to an abuse of discretion. 219 
Given the cle ar l angu age in Etsitty, it w as not long before the issue arose 
ag ain in a c ase with a stronger evidenti ary record. In United States v. Foot­
racer,220 the district court h ad tr ansf erred the N av ajo de fend ant's tri al from 
Prescott to Phoenix ; the district court then denied the def end ant's motion to 
move the tri al b ack to Prescott. The def end ant argued on appe al th at the 
tr ansfer of his c ase from Prescott to Phoenix denied him a jury p anel com­
posed of a fair cross section of the community. 22 1 He presented evidence 
indic ating th at N ative Americ ans constituted 20.78% of the popul ation over 
2 1 1 .  Id. 
2 1 2. See, e.g., United States v. Pino, 708 F.2d 523 ( 10th Cir. 1983). 
2 1 3. United States v. Etsitty, 1 30 F.3d 420 (9th Cir. 1997), amended by 140 F.3d 1 274 (9th 
Cir. 1997). 
2 14. Etsitty, 1 30 F.3d at 424. 
2 1 5 . Id. at 424-25. 
2 1 6. /d. at 425. 
2 1 7. Id. at 425-26. 
2 1 8. Id. 
2 1 9. Id. at 425. 
220. 1 89 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 1999), withdrawn, 252 F.3d 1 059 (9th Cir. 2001) .  
22 1 .  Foot racer, 1 89 F.3d at I 060. 
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the age of eighteen in the Prescott Division, but only 1 .73% of the popula­
tion over the age of eighteen in the Phoenix Division. 222 The Ninth Circuit 
once again found that the third prong of Duren was not met. 223 The court 
departed, however, from the approach it had used in Etsitty and character ­
ized the key language in that case as dictum. Instead, it held that there was 
no systematic exclusion of Indians from the jury venire because the move 
f rom Prescott to Phoenix systematically excluded all residents of the Pres­
cott Division, not just Indians : " Native Americans are not treated differently ; 
they are excluded to the same extent as all other racial and ethnic groups in 
the Prescott Division."224 
A vigorous dissent by Judge Pregerson excoriated the majority for ig­
noring its w arning in Etsitty and for "importing the equal protection concept 
of disc riminatory intent into what is a straightforward Sixth Amendment fair 
cross-section challenge."225 A petition for rehearing was filed and the opin­
ion was withdrawn almost two years late r. 226 Meanwhile, shortly after 
Etistty, the federal district court in Arizona amended its local rules to pro­
vide that cases arising in the Prescott Division will be tried in Prescott.227 
The rule change presumably prevents a repeat of the issue in that district. 
The " fair cross -section" issue arose again the Ninth Circuit in United 
States v. Bushyhead. 228 The defendant , an Indian prosecuted for a murder on 
the Py ramid Lake Paiute Reservation in northern Nevada, a rgued that his 
conviction should be reversed because he was denied a panel constituting a 
" fair cross -section" of the community ; the jury selection plan in t he District 
of Nevada drew only from county voting lists and not from t ribal voting 
lists. 229 The Ninth Circuit rejected Bushyhead's argument. The J S S A  gener­
ally authorizes the dist rict court to select the political subdivisions from 
which it will obtain voting lists .210 It seems to allow, but does not require, the 
district court to select among other appropriate subdivisions of government 
from which it will draw lists.23 1 The Ninth Circuit noted that people living on 
reservations in Nevada also live within Nevada counties and thus are not 
purposefully excluded from the county voting lists ; they may register for 
222. Id. at 1 066 n. 1 (Pregerson, J., dissenting). 
223. Id. at 1 061-62. 
224. Id. 
225. Id. at 1 067 (Pregerson, J., dissenting). 
226. Footracer, 252 F.3d 1059, 1059 (9th Cir. 2001 ). The opinion was replaced with an unpub­
lished memorandum disposition that rejected the defendant's arguments with little analysis. United 
States v. Footracer, 1 6  F. App'x 595, 595-96 (9th Cir. 2001 )  (unpublished op.). The withdawal of 
the opinion surely reflects problems with the court's original analysis of this issue. 
227. Rules of Practice of the U.S. DIST. CT. FOR THE DIST. OF ARIZ. i . l (c) (2003) (rule relo-
cated to 77. l (c) in 2004). 
228. United States v. Bushyhead, 270 F.3d 905, 907 (9th Cir. 2001 ). 
229. Id. at 909. 
230. Id. at 9 1 0; see 28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(2) (2000). 
23 1 .  28 U.S.C. § l 863(b )(2). 
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el ections lik e any oth er citiz ens within thos e counties.23 2 Th erefor e, th e court 
h eld that Bushyh ead could not establish that th e jury sel ection plan was not 
fair or reasonabl e under Duren's s econd prong or that it caus ed "syst ematic 
exclusion" of Nativ e Am ericans under th e third prong. 233 Thus, th e Ninth 
Circuit joins th e Eighth and Tenth Circuits in never having ent ertained a 
successful challeng e by an Indian to an Indian country pros ecution for lack 
of a jury constituting a "fair cross-s ection" of th e community. Tog eth er th es e  
three circuits make up th e vast majority of Indian country jurisdiction in th e 
United Stat es. 
E. A Critique of Jury Composition Cases in Indian Country 
In each of the challeng es discuss ed above, th e parti es argu ed that th e 
jury pools fail ed to constitut e repr es entativ e cross-s ections of th e commu­
nity b ecaus e they excluded Nativ e Americans.234 Th e parti es and th e courts 
have mad e three g eneral typ es of analytical errors in th ese cas es. 
1. Representativeness and a Jury of One 's Peers 
First, in using th e standard d ev eloped in Duren v. Missouri, th e courts 
and th e litigants hav e lost sight of on e of th e original principles that ani­
mat ed Strauder: " [t ]h e  v ery idea of a jury is a body of men compos ed of th e 
peers or equals of th e p erson whos e rights it is s el ect ed or summoned to 
d etermin e; that is, of his neighbors, f ellows, associat es, persons having the 
same legal status in society as that which he holds." 23 5 
In Indian country cas es, obtaining jurors from th e ent ire district r esults 
in using jurors from outside th e Indian country jurisdiction of the court. Al­
though n eith er th e Constitution nor th e Sixth Am endment us e th e t erm 
"peers," th e Suprem e  Court has, from time to time indicat ed that th e right to 
trial by jury m eans a right to a jury of on e's peers. 236 Since th e t erm is not 
explicitly constitutional, it has nev er been eff ectiv ely d efined, at l east for 
federal purpos es. 237 How ev er, th e Court has sugg est ed that th e t erm is im­
plicit within th e d efinition of jury and that th e t erm m eans to include only 
thos e persons with th e same l egal status as th e defendant, thos e who live 
232. Bushyhead, 270 F.3d at 910.  
233.  Id. at 909-10. 
234. See, e.g. , id. at 907; United States v. Footracer, 189 F.3d 1058, 1 061  (9th Cir. 1 999), 
withdrawn, 252 F.3d 1 059 (9th Cir. 200 1 ); United States v. Yazzie, 660 F.2d 422, 426--28 ( 1 0th Cir. 
1981)  (finding no underrepresentation of Indians on jury venires); cf United States v. Raszkiewicz, 
1 69 F.3d 459, 462-Q7 (7th Cir. 1999) (rejecting non-Indian defendant's claim in a federal bank 
robbery case that the jury did not represent a fair cross-section of the community because, though it 
included "urban Indians," it did not include "reservation Indians"). 
235. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 ( 1 880) (emphasis added). 
236. See id. ; Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 4 1 1 ( 1972); see also Massaro, supra note 1 46, 
at 548 ("Although the United States Constitution makes no mention of 'peers,' most people believe 
the Constitution entitles them to a 'jury of their peers."'). 
237. See Massaro, supra note 1 46, at 548-50. 
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wit hin t he reac h of t he same laws.238 Since no off -reservation person can 
be prosecuted for an Indian country offense unless he ventures into Indian 
country and commits a crime, t he average juror in an Indian country case 
is simply not in any practical sense a "peer" to the defendant in t he case. 239 
Suc h a sc heme is t hus arguably contrary to the broader principle enunci­
ated in Strauder t hat a person s hould be judged by persons subject to t he 
same laws. 240 
2. Considering the Indian Law Context of These Cases 
Litigants and t he courts have also failed to give proper consideration to 
the Indian law context of t hese cases. As t he Supreme Court recognized 
w hen it first up held t he Major Crimes Act, " [Indians ] owe no allegiance to 
t he States, and receive from them no protection. Because of t he local ill feel­
ing, t he people of t he States w here t hey are found are often t heir deadliest 
enemies."241 Given t hat one of the justifications for t he Indian country crimi­
nal justice regime is t he federal government 's duty of protection toward 
Indians and, often, as against state authority (and state aut horit ies), how can 
state voter registration lists be the appropriate resources for creating a jury 
pool ? In ot her words, w hy s hould federal courts look to t he people w hom 
t he Supreme Court once described as t he Indians ' "deadliest enemies" to 
construct a jury pool t hat is impartial for purposes of t he Sixt h Amendment ? 
Viewed in t his lig ht, the defendant 's argument in Bushyhead was, in 
many ways, the most insight ful. The facts supporting t his case were far 
stronger t han t he Nint h Circuit recognized. In general, alt houg h the partici ­
pation of Indians in state elections seems to be growing,242 Indians can be 
expected to be far more invested in t heir tribal governments t han in state 
governments. On Indian reservati ons, tribal governments are often more 
salient t han state governments. Tribal governments often provide numerous 
services, suc h as medical and dental care, social services, sc hools and edu­
cation, and law enforcement. In ot her words, t he existence of tribal 
238. Strauder, J OO U.S. at 308. 
239. For a discussion about the importance of the inclusion of peers on a jury, see Massaro, 
supra note 146, at 552. Massaro finds that "[t]he idea behind the peer concept . . .  is to assure empa­
thy, not sympathy, for the accused. Empathy in this sense means the capacity for participating in or 
vicariously experiencing another's feelings, volitions, or ideas. It is a form of understanding." Id. 
She continues, "A jury that includes the defendant's peers-people who are able to identify with the 
defendant and his experiences-may view the prosecution's case very differently than would a jury 
of people who are merely 'impartial' or who are peers of the alleged victim." Id. 
240. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit's assertion in United States v. Footracer that "Native Americans 
are . . .  excluded [only] to the same extent as all other racial and ethnic groups in the Prescott Divi­
sion," 1 89 F.3d 1 058, 1 06 1  (9th Cir. 1999), withdrawn, 252 F.3d 1059 (9th Cir. 200 1 ), harkens back 
to Justice Field's dissent in Strauder, which plaintively explained that the black defendant in that 
case received a fair jury because he received exactly the same type of jury (twelve white males) that 
any white defendant received. Strauder, 100 U.S. at 3 1 2  (Field, 1., dissenting) (citing his own dis­
sent in Ex parte Virginia, 1 00 U.S. 339, 349-70 (1 880)). Such an approach thus seems patently 
inconsistent with the plain meaning of the majority opinion in Strauder. 
24 1 .  United States v. Kagama, 1 1 8  U.S. 375, 384 ( 1886). 
242. See generally La Veile, supra note 96. 
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governments tends to undermine the im portance of local and state govern­
ments. Tribal governments tend to provide even more services than state and 
local governments routinely provide to their own constituents. It is only 
natural that Indians have greater interest in their governments than in state 
governmental institutions. Thus, tribal citi zens may not have as much reason 
to partici pate in state elections and voting. 
While one might criticize Indians for "o pting out " o f  their right to par­
tici pate in the state electoral processes, the Indian country criminal justice 
regime implicitly condones the notion that Indians need not partici pate in 
state electoral politics. Indeed, federal la w creates criminal jurisdiction that 
is exclusively federal and tribal and thus serves to shield Indians from the 
in fluence o f  state officials. Under such circumstances, Indians might be ex­
pected to o pt out o f  state and local elections for officials who have little or 
no impact on their lives. The Major Crimes Act and other federal laws like it 
are designed to preserve a se parate existence for Indian tribes. Indeed, they 
presume to preserve each tribe's right to remain alienated from the state 
body politic. To some degree, the very purpose o f  an Indian reservation is to 
provide a re fuge from state governments. 243 Given this underlying rationale 
for Indian reservations, it is curious that federal courts would look to state 
voter rolls to find jurors. It undermines the very nature o f  a reservation as a 
sanctuary from state authority. 
3. Focusing on "The Community " 
Perha ps the most important error that the litigants and courts have made 
in these cases, ho wever, is failing to use the basic theory o f  Duren properly 
by failing to focus on the proper legal princi ples. In focusing on "fair cross­
section," each o f  these challenges has simply argued the wrong point. At­
tempting to achieve "a fair cross-section o f  the community" begs the most 
im portant question : what community ? 
While the routine approach to jury selection may be legitimate in the 
context o f  general federal criminal laws, the Indian count ry la ws are not 
federal la ws o f  general applicability with nation wide application. Indian 
country prosecutions are not brought to protect the national "community. " 
They are brought to protect the Indian reservation community. Thus, a jury 
pool that re presents a fair cross -section of the judicial district or a division 
thereo f will not constitute a cross-section, fair or other wise, o f  the Indian 
country community. And it is only the existence o f  the crime within the In­
dian country community that justifies federal jurisdiction. 
In Clifford, Etsitty, Yazzie, and even to some degree in Bushyhead, the 
defendants tried to shoeho rn other wise strong arguments into the wrong 
portion o f  the reasoning of Duren v. Missouri. In insuring a fair cross­
section o f  the community on the jury panel, Duren v. Missouri sought not to 
243. Cf Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 389 ( 1 976) (explaining that not even Public 
Law 280 was intended "to subject reservation Indians to the full sweep of state laws and state 
taxation"). 
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seek diversi ty for diversi ty's sake, bu t sough t to ensure represen ta tiveness 
o f  the communi ty so as to pro tec t the communi ty's cen tral role in criminal • • 244 JUSt1ce. 
While Duren was a ttemp ting to pro tec t the impor tan t role o f  the com­
muni ty, i t  may have seemed to be doing so in a manner tha t  ensured 
an tidiscrimina tion and even racial in tegra tion o f  the legal process. Bu t 
"an tidiscrimina tion" and in tegra tion principles are no t the appropria te norms 
for addressing a legal regime affec ting Indians in Indian country. The under­
lying jus tifica tion for a separa te Indian country regime is preserva tion o f  the 
tribal righ t to remain separa te and to avoid in tegra tion. 245 In o ther words, 
discrimina tion, or a t  leas t separa tism, is a posi tive norma tive principle in 
Indian law, no t a nega tive one, and no t one in favor o f  Indians as a race bu t 
in favor o f  tribes as dis tinc t poli tical organiza tions tha t  have a righ t to con­
tinue to exis t and exercise sel f-governance and sel f-de termina tion. 246 In tha t  
sense, the li tigan ts and cour ts should look to the deeper in ten tion o f  Duren v. 
Missouri, which was to ensure tha t  a communi ty is well -represented in i ts 
criminal jus tice regime. 247 
To frame the overarching problem in a slightly differen t way, jury panels 
in federal Indian country cases are no t underinclusive because they fail to 
include adequa te numbers o f  Na tive Americans bu t rather overinclusive be­
cause they include persons who do no t live in Indian coun try and are no t 
rou tinely subjec t to federal Indian coun try jurisdic tion. The composi tion o f  
Indian coun try juries is thus akin in the non -Indian con tex t to using a s ta te­
wide jury pool to adjudica te a local crime. No t only is such an approach 
difficult to jus ti fy as ma tter o f  criminal jus tice prac tice, i t  would viola te 
sta te cons ti tutions in many s ta tes. 248 A proper analysis thus involves a more 
care ful and explici t examina tion o f  the word "communi ty ." 
The " fair cross -sec tion o f  the communi ty" rhe toric grows from the Sixth 
Amendmen t's in teres t in crea ting an "impar tial jury." Federal courts have 
tended to cons true "communi ty" as the en tire judicial dis tric t in which the 
offense occurred or as a division, which is a smaller subuni t o f  the dis tric t. 249 
In other con tex ts, the Supreme Cour t has recognized tha t  defining commu-
244. See Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 365-66 ( 1 979). 
245. Reservations exist in the United States to preserve for Indians and Indian tribes a right to 
what Professor Wilkinson has called a "measured separatism," a sanctuary where they are shielded 
from the authority of state actors. CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME, AND THE 
LAW: NATIVE SOCIETIES IN A MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 1 1 3 ( 1 987). 
246. See, e.g., Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 (2000); United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 
64 1 ,  646 ( 1977); Morton v. Mancari, 4 1 7  U.S. 535 ( 1 974). 
247. See supra note 1 60. 
248. Brian C. Kalt, Crossing Eight Mile: Juries of the Vicinage and County-Line Criminal 
Buffer Statutes, 80 WASH. L. REV. 27 1 ,  272-333 (2005) (discussing state common-law principles 
and state constitutional provisions on trials by jury of the vicinage). 
249. See, e.g., Jeffers v. United States, 45 1 F. Supp. 1 338 (N.D. Ind. 1978) (holding that the 
term "community" is a term of art that refers to the total populace of the district or division where 
the court convenes). The Jury Selection and Service Act implicitly assumes such a construction. See 
28 U.S.C. § l 869(e) (2000). 
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nity is , to some degree , an exercise in existentialism : " [c ]ommunities differ 
at different times and places. "2 50 But rather t han creating fair cross-sections 
o f  t he communities served by and subject to t he Indian country legal regime , 
t he courts have ensured only t hat t he federal juries represent cross-sections 
o f  far different communities. 
In future cases , de fendants s hould make t he straig htfor ward argument 
t hat jurors in Indian country cases cannot be dra wn from addresses outside 
Indian country because " Indian country " is t he community t hat t he la w is 
designed to protect. 
Even under t he crabbed approac h t hat t he Eig hth, Ninth, and Tent h Cir­
cuits have used in construing Duren, Indian country defendants ought to be 
able to make better arguments t han t hey have presented in past cases. Indian 
de fendants have made a critical error in presenting to t he court statistics de­
scribing t he entire district or division in which t he court sits. T he language 
o f  Duren recognizes t hat state wide figures are not al ways t he relevant 
ones.2 5 1 W hile statistical numbers mig ht be difficult to obtain , t he commu­
nity o f  re ference for an Indian country case surely can be no greater t han t he 
geograp hical community t hat is subject to t he Indian country laws. T hus , 
defendants and defense attorneys s hould begin t heir analyses wit h  very di f­
ferent statistics t han have been presented in t he past. Specifically , t he 
beginning point for demonstrating disparity s hould be t he number o f  Indians 
wit hin Indian country communities , for it is only t hese communities t hat are 
wit hin t he Indian country jurisdiction o f  t he court. Given t hat Indians repre­
sent large majorities on Indian reservations , it s hould be easy to establis h 
substantial absolute disp arities and extremely large comparative disparities 
bet ween t heir representation in t he relevant population and t heir representa­
tion on jury venires and juries , especially in jurisdictions t hat hold trials in 
locations at great distances from t he Indian reservations. 
To evaluate t his argument in a real context , consider t he federal district 
o f  Arizona. Arizona's federal judicial district is divided into t hree divisions , 
the Prescott Division , t he P hoenix Division , and t he Tucson Division. O f­
fenses arising in t he Prescott Division are , t heoretically , set for trial in t he 
Prescott Division. And jurors for trials in t he Prescott Division are drawn 
from t he five nort hern Arizona counties t hat make up t he Prescott Division. 
T he Arizona portion o f  t he Navajo Nation lies wholly wit hin t he Prescott 
Division and , according to t he 2000 Census , has a little more t han 1 00,000 
people.2 52 A county-by-county survey o f  t he five counties t hat make up t he 
250. Taylor v. Louisiana, 4 1 9  U.S. 522, 537 ( 1 975). 
25 1 .  Duren seems to concede that the community of reference is "this community," that is, the 
one in which the crime occurred. See Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 365-66 (1 979). It further 
looked to the statistical data for Jackson County, which represents the jurisdiction of the state dis­
trict court in that case. Id. 
252. The actual number was 1 04,565. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, PROFILE OF SELECTED Eco­
NOMIC CHARACTERISTICS: 2000: GEOGRAPHIC AREA: NAVAJO NATION RESERVATION AND 0FF­
RESERVATION TRUST LAND (AZ PART) 3 (2000), available at http://www.indianaffairs.state.az.us/ 
tribes/Navajo.pdf. 
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Prescott Divisio n reveals that the Divisio n, as a whole , encompasses almost 
650,000 people .253 
FIGURE 3 
ARIZONA INDIAN RESERVATIONS AND DISTRICT COURT VENUES 
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Eve n assumi ng that Navajo reservatio n reside nts were as well repre­
se nted as those outside the reservatio n i n  the cou ntry rolls used to construct 
the jury pool, the average jury would be composed of jurors draw n over­
whelmi ngly f rom outside I ndia n cou ntry . As a resu lt , the I ndia n cou ntry 
253. See U.S. District Court, District of Arizona, Frequently Asked Questions (Aug. 8, 2005), 
http://www.azd.uscourts.gov/azd/courtinfo.nsf/court/faqs?opendocument; Arizona State & County 
QuickFacts, http://quickfacts.census.gov.qfd/states/04000.html (last visited Sep. 5, 2005). 
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commu nity is o nly we akly represe nted, if  at all, i n  the jury pool. As a 
pr actic al m atter, jury tri als th at are origi nally set for tri al i n  Prescott are 
quite o fte n moved to Phoe nix, which dr aws its jurors from the Phoe nix 
Divisio n. The Phoe nix Divisio n h as a sm aller I ndi an cou ntry l and b ase and 
an e normous metropolit an popul atio n, almost all o f  which is outside o f  
I ndi an cou ntry. B ased o n  the demogr aphic numbers alo ne, it is likely th at 
most juries he ari ng I ndian cou ntry c ases i n  Phoe nix l ack a si ngle I ndi an 
cou ntry reside nt . Such a jury simply c annot be fairly s aid to "represe nt" 
th at commu nity. 
The mor al force behi nd the pri nciple o f  commu nity represe nt ative ness is 
stro ng and, perh aps iro nic ally, eve n the N av ajo N atio n trib al courts h ave 
adopted it. 254 I n  Navajo Nation v. MacDonald, the N av ajo N atio n Supreme 
Court affirmed a jury selectio n process i n  which a trib al court clerk cre ated 
the jury ve nire by selecti ng names from the N av ajo N atio n voter rolls (all o f  
which are trib al members) and also selecti ng a ser ies o f  names th at did not 
appe ar to be N av ajo from the county voter registr atio n  rolls (which might 
well i nclude trib al members, or no nmember I ndi ans or no n-I ndi ans). 255 
The N avajo N atio n Supreme Court recog ni zed th at trib al courts h ave 
u nique problems selecti ng juries u nder such an appro ach ; no n- I ndi ans m ay 
not feel compelled to appe ar whe n summo ned for trib al jury duty.256 More­
over, the N av ajo N atio n Supreme Court's adoptio n o f  the fair cross -sectio n 
requireme nt does not appe ar to be compelled by the feder al I ndi an Civil 
Rights Act.257 I ndeed, although th at Act gu ar antees right to a jury tri al th at is 
i n  other respects somewh at bro ader th an the right to jury tri al set forth in  the 
feder al Co nstitutio n,258 the st atute actu ally omits the requireme nt for an "im­
p arti al" jury, which is the co nstitutio nal hook for the "fair cross-sectio n" 
requireme nt.259 The inte ntio nal omissio n o f  the requireme nt o f  an "imp ar­
ti al" jury m ay well h ave bee n i nte nded to preve nt trib al courts from bei ng 
forced to go outside the ir ow n membership rolls to fi nd jurors. I n  other 
words, the N av ajo N atio n courts provide a " fair cross -sectio n" right to de­
fend ants o f  the tribe's ow n accord eve n though it is not required by feder al 
l aw. This is some indic atio n o f  the esteem i n  which the trib al jurisdictio n 
with the si ngle l argest sw ath o f  I ndi an cou ntry feels about the pri nciple, a 
fact th at ought to be relevant to feder al policym akers. 
254. See 25 U.S.C. § 1 302 (2000). 
255. Navajo Nation v. MacDonald, N.L.R. Supp. 285 (Navajo 199 1 ). 
256. Id. at 286. 
257. 25 u.s.c. § 1 302. 
258. See 25 U.S.C. § 1 302( 1 0). This Act requires tribes to provide juries to anyone accused of 
an offense punishable by imprisonment. The federal Constitution only recognizes such a right for 
persons subject to a term of imprisonment for "serious offenses," which primarily refers to non-petty 
offenses, or those offenses which carry a prison term of greater than six months. See Duncan v. 
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 1 45, 1 59 ( 1 968); Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373 ( 1 966). 
259. As is its style, the Navajo Nation Supreme Court did not acknowledge the Indian Civil 
Rights Act in its opinion and chose to apply the principle on its own accord. MacDonald, N.L.R. 
Supp 285 (Navajo 1991 ). 
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In short, federal courts have erred in construing the relevant community 
as the entire judicial district, rather than considering which community the 
law seeks to protect. The Major Crimes Act and General Crime Act apply 
only within "Indian country" as that space is carefully defined in the United 
States Code.260 Indian country is an area in which the primary local govern­
mental entity-the Indian tribe-has been stripped of its own authority to 
prosecute and adjudicate felony offenses. Against this backdrop, these laws 
thus provide courts with clear direction as to which community these laws 
are designed to protect. While the word "community" may be ambiguous in 
the Sixth Amendment, in the JSSA, and even in Supreme Court doctrine, 
any ambiguity about the word in the Indian country context is erased by the 
explicit definitions of Indian country in federal law. Indeed, the federal dis­
trict courts would lack jurisdiction to prosecute most Indian country cases 
crimes if they had not arisen in Indian country. 
The crimes enumerated in the Major Crimes Act are serious but routine 
offenses of a local nature with significant local effects and few effects be­
yond the locality. Yet most federal juries are unlikely to include a single 
representative from the local Indian community where the offense occurred 
and likely will not even include a single person who lives within Indian 
country. If the Sixth Amendment's requirement of a jury that is fairly repre­
sentative of the community arises from the theory that the jury exists to 
ensure that the affected community plays a role in the provision of criminal 
justice within that community,261 then these purposes fail miserably in Indian 
country prosecutions. Because a federal jury is not composed of members of 
Indian reservation communities, it cannot claim to represent the Indian 
communities where major crimes occur. Thus, such juries do not ensure the 
legitimacy of criminal verdicts. 
4. Practical Effects of These Errors 
While such convictions are thus illegitimate as a formal matter, serious 
pragmatic ramifications follow from the errors in composing federal juries. 
First, actual substantive errors may well creep into verdicts. Substantive 
criminal law is replete with statutory language that calls for interpretations 
of language by the local community, through the jury, in adjudicating crime. 
For example, some crimes and defenses hinge on whether an action or per­
ception was "reasonable."262 The word "reasonable" is inherently subject to 
context and cultural norms. It is, to a large degree, an empty vessel that 
260. 1 8  u.s.c. § 1 1 5 1  (2000). 
26 1 .  See Massaro, supra note 146, at 546 ("One function of the jury, although not the only 
function, is to satisfy a community-centered interest in participation in the justice system by inject­
ing representative community voices and values into the decision process."). 
262. For example, the doctrine of self-defense uses the concept of reasonableness in numer­
ous contexts. A common statement of the rule of self-defense, for example, is that one is privileged 
to use "reasonable" force against an adversary if one "reasonably" believes that he is in danger and 
that such force is necessary to avoid the danger. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 10.4 (4th ed. 
2003). 
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l awmakers and courts intention ally le ave empty to be filled by jurors in any 
given c ase. In ot her words, t he jury is t he c arrier of cultur al norms of w hat is 
re ason able in any given community. A jury that is not represent ative of t he 
community m ay well provide t he wrong definition of t he word "re ason able," 
and t hereby re ach an erroneous verdict. Given t he open texture in herent in 
l angu age and t he peculi ar role of juries in providing me aning in different 
contexts, it is possible for suc h errors to occur in a v ariety of contexts in 
crimin al adjudic ations. 
Second, consider a pr actic al, but even more fund ament al problem. T he 
imp act and t he import ance of any sing le crimin al conviction lies in its 
bro ader me aning. E ac h  conviction derives its norm ative force from w hat 
crimin al l aw t heorist Henry H art c alled t he "mor al condemn ation of t he 
community."263 Indeed, expression of t he mor al condemn ation of t he com ­
munity is one of t he most profound purposes of t he crimin al justice 
system. Since, in Indi an country c ases, t he defend ant's community is ab­
sent, a convicted Indi an country defend ant is not likely to feel t he weig ht 
of t he condemn ation of his own community. He is t hus muc h less likely to 
feel t he mor al weig ht of t he verdict. T hat weig ht, w hich c auses t he defen­
d ant to feel s hame, is a power ful force driving t he re habilit ative effects of 
crimin al justice.2 64 Absent s hame, one of t he core purposes of punis hment 
will not be met. 
Jurors from outside Indi an country m ay be in some senses "imp arti al" as 
jurors, but they m ay very well be entirely uninterested. W hile suc h a jury 
mig ht be able to perform adequ ately t he simple t ask of me asuring t he evi­
dence ag ainst an objective leg al st and ard, we use juries for muc h more 
sop histic ated re asons. After all, a judge could perform the s ame t ask and yet 
t he Supreme Court has repe atedly s aid t hat a judge is not adequ ate to t he 
t ask.265 A jury not represent ative of t he community is no better t han a 
judge.2 66 It c annot be s aid to be serving any of t he ot her import ant v alues 
t hat the Supreme Court has discussed in dozens of c ases cited above. Suc h a 
jury is not "represent ative of t he community" or "f airly represent ative of t he 
loc al popul ation" as Taylor v. Louisiana267 s ays a jury must be. 268 
263. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, LAW & CONTEMP. PRoss., Summer 
1 958, at 401 ,  406 ( 1958). 
264. Toni M. Massaro, Shame, Culture, and American Criminal Law, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1 880, 
1 901  ( 1 99 1 )  (describing the sheer power of the emotion of shame which "strikes at the center of 
human personality" and "forces a downward redefinition of oneself'). To perhaps oversimplify, 
Professor Massaro is critical of modern efforts to leverage the shaming capabilities of criminal law 
precisely because shame is too powerful to be used in a humane manner. It is inherent in every 
criminal case. 
265. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 
266. And the ramifications are real. A judge sitting as a finder of fact in a bench trial decides 
cases differently than a jury. See Barry C. Feld, The Constitutional Tension Between Apprendi and 
McKeiver: Sentence Enhancements Based on Delinquency Convictions and the Quality of Justice in 
Juvenile Couns, 38 WAKE foREST L. REV. 1 1 1 1 , 1 1 6 1 -69 (2003). 
267. 4 1 9  U.S. 522, 537-38 ( 1975). 
268. In Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 483 ( 1 990), Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, 
noted that though the jury panel or venire must be representative of the community, it is to be ex-
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We might also questio n whether such juries are actually impartial. Ka­
gama' s admo nitio n that citize ns of the states i n  which the I ndia n 
reservatio ns are located are "ofte n [the I ndia ns' ] deadliest e nemies "269 may 
seem archaic a nd obsolete. 270 But while the relative "deadli ness " of state 
citize ns u ndoubtedly has decli ned to some degree si nce the Major Crimes 
Act was e nacted i n  the 1880s, state citize ns may not have the I ndia n cou ntry 
commu nities' best i nterests at heart. Racism a nd bias remai n stro ng ,  particu­
larly i n  states where I ndia ns compete with no n- I ndians for limited 
resources.271 Accordi ngly, juries draw n broadly from outside I ndia n reserva­
tio ns may not be "impartial " whe n a n  I ndian is a de fenda nt. 272 
I n  summary , the regular federal jury selection process simply does not 
allow the jury to serve its fundame ntal purpose i n  I ndia n country cases. 
These juries are not represe ntative of the commu nity that is targeted or af­
fected by the federal I ndia n cou ntry crimi nal justice regime. Neither 
Co ngress nor the courts have ever addressed this fundame ntal i ncohere nce 
i n  the compositio n of juries in  the I ndia n cou ntry crimi nal justice system. 
Because the jury 's chief import ance i n  America n crimi nal justice is to give 
the commu nity a role a nd because that role is crucial to the system's legiti­
macy, the verdicts produced through the existi ng jury process are not 
legitimate. The legacy of colo nizatio n is prese nt in  each of them. 
I V. PUBLIC ACCESS, VENUE, AND PUBLIC TRIALS 
Closely related to the jury compositio n problems i n  I ndia n cou ntry cases 
is a related set of issues in the co nstitutio nal doctri nes of publicity a nd 
ve nue. While jury compositio n pri nciples address which commu nity decides 
pected that representativeness will be diminished through peremptory strikes as the panel is reduced 
to an actual jury. Though representativeness will inevitably decrease, the jury's ability to judge the 
case impartially will increase. Id. 
269. United States v. Kagama, 1 1 8 U.S. 375, 384 ( 1 886). 
270. All Indians now have a right to be state citizens and to vote in state elections. Indian 
Citizenship Act of 1 924, Pub. L. No. 68- 1 75, 43 Stat. 253 ( 1 924) (now codified as part of 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1 40 1 ). 
27 1 .  THOMAS BIOLSI, "DEADLIEST ENEMIES": LAW AND THE MAKING OF RACE RELATIONS 
ON AND OFF ROSEBUD RESERVATION 2 (2001 )  (surveying the circumstances in South Dakota and 
finding "antagonism between reservation Indians and the surrounding populations does persist"); 
see Clinton, supra note 20, at 52 1 n.88; (asserting that juries in communities immediately adjacent 
to Indian reservations are likely to be more hostile to an Indian defendant, due to common racial 
prejudice, than a federal jury drawn from a broader cross-section of the population); Bryan H. Wil­
denthal, Fighting the Lone Wolf Mentality: Twenty-First Century Reflections on the Paradoxical 
State of American Indian Law, 38 TuLSA L. REV. 1 1 3, 1 45 (2002) (noting that the statement in 
Kagama "is still true to some extent"); see also King, supra note 1 67, at 77 ("[J]urors, like all of us, 
are influenced by stereotypes about racial groups and members of racial groups. Negative racial 
stereotypes produce a 'reverse halo effect' :  members of negatively stereotyped groups are assumed 
to possess negative traits. and positive information about them is devalued."); cf Arizona v. San 
Carlos Apache Tribe of Ariz., 463 U.S. 545, 566-67 ( 1983) (recognizing that there is "a good deal 
of force," to the argument that "[s]tate courts may be inhospitable to Indian rights"). See generally 
ELIZABETH COOK-LYNN, ANTI-INDIANISM IN MODERN AMERICA (200 1 ). 
272. Zuni Cruz, supra note 42, at 2 1 48 (citing "the prejudices of the jury pool" as one of the 
problems in a trial for a Navajo defendant being tried in state court for an off-reservation offense). 
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a case by focusin g on which community comprises the jury , the venue pro­
visions address which community hosts the trial. 
In recent years , transfers of venue in several hi gh profile cases , includ­
in g the trial of the Los An geles police officers who beat Rodney Kin g  and 
the New Yor k  City police o fficers who killed Amadou Diallo , have been the 
subject of scathin g academic and public commentary. 273 Such transfers raise 
concerns not only with re gard to the racial composition of the juries in the 
new venue of transfer , but also a more serious problem-the preclusion of 
the affected community from participatin g in and witnessin g the trial. But 
while the Kin g  and Diallo trials were extraordinary and received tremendous 
public attention , Indian country trials are always handled outside of Indian 
country. Thus , all Indian country cases are subject to the same basic flaws 
that spawned extensive criticism in t hese two extraordinary cases. 
This Part will address two types of issues that merit concerns for both 
defendants and communities in every Indian country case. First , it will dis­
cuss the defendant's and the public 's ri ght to access the trial. It will then 
273. For criticism of the venue transfer decision in the King case, see Erwin Chemerinsky, 
How Could the King Jury Do That?, LEGAL TIMES, May 1 1 , 1992, at 23 ("However well­
intentioned, the decision to change venue was highly questionable. The shift from Los Angeles to 
Simi Valley produced a significantly different demographic composition for the jury pool. Los An­
geles is ethnically and economically diverse. Simi Valley is virtually all white and suburban."); 
David P. Leonard, Different Worlds, Different Realities, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 863, 883 (2001 )  ("Had 
the case been tried in central Los Angeles, before a jury comprised, at least in part, of poor African 
Americans or others with similar life experiences, the defense argument that the police were react­
ing to a combative, potentially dangerous suspect almost certainly would have fallen on deaf ears. It 
would not have been difficult for jurors chosen from an inner city community to believe what their 
eyes were telling them-that the police officers brutally and unnecessarily beat an African American 
man who had committed no serious crime."); David Margolick, Switching Case to White Suburb 
May Have Decided Outcome, N.Y. TIMES, May I ,  1992, at A20 ("In fact, however, the outcome of 
the case may well have been decided when Judge Stanley Weisberg of California Superior Court 
transferred the case from the city to Simi Valley, an overwhelmingly white, conservative enclave that 
is the home of the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library."); Marvin Zalman & Maurisa Gates, Re­
thinking Venue in Light of the "Rodney King " Case: An Interest Analysis, 41 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 2 1 5, 
2 16  (2003) ("Soon after the verdict some legal observers suggested that an earlier decision to order 
a change of venue from urban Los Angeles to the suburban community of Simi Valley was the criti­
cal feature in the acquittal." (footnote omitted)). Similar disapproval surrounded the Diallo case in 
1 999. See Engel, supra note 149, at 1665 ("Recognizing that Los Angeles jurors are not Simi Valley 
jurors, nor Albany jurors Bronx jurors, leads to the conclusion that, before transferring a case, courts 
first must try to solve the problem of prejudice against the defendant in the original venue."); Josh 
Getlin, Cop Trial 's Move Roils New York, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 27, 1999, at A l  ("Judges 'made demo­
graphics destiny,' said Newfield, suggesting the court should have tried to find impartial jurors 
before moving the case. Now, he said, 'they have put New York on a path toward Simi Valley and 
Rodney King."'); Bob Herbert, Editorial, A Whitewash in Albany, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 1 999, at 
A23, ("The problem is that the five Appellate Division judges who ordered the change of venue 
went out of their way to shift the case to an almost lily-white comfort zone for the officers. The 
judges stomped all over the appearance of fairness when they deliberately placed the case out of the 
reach of black New Yorkers, who the judges seem to feel are by reason of their color incapable of 
considering the evidence in the case and rendering a fair verdict."); Editorial, The Wrong Venue, 
N.Y. T1MES, Dec. 1 8, 1 999, at A22 ("The decision by a state appellate court to move the criminal 
trial of four New York City police officers charged with the killing of Amadou Diallo to Albany 
County seems unjustified. The accused officers are presumed innocent and deserve a fair and impar­
tial trial, but there is no evidence that the people of the Bronx and New York City cannot be trusted 
with this trial. Moving the trial to Albany, a predominantly white area, could lessen the respect with 
which many residents of New York City view the verdict."). 
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discuss the issue of location of the trial, including the venue provisions and 
the implicit constitutional principle of vicinage.274 
A. Rights of Public Access to Criminal Trials 
Public access or publicity for criminal trials is guaranteed by two separate 
constitutional provisions. The Sixth Amendment protects the defendant's right 
to a public trial on the theory that the public will provide safeguards to corrup­
tion or oppression by government officials. The First Amendment creates a 
constitutional right of access to criminal trials for general members of the 
public who are not parties to the case.275 The Supreme Court has repeatedly 
emphasized the importance of public access in criminal trials. While the fed­
eral Indian country criminal justice regime may pose few formal barriers to 
public access, the regime creates substantial de facto barriers that prohibit 
meaningful public access to criminal trials and thus may violate the constitu­
tional rights of both the defendant and the Indian country community. 
1. The Source and Rationale for the Right to 
Public Trials and Public Access 
The Sixth Amendment explicitly guarantees the defendant's right to a 
public trial: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right 
to a speedy and public trial . . . .  "276 This provision protects the defendant in 
myriad ways. First and foremost, it "has always been recognized as a safe­
guard against any attempt to employ our courts as instruments of 
persecution."277 According to the Court, "contemporaneous review [of judi­
cial action] in the court of public opinion is an effective restraint on possible 
abuse of judicial power."278 Open proceedings-and publicity-also improve 
the quality of justice that the defendant receives by encouraging witness 
honesty and conscientiousness and sometimes providing an opportunity for 
unknown witnesses to come forward.
279 
However, the defendant is not the only player in the criminal justice 
scheme with important interests protected by public access. While the Su­
preme Court has refused to hold that the defendant's Sixth Amendment right 
protects the public,280 in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,281 the Court 
274. For those not familiar with the term, vicinage means simply "neighborhood." It is associ­
ated with a right at common law to be tried within the neighborhood or county where the crime 
occurred. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1 567 (6th ed. 1990). 
275. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Super. Ct., 457 U.S. 596, 603 ( 1982). 
276. U.S. CONST. amend VI. 
277. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 380 ( 1979) (quoting In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 
257, 270 ( 1 948)). 
278. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. at 270-7 1 .  
279. Gannett Co., 443 U.S. at 383. 
280. See id. at 383-84. 
28 1 .  448 U.S. 555 ( 1 980). 
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did reco gnize a ri ght ema nati ng from the First Ame ndme nt that protects the 
public 's ri ght of access to crimi nal trials. As a result, a First Ame ndme nt 
ri ght, possessed not by the defe nda nt but by the public, has a n  equally si g­
nifica nt role a nd also serves ma ny importa nt purposes. Cumulatively, the 
cases deali ng with the defe nda nt's Sixth Ame ndme nt public trial ri ghts a nd 
the public's First Ame ndme nt ri ghts to ope n access to trials produce literally 
doze ns of justificatio ns for the importa nt role that public access plays. 
Some justificatio ns are as broad as the usual justificatio ns for ope n gov ­
ernme nt :  public scruti ny has be neficial effects for a ny governme ntal 
fu nctio n,282 a nd the public must be able to see the governme nt 's work to 
evaluate it. 283 
Many of the justi ficatio ns are hi ghly specific to the crimi nal trial proc ­
ess. The ri ght of public access is ofte n justified, for example, by utilitarian 
philosophy about the operatio n of the justice system. The Supreme Court 
has held that "public access to crimi nal trials . . . is essential to the proper 
fu nctio ni ng of the criminal justice system."284 The Court has cited the writ­
i ngs of Hale a nd Blacksto ne a nd cited approvi ngly of Jeremy Be ntham's 
reco gnitio n that, be gi nning ce nturies a go, "ope n proceedi ngs e nha nced the 
performa nce of all i nvolved, protected the jud ge from imputatio ns of dis­
ho nesty, a nd served to educate the public." 285 
Some of the justificatio ns are not merely utilitaria n, but normative : 
" [P ]ublic proceedi ngs vi ndicate the co ncerns of the victims a nd the commu­
nity i n  k nowi ng that offe nders are being brought to accou nt for their 
crimi nal co nduct . . . .  " 286 The public has a "defi nite a nd co ncrete i nterest i n  
seei ng that justice is swiftly a nd fairly admi nistered."287 A nd some of the 
justificatio ns are both utilitaria n and normative. The Court has borrowed 
from Be ntham the notio n that trials have "si gnifica nt commu nity therapeutic 
value" that is served o nly with ope n access to trials : 
When a shocking crime occurs, a community reaction of outrage and pub­
lic protest often follows. Thereafter the open processes of justice serve an 
important prophylactic purpose, providing an outlet for community con­
cern, hostility, and emotion . . . .  The crucial prophylactic aspects of the 
administration of justice cannot function in the dark; no community ca­
tharsis can occur if justice is done in a corner or in a covert manner. [And] 
results alone will not satiate the natural community desire for "satisfac­
tion." A result considered untoward may undermine public confidence, and 
282. Gannett Co. , 443 U.S. at 4 1 2  (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
283. See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 464 U.S. 501 ,  507 ( 1984) [hereinafter 
Press-Enterprise /] ;  see also Press-Enterprise Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 478 U.S. I, 1 9  ( 1986) (Ste­
vens J., dissenting) [hereinafter Press-Enterprise II] ; Globe Newspaper Co. v. Super. Ct., 457 U.S. 
596, 604 (1982) (finding a First Amendment right of access to criminal trials designed to protect 
free discussion of government affairs). 
284. Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 12.  
285. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 569 & n.7. 
286. Id. at 509. 
287. Gannett Co., 443 U.S. at 383. 
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where the trial has been concealed from public view an unexpected out­
come can cause a reaction that the system at best has failed and at worst 
has been corrupted. 
288 
The Cou rt has also explained that without access , the community will not 
unde rstand the system in general or its particula r wo rkings in a speci fic 
case , and it is difficult for a community to accept what it cannot obse rve. 289 
In sum , the First and Sixth Amendments protect diffe rent so rts of inter­
ests . Whethe r viewed from the public's perspective or the defendant's , 
howeve r, public access is fundamental to the purposes of criminal trials. 
Without it , the defendant is denied key safeguards and the community is 
denied key pa rticipato ry inte rests , not the least of which are peace of mind , 
catharsis , and closure. Without access to the trial by the interested commu­
nity , neithe r the defendant's inte rests no r the public's interests are served. 
2. Public Access and Indian Country Defendants 
As explained above , t rials for local offenses in Indian count ry routinely 
occur mo re than a hundred miles away from the communities where the 
c rimes occu rred. 290 In light of the t remendous distances , deep poverty , and 
other daily facts of life on Indian rese rvations , the defendants , thei r families , 
the victims , the witnesses , and othe r membe rs of the community are often 
unable to attend c riminal t rials. 291 While the re may be no formal bar to ac­
cess , the federal regime's removal of the t rial from the community whe re the 
crime occurred to a distant city c reates a routine , de facto denial of public 
access to t rials. 
Consider that witnesses who appear in federal court by subpoena a re 
routinely reimbursed fo r  t ravel expenses , provided hotel rooms , and paid 
witness fees , even though the law requires them to appea r.292 In other words , 
though attendance is mandato ry and absence is punishable by contempt p ro­
ceedings , the fede ral government subsidizes their appearance. While such 
payments may well be necessa ry to vindicate the defendant's Fifth Amend­
ment right to due process and Sixth Amendment right to present witnesses , 
such payments seem to concede that witnesses sometimes cannot appear 
288. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 569-571 (internal citations omitted, but citing, 
among others, JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE ( 1 827)). 
289. Id. at 572. 
290. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
29 1 .  Admittedly, some o f  the same arguments might b e  made by any federal defendant i n  a 
large federal district. The federal districts with Indian country may be much larger than any federal 
districts that the Framers might have conceived of. Of the original colonies, even Virginia and New 
York are comparatively small by the standards of the Western and Midwestern states where Indian 
country jurisdiction exists. For most federal offenses, there is a legitimate national interest involved 
and the defendant's actions must affect national interests. Otherwise, presumably, there would be no 
federal jurisdiction. As noted above, however, Indian offenses are local in nature. 
292. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, INSTRUCTIONS FOR FACT WITNESSES APPEARING ON 
BEHALF OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FORM OBD 2 ( 1996), available at 
http://www.usmarshals.gov/prisoner/obd2.pdf. 
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without feder al assist ance. Give n  the po verty on I ndi an reser vatio ns, 1t 1s 
i ndisput able th at members of the Indi an commu nity ordi narily might also be 
u nable to atte nd feder al crimi nal tri als abse nt fi nanci al assist ance. 
Give n  th at de facto de ni als of access to Indi an cou ntry tri als c an be eas­
ily est ablished, at le ast i n  some c ases, the questio n is whether such 
circumst ances co nstitute effecti ve de ni al of the commu nity's First Ame nd­
me nt right to public access. A compelli ng argume nt c an be m ade th at they 
do. While not all of the justific atio ns for public access cited by the Court i n  
rece nt c ases require access by the affected community,293 most of the justif i­
c atio ns require, or, at a mi nimum, will be better served by, the i nvol veme nt 
of the specific commu nity i n  which the crime occurred. 
Co nsider first the defe nd ant's right to a public tri al as a crimi nal proce­
dur al s afegu ard. O ne st ated justific atio n for public tri als is to e nsure the 
"i ntegrity and qu ality" of the testimo ny offered at tri al 294 and to e ncour age 
wit nesses to perform their duties more co nscie ntiously. 295 Give n  those co n­
cerns, access by members of the affected commu nity -frie nds and 
neighbors, i n  other words, r ather th an str angers-is li kely to be much more 
effective i n  i nsuri ng wit ness co nscie ntious ness and ho nesty. Pr actic al ex­
perie nce suggests th at it is h arder to lie i n  fro nt of frie nds th an str angers. 
Indeed, the absence of any members of the relevant commu nity i n  the g al­
lery or o n  the jury m ay embolde n a wit ness who is pro ne to lie or m ay at 
le ast allow the wit ness to be more c areless with the facts. I n  such circum­
st ances, the wit ness is not directly accou nt able to his ow n commu nity for 
the testimo ny he provides. The wit ness's commu nity m ay well be e ntirely 
u naw are of the proceedi ng. At the s ame time, the cultur al gulf m ay re nder 
the wit ness less i nvested i n  and less respect ful of the feder al criminal justice 
process. It is, of course, the defe nd ant's ow n neighbors who are likely to be 
most co ncerned about any attempt to "employ [the ] courts as i nstrume nts of 
persecutio n"296 ag ai nst a member of their commu nity. 297 The Supreme Court 
h as also justified public access o n  the expect atio n th at publicity m ay "i n­
duce u nknow n wit nesses to come forw ard with relevant testimo ny."298 
293. As long as the trial is open at least to some portion of the public, some of the "open 
government" purposes will be met. However, general members of the public cannot provide the 
safeguard against governmental misconduct that members of the Indian country community could 
provide. Community members are likely to have both a greater sense of the context of the govern­
ment action and a keen incentive to conduct careful scrutiny; after all, it is their community that the 
crime has affected. 
294. See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 578 ( 1980). 
295. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 383 ( 1979). 
296. Id. at 380 (quoting In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270 (1 948)). 
297. One who believes in the right of jury nullification might recognize no opportunity for the 
Indian community to exercise the jury nullification power. See, e.g. , Paul D. Butler, Race-Based Jury 
Nullification: Case-in-Chief, 30 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 9 1 1 , 9 1 2- 1 3, 9 1 8-2 1 ( 1997) (arguing that 
minority jurors should exercise the power of jury nullification to overcome their marginalization as 
minorities in the political process and to serve as a political protest). 
298. Gannett Co. , 443 U.S. at 383. 
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Certainly, this cannot be so unless the specific community in which the wit­
nesses a re located has easy access to the trial.299 
3. Public Access and Indian Country Communities 
Though the defendant's inte rests sometimes ove rlap with the commu­
nity's, tum now from publicity as a safegua rd to the def endant to conside r 
the public's pa rticular inte rests in open access. Conside r for  example the 
"community the rapeutic" justification for  public t rials. Such a purpose sim­
ply cannot be se rved unless the affected community has access to the t rial. 
No othe r community will do. It is the affected community that will have a 
" fundamental , natural yearning to see justice done."300 It is the affected 
community that might otherwise engage in "venge ful self -help"301 if it is not 
satisfied with the process o r  the outcome. 
Indeed, this presents anothe r c ruel i rony of the existing system. Fede ral 
officials o riginally justified their asse rtion of need fo r  the Majo r Crimes Act 
at least pa rtially on the concern that absent f ede ral t rials, there would be an 
unending cycle of violence because victims would naturally seek revenge 
and the re was no t ribal forum to resolve these disputes. 302 Though that ar­
gument was dubious in context (tribes had methods of maintaining orde r 
that had wo rked for  centuries and this pa rticula r offense had been addressed 
by the t ribe in a traditional manner303), certainly one of the purposes for  a 
criminal justice system is to address w rongs within formal channels to p re­
vent info rmal efforts at revenge. But how can the c riminal justice system 
se rve this pu rpose if the relevant community is unawa re of the c riminal jus­
tice system's wo rk ? 304 Indeed, if revenge is a serious concern, the existing 
system does not address it ; acts of revenge might occur in Indian country 
because the community has no idea that "justice" has already been achieved. 
Public access does not necessa rily require actual members of the com­
munity in the court room. But since fede ral trials are not televised, they are 
299. While this argument is being made in the context of trial, the requirement of public ac­
cess also has been held to apply to other key stages of criminal proceedings. See, e.g., United States 
v. Alcantara, 396 F.3d 1 89 (2d Cir. 2005) (plea and sentencing hearings). 
300. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 571 ( 1 980). 
30 1 .  Id. 
302. See supra note 83 and accompanying text. 
303. See generally SIDNEY L. HARRING, CROW DOG'S CASE ( 1 994). 
304. In this regard, the Indian country criminal justice regime ironically fails also to meet 
another of the key original purposes of the federal Major Crimes Act. One ostensible purpose of the 
Major Crimes Act to involve Indians in the American criminal justice system in an effort to "civi­
lize" and assimilate them. In debate on the Act, one member of Congress repeatedly cited the 
Secretary of the Interior's arguments that such a law was needed for "civilizing the Indian race." 1 6  
CONG. REC. 934 (1885) (statement of Rep. Cutcheon). While such a purpose might be explicitly 
disavowed in the current era, such a purpose could never have been served with trials held hun­
dreds of miles from the Indian communities and without involvement from those communities. 
Such trials may have helped to "assimilate" the Indian defendant who was then convicted and 
served a term of imprisonment, but surely Congress did not mean to assimilate Indians one 
criminal defendant at a time. 
February 2006] American Indians, Crime, and the Law 771 
perhaps the least friendly forums for other forms of public access. In Indian 
country, it is likely that most t ribal members are not even aware of distant 
federal c riminal trials even while they are occur ring. Few Indian country 
cases are covered in the popular press such as local television news pro­
grams or la rge daily ne wspapers.30 And while some local communities may 
have week ly or monthly newspapers that serve Indian country communi­
ties,3 06  fe w report on f ederal criminal trials. 
To put the real world rami fications of an Indian country p rosecution in 
the plain words of an Indian who served as a United States Attorney, the 
federal proceedings a re practically meaningless to the Indian community : 
" five Indian def endants are arrested on the reservation for the assault and 
robbery and taken to federal court in Rapid City. Two of them eventually 
return to the rese rvation, but three of them don't come back ; folks on the 
reservation don't really know why."307 As a result of this lack of understand­
ing of the federal criminal process and the particular facts of individual 
t rials , the existing system provides none of the of the "community therapeu­
tic" benefits thought to be served by public trials. 
The Supreme Court has repeatedly justi fied open access on the theory 
that it enhances not only basic f airness itself, but equally importantly, the 
appearance of fairness within the judicial system.308 Given that the Indian 
country c riminal justice system has famously -and fairly -been character­
ized by legal scholars as a "jurisdictional maze ,"3 09 it is fair to speculate that 
there may be fundamental parts of the system that are poorly understood by 
the average member of an Indian co mmunity. 
The simplest way to convey the Supreme Cou rt's "legitimacy " argument 
is to recognize that people are inherently suspicious of that which they do 
not understand. Like the proverbial tree that falls in the forest, does a trial 
that occurs hundreds of miles from the Indian community where the crime 
occurred reverberate with justice or f airness ? By virtue of the federal courts' 
practical inaccessibility to the Indian community, federal Indian country 
c riminal trials fail to educate Indian co mmunities generally about the proc­
ess of federal criminal law or speci fically about the facts of individual cases. 
Absent involvement by the affected community, a trial cannot assure the 
305. Kara Briggs et al., The Reading Red Report, Native Americans in the News: A 2002 
Report and Content Analysis on Coverage by the Largest Newspapers in the United States (2002) 
(unpublished report), http://www.naja.com/resources/publications/2002_reading_red.pdf (finding a 
pattern of lack of coverage and uninformed coverage following a statistical analysis of the reportage 
in eight of the largest American newspapers about American Indians and tribes). 
306. One example is the Gallup Independent which occasionally presents articles addressing 
Indian country criminal issues related to the Navajo Nation. See INDEP. (Gallup, N.M.), 
http://www.gallupindependent.com (last visited Nov. 1 3, 2005). 
307. Discussion with Philip Hogen, former United States Attorney of South Dakota, Washing­
ton, D.C. (September 2 1 ,  2005). 
308. Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. 501 ,  508 (1984). 
309. Clinton, supra note 20; Richard W. Garnett, Once More into the Maze: United States v. 
Lopez, Tribal Self-Determination, and Federal Conspiracy Jurisdiction in Indian Country, 72 N.D. 
L. REV. 433 ( 1996); William V. Vetter, A New Corridor for the Maze: Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction 
and Nonmember Indians, 1 7  AM. INDIAN L. REV. 349 ( 1 992). 
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legitimacy o f  the criminal justice system in general or the verdict issued in 
any given case. 
Perhaps most importantly, federal Indian country trials undermine the 
most basic moral underpinnings of the criminal law. I f  a de fendant does not 
feel the weight o f  moral judgment o f  his own community, he may not be 
con fronted with his own actions in a way that would cause him to regret the 
actions that gave rise to his criminal offense. This harms both the de fendant 
and the community and frus trates both the rehabilitative and retributive pur­
poses o f  criminal law. 
4. Public Trials and Self-Government 
Jury t rials and access to these trials by the general public are fundamen­
tally designed to preserve public participation in government. In a lengthy 
concurrence in Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, Justice Stevens indi­
cated that a primary mission o f  First Amendment was to secure meaning ful 
public control over the process o f  governance. 310 He explained this mission 
in the context o f  public t rials: 
[T]he First Amendment serves to ensure that the individual citizen can ef­
fectively participate in and contribute to our republican form of self­
government. . . .  Our system of self-government assumes the existence of 
an informed citizenry . . . . It follows that a claim to access cannot succeed 
unless access makes a positive contribution to this process of self-
3 1 1  
governance. 
The words of Justice Stevens highlight the dissonance that exists in In ­
dian count ry criminal justice. I f  the fundamental aim o f  the First 
Amendment protection o f  public access to criminal trials is to prese rve the 
communities control over government, that is, its sel f-government, then In­
dians and Indian tribes have been wronged twice over. First, the Indian 
country criminal justice system displaced tribal governance over the most 
impo rtant criminal justice issues on the reservation. It then denied the Indian 
community the participato ry rights that most other American communities 
have in their federal criminal justice system. 
B. Venue, Vicinage, and Place of Trial 
The Constitution addresses concerns similar to those outlined above in 
the venue p rovisions . The Constitution addresses the broad issue o f  venue 
by p roviding that criminal trials shall be held in the state in which the crime 
occu rred. 312 Though this mandate, in the past, was codi fied in federal law,313 
3 1 0. Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 5 1 9  (Stevens, J., concurring). 
3 1 1 .  Id. at 5 1 8- 19  & n.4 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citations and footnotes omitted). 
3 1 2. U.S. CoNsT. art. m, § 2. 
3 1 3. See 28 U.S.C. § 1 393, repealed by Pub. L. 1 00-702, Title X, § I OOl (a), 1 02 Stat. 4664 
( 1 988). 
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it is currently addressed in the rules of criminal procedure. Rule 18 of the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure re quires that generally "the gove rn­
ment must prosecute an o ffense in a district where the offense was 
committed."314 It further re quires the court to "set the place of trial within the 
district with due regard for the convenience of the defendant and the wit-
,,3 1s nesses . . . .  
The Sixth Amendment addresses a related but somewhat narrower con­
cept of vicinage. It holds that the jury shall be drawn from the " State and 
district wherein the crime shall have been committed. "3 16 According to Pro­
fessor Akhil Amar, the narrow vicinage requirement in the Sixth 
Amendment arose directly from conce rns by the Anti-Federalists who 
"wanted an explicit guarantee that juries would be organi zed around local 
rather than statewide communities. "3 17 As a result, Amar views the jury as an 
"institution of localism and popular sovereignty ."318 
One reason for the narrow vicinage right was to ensure that the trial was 
"public" in every meaning ful sense. In a world with far fewer media outlets 
than today's world, Professor Amar explains, "the public trial was designed 
to in fuse public knowledge into the trial itself, and, in tu rn, to satisfy the 
pu blic that truth had prevailed . . . .  "3 19 The public trial was designed to en ­
sure values of "democratic openness and education, public confidence, 
anticorruption, and truth seeking."3 20 
Amar believes that the decision to use the word "district " rather than the 
common law term "vicinage " in the Sixth Amendment reflects a compro ­
mise by the founders to allow a political branch to make the ultimate 
decision. Thus, Congress would determine the scope of any "vicinage" right 
simply by defining judicial districts.3 21 Another commentator, Steven Engel, 
would go farther than Amar. Engel has argued that the vicinage presumption 
"inhered in the very notion of trial by jury " and was so fundamental to the 
common law legal tradition that the right to a jury of the vicinage did not 
need to be preserved explicitly.3 22 Engel highlights the adjudicative quality 
of the local jury, which is likely to be more familiar with the context of the 
crime and thus less likely to convict the innocent than a jury from a di fferent 
3 14. FED. R. CRIM . P. 1 8. 
3 1 5. Id. 
3 1 6. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
3 1 7. AMAR, supra note 1 38, at I 05. 
3 1 8. Id. at 106. 
3 1 9. Id. at 1 1 3.  
320. Id. 
32 1 .  While the right t o  a local jury was i n  some sense a safeguard fo r  the defendant, i t  was not 
the most protective safeguard. That approach might have been, for example, to select a jury from his 
own home state. Thus, the "district" requirement represented a compromise between the competing 
interests of the defendant and the community in which the crime occurred. See AMAR, supra note 
1 38, at 8 1-1 1 8; see also Massaro, supra note 1 46, at 508 (tracing the meaning of "district" in the 
Sixth Amendment). 
322. Engel, supra note 1 49, at 1 69 1 .  
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community.3 23 He als o vaunts the representative nature of the local jury , 
highlighting the jury's role as the "democratic branch" of the judiciary with 
the responsibility of "injecting the v oice of the community into the admini­
stration of the laws."3 24 Finally , he notes the importance of the jury acting as 
the "voice" of the local community ; as a result of the transfers of the King 
and Diall o trials , he argues , the juries in those cases had no claim t o  speak 
for the affected communities and thus the verdicts were not viewed as le -• • 3 25 g 1t 1mate. 
Engel's argument for a vicinage right rests not just within the Sixth 
Amendment , but als o within the First Amendment right of access cases dis­
cussed previ ously as well as cases , such as Powers v. Ohio,3 26 which 
recognize the right of individual jurors to serve on juries , or at least n ot to 
be arbitrarily excluded. 
While Engel's argument that there is an implicit constitutional vicinage 
right is compelling , Indian defendants and communities do not need to c on­
vince courts t o  go nearly s o  far. Indian country communities need only to 
have c ourts recognize a much more modest vicinage right ; that is , the vici­
nage right should be coextensive with the court's ge ographical 
jurisdiction.3 27 F or Indian country offenses under the Major Crimes Act and 
the General Crimes Act ,3 28 the geographical jurisdicti on of the court extends 
only to Indian c ountry. 
Given the imp ortance of the First and Sixth Amendments and the gen­
eral importance of the jury in American criminal justice , the problems 
identi fied above strike at the c ore of the Indian country criminal justice sys­
tem. Whether the legal argument is presented as a right to a public trial , 
public access , venue , or vicinage , trials in Indian country fail t o  square with 
fundamental constitutional values. As a result , Indian defendants and Indian 
communities are subjected to a federal criminal justice process that is of 
dubious constitutional and moral legitimacy. 
323. Id. at 1 693-95. 
324. Id. at 1 696. 
325. Id. at 1 698-99. 
326. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 406 ( 1 99 1 )  ("The opportunity for ordinary citizens to 
participate in the administration of justice has long been recognized as one of the principal justifica­
tions for retaining the jury system."). 
327. Even if Amar's view is correct that any constitutional vicinage right is limited by Con­
gress's definition of district, Congress has done a curious job of defining federal judicial districts. 
Consider that the State of Oklahoma is divided into three judicial districts while the State of Ari­
zona, a much larger and more populous state, constitutes only one judicial district. The result is that 
jurors (as well as defendants, witnesses, or victims) in Oklahoma are, on average, far closer to the 
federal criminal trials that arise in their communities than jurors in Arizona. Such a regime poses a 
disparate burden on Indian communities in Arizona. 
328. One remaining question is whether such reasoning could be extended to prosecutions in 
federal enclaves, such as military bases. In those circumstances, some of the arguments are equally 
compelling; however, those cases involve particular reasons for the federal jurisdiction that are 
fundamentally different than Indian reservations, and the background tribal sovereignty, the notion 
that there is a pre-existing sovereign that has been shunted aside, is absent. 
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V. A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS OF REFORM 
Th e existing federal syst em has many flaws and som e of th ese flaws ar e 
s erious. Ind eed, they strike at th e v ery h eart of th e l egitimacy of the syst em. 
Th e issues rais ed h er ein must b e  addr ess ed if any m eaning ful r eform of In­
dian country criminal justic e is to occur. Th e fram ework for r eform is, 
how ev er, not obvious. 
On e could r ead th e critical analysis s et forth abov e and make a reason­
able argument that th e federal Indian country criminal justic e syst em is not 
fatally flaw ed, but that it has stray ed from its own guiding norms. Thus, on e 
might "r eform" th e existing fed eral syst em simply by st eering it back to its 
foundational norms and without oth erwis e looking outside that system. 
Tr em endous improv ements might b e  achi eved simply by applying exist­
ing f ed eral norms mor e car efully and appropriat ely. For exampl e, the 
pros ecutorial function should be modifi ed so that the pros ecutor execut es 
h er r esponsibility in a mann er consist ent with th e th eor etical foundations for 
th e exercis e of pros ecutorial pow er. Likewis e, jury composition should pro­
c eed in accordanc e with the fundamental Sixth Amendment norm of 
community r epr es entativeness. It might w ell b e  possible to impl em ent vari­
ous r elativ ely mod est r eforms to th e existing syst em that would help th e 
federal syst em achi ev e  complianc e with its own norms. 
Working on an approach to fixing th e federal syst em, how ever, is not 
n ec essarily th e appropriat e plac e to b egin. A s erious effort at r eforming 
criminal justic e in Indian country ought also to look outside th e federal sys­
t em. Put anoth er way, th e r eform analysis ought to b egin on e st ep prior to 
evaluation and r eform of th e fed eral syst em. Such an effort might b egin by 
asking wh eth er th e federal government is th e prop er gov ernmental institu­
tion to provide law enforc ement and criminal justic e on Indian r eservations. 
Aft er all, th e f ed eral governm ent is only on e of th e possibl e providers of 
criminal justice and public safety on Indian r es ervations. 
In th e Unit ed Stat es today, there  ar e thr ee differ ent provid ers of criminal 
justic e in Indian country. In addition to th e federal system, many tribal sys­
t ems ar e involved in criminal justic e, though th eir jurisdiction is limit ed to 
misdem eanors.329 And in some stat es (thos e in which Public Law 280 or 
similar laws pr evail), stat e and local gov ernments hav e criminal jurisdiction 
on Indian r es ervations. A car eful focus on r eform of criminal justic e in In­
dian country would evaluate each of th es e  three governm ent-types and 
d et ermin e which is b est suited to th e important r esponsibility of Indian 
country criminal justic e. Each of th e three gov ernment types has advantag es 
and disadvantag es compar ed to th e oth ers. 
For example, while th e existing fed eral syst em has all of th e problems 
s et forth above (and mor e), stat e authority in this r ealm also pos es some 
probl ems. Although th e fundamental g eographic and accountability issu es 
pos ed by pros ecutions by distant fed eral pros ecutors might b e  mitigat ed by 
us e of local stat e pros ecutors, new probl ems might aris e. Giv en that th e 
329. See Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1 302 (2000) . 
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federal system was justi fied by the n oti on that l ocal state citi zens were the 
tribe's "deadliest enemies," we might see seri ous pushback and c oncern by 
tribes in resp onse to  a pr op osal t o  tum criminal auth ority over t o  the states. 
The cavalry effect that a fflicts federal pr osecut ors might simply be replaced 
by s omething even more pernici ous. The pr oblem of federal declinati on and 
underpr osecuti on c ould well be exacerbated or might even morph int o the 
opposite problem with an elected l ocal pr osecutor using aggressive pr osecu­
ti ons of Indians in some cases as a race-baiting appeal t o  the w orst 
tendencies of majority white v oters in rural districts. In other w ords, the 
p olitical stakes in the outside c ommunity neighb oring the reservati on c ould 
have negative effects on criminal justice on the reservati on. Yet, despite the 
pr oblems related to  federal and state pr osecut ors, real c oncerns might be 
raised in s ome quarters ab out giving tribes m ore power over criminal jus­
tice. To outsiders (and s ometimes t o  insiders), tribal governments are 
s ometimes viewed as being tugged in inappr opriate directi ons by warring 
p olitical facti ons and the reputati ons of tribal officials are sometimes tar­
nished by asserti ons of c orrupt ibility. As a result, s ome might view the 
independence and lack of acc ountability of federal prosecut ors as a distinct 
advantage that helps them, in m ost cases, t o  make charging decisi ons in a 
fairer and more objective fashi on. As this analysis of the pr osecut orial func­
ti on illustrates, care ful analysis for purp oses of a reform agenda is a 
c omplex task. 
M ore over, any such analysis sh ould rec ognize that the soluti on may n ot 
involve a winner -take-all appr oach for the federal, state, or tribal g overn­
ments. Because there are ways t o  split the criminal justice functi on between 
g overnments, it is imp ortant als o t o  examine the respective roles that each 
g overnment might play as t o  each instituti onal functi on. F or example, the 
average Indian c ountry case n ow involves federal pr osecut ors appearing 
before what am ounts t o  state juries. And, thr ough a self -g overnment c on­
tract, an Indian tribe may well have pr ovided the p olice investigative 
services used in the case. In essence, the existing scheme is often one of 
hybrid r oles. It is imp ortant t o  rec ogni ze the fluidity of current allocati ons of 
power and t o  rec ogni ze the p ossibility that such a hybridi zed or shared ju­
risdicti onal approach might be m ore fruit ful than seeking to  place all 
functi ons within only one government. 
In sum, a c omprehensive analysis of reform must take a sober l ook at 
the three governmental opti ons and must c ompare and c ontrast th e utility of 
each in pr oviding criminal justice in Indian c ountry. In taking a hard l ook at 
key p orti ons of the federal system as it currently operates in Indian c ountry, 
this article has s ought to  begin that pr ocess. 
C ONCLUSION 
The C onstituti on implicitly and explicitly rec ogni zes that crime is a l o­
cal pr oblem and sh ould be addressed by l ocal instituti ons. Tw o of the key 
instituti ons of American criminal justice, pr osecut or and juries, have been 
designed in such a way t o  execute this fundamental c onstituti onal n orm. 
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Bo th prosecutors and juries, however, fail to meet their constitutionally en­
visioned responsibili ties in federal Indian country cases, primarily because 
they do no t embrace the Consti tution's clear preference for local criminal 
justice solu tions to local crime problems. 
In most of the United States, addressing violent ac ts in criminal trials is 
an expressive communi ty ac t. Indeed, most felony prosecutions in this coun­
try are conducted under the direct au thority of prosecu tors who are elec ted 
by the community they serve. Because the Indian coun try is deal t out of i ts 
criminal jus tice sys tem, the process of criminal jus tice on Indian reserva­
tions is nei ther an affirma tion of communi ty mores nor a formalized 
expression of community outrage. To the local community, it is, a t  bes t, a 
hollow effort. At wors t, i t  is simply another imposition of authori ty by a 
foreign governmen t that does no t even seriously intend to occupy the soil 
upon which it seeks to impose i ts will. It is a relic of the colonialis t roots of 
the American criminal jus tice sys tem. 
The preference for local control in the American criminal justice system 
has animated the Cons titution for more than two centuries, and that has been 
ins ti tu tionalized in norms of American constitu tional criminal procedure 
since shortly after the Civil War. It is perhaps ironic that this preference for 
local communi ty control has a parallel in federal Indian policy. In the las t 
three decades, Congressional Indian policy has adop ted the rhetoric of 
" tribal self-de termina tion." Local communi ty represen tation in criminal jus­
tice and tribal self-de termina tion in other areas of governance really are not 
tha t  different. Indeed, the theories underlying local criminal justice and 
tribal self-de termina tion spring from the same sources of liberal poli tical 
philosophy and are designed to serve similar interes ts. Thus, while the de­
nial of tribal self-determination has constitu tional ramifications for a federal 
criminal jus tice system tha t  denies local con trol of the key insti tutions of 
criminal justice, tribal self-determina tion may offer one possible route out of 
the exis ting morass. 
If a fundamen tal principle of American governance and of criminal ju­
risprudence is that crime and criminal justice are local issues, then Indian 
communi ties deser ve a far greater role in the criminal justice system tha t  
affec ts them. The United S ta tes Cons ti tution may well demand it. 
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